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Attitudes to risk have generated a lot of attention over the years due to its vital 
importance in decision-making processes that are necessary for life and livelihoods. 
Attitudes towards uncertainty have received less attention even though arguably most 
important decisions are under uncertainty rather than risk. In addition, many studies 
modelling attitudes to risk have adopted experiments that place significant cognitive 
burden on respondents. Crucially, they are also framed in a way that do not reflect 
everyday problems. Specifically, the most common way of eliciting attitudes is to ask 
decision makers to choose between discrete monetary lotteries with known 
probabilities attached to the payoffs. Yet, arguably, the vast majority of choices that 
people make in their day-to-day lives are with respect to continuous non-monetary 
outcomes. To address these gaps, this thesis investigates responses to continuous 
‘prospects’ across different conditions (risk & uncertainty), contexts (monetary & time) 
and content domains (gain, loss & mixed). Further, this thesis examines the link 
between attitudes to risk/uncertainty and mental health related factors and the effect 
of attitudes to risk and uncertainty on farmers’ decisions both for themselves and for 
others. 
This thesis uses both non-parametric methods - relating to the patterns that 
characterise participants’ choices and their determinants; and parametric models – 
based upon cumulative prospect theory (CPT) as it extends to continuous prospects. 
The data were gathered using lab-in-field experiments in which Nigerian farmer’s chose 
between pairs of prospects with continuous distributions, which were not exclusively 
monetary in nature.  Attitudes towards risk, as opposed to uncertainty were elicited by 
specifying that all outcomes over the specified interval were ‘equally likely’ (thus a 
uniform probability density).  Uncertainty was specified by indicating to farmers that 
one outcome within the specified interval would be realised but without the 
specification of an associated probability density. 
Key findings are that attitudes differ under different conditions, contexts and 
content domains. Using continuous prospects, respondents did not treat equally likely 
outcomes as ‘equally likely’ and appear to demonstrate cumulative probability 
distribution warping consistent with the CPT.  However, there were behaviours that are 
difficult to reconcile with CPT such as the preferences of many respondents could only 
be modelled using “extreme curvature” of the value function. This was induced by what 
we term negligible gain avoidance (i.e. avoiding prospects with zero lower bound in the 
gain domain) or negligible loss seeking (i.e. preferring prospects with zero upper bound 
in the loss domain) behaviours. CPT, Salience theory, Heuristics and other theories 
examined in this study could not alone explain these behaviours. Results from 
investigating the effect of bipolar disorder tendencies (BD) on risk attitudes show 
that BD significantly affects the shape of the value and probability weighting 
functions; and farmers that have BD are more likely to make random choices. Other 
results show that risk aversion for losses increases participation in off-farm income 
generating activities; and that farmers’ likelihood to engage in specific types of off-
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Background of the Study 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Hardly any ‘real world’ decisions are made without some degree of uncertainty 
and/or risk. Much has been reported about the risk attitudes1 of people, including 
farmers, but there has been less attention to uncertainty. Yet, farming decisions  are 
permeated with uncertainties ranging from - the unpredictable nature of weather, 
household health and government legislation - to fluctuating input and output 
prices. As a result, farmers’ attitudes towards risk and/or uncertainty are pivotal to 
their decisions (Bard & Barry, 2001; Haneishi et al., 2014; Bauer & Buchholz, 2008; 
Sengupta, 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012).  
Numerous studies have now made contributions that provide insights into decision-
makers’ (DMs’) attitudes to risk and uncertainty. These studies have been driven by 
multidisciplinary perspectives including mathematics, economics and psychology. 
Each are directed at examining and rationalizing risk and uncertainty attitudes. 
However, there is a lack of consensus on the estimation methods, suitable elicitation 
tools and techniques. Specifically, risky and uncertain decision-making theories and 
methods have not been exhaustively tested. Thus, the extent to which theories about 
uncertain and risky choice reflect actual behaviour is not fully known. 
This study examines attitudes to risk and uncertainty by farmers in Nigeria and 
connects the findings with other important farm issues including the relationship 
between mental health related factors and risk or uncertainty attitudes; and the 
effect these attitudes to risk and uncertainty have on farmers’ day-to-day decisions 
both for themselves and for others. The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
problems, motivate the research questions and guide the reader as to the specific 
objectives of this thesis. 
                                                          
1 Attitudes in this context refers to a decision maker’s mental disposition with respect to a state. 
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1.1  Problem Statement 
Mixed inferences about risk and uncertainty attitudes and its implications 
In the broader literature, the nomenclature of risk and uncertainty is not used in a 
standardised way. The applied literature uses the term risk, when it probably means 
uncertainty. The distinction between risk and uncertainty is discussed in section 2.1 
of Chapter 2.  However, at this point it is necessary to mention that the working 
definition of risk adopted in this thesis is a DM faced with a situation in which the 
associated probability density of realising outcomes is specified and the DM has this 
information. As for the case of uncertainty, the DM has insufficient information of 
the associated probability density but has information that one outcome within an 
interval will occur.  
Farmers in developing countries have frequently been reported to have 
homogenous mostly ‘risk-averse’ attitudes. Several of these studies have also 
assumed that risk and uncertainty attitudes are personality traits thus it is stable 
across context and content domains (e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977; Paunonen & 
Jackson, 1996). However, much recently there has been disagreement about the risk 
attitudes of small farmers. Some authors have reported that - far from conforming 
to the stereotype of extremely risk averse that small farmers have often assumed to 
be – there is evidence that farmers may be risk neutral (as in Vieider, Truong, 
Martinsson, & Nam, 2013) or risk seeking (see Henrich & McElreath, 2002; Maertens, 
Chari & Just, 2014). These authors have argued in favour of domain-specific 
construct which implies individual are not consistently risk-taking or risk-averse 
across domains but that attitudes depend on the domain and ‘size’ of the prospects. 
In Nigeria, a the Top-Down2 approach is operated and farmers rely on the 
government for support; the assumed stereotypic ‘risk averse’ attitude of farmers 
by the government has influenced the nature of agricultural policies, projects and 
support of successive governments towards farmers. For example, in order to 
encourage production the marketing board policy provided a guaranteed return for 
                                                          
2 The top-down approach refers to a system where all planning and intervention is at the national 
level without any participation in the decision making process by the farmers who are supposed to 
be beneficiaries.  This method has the demerits of one-way flow of information without room for 




farmers’ produce though at prices substantially lower than market prices. However, 
in most cases the objectives of these policies are usually not met (Nwankwo & 
Wolfgang, 2008; Olubiyo et al., 2009). One of the factors attributed to these failures 
(e.g. considering the case mentioned above where the post-marketing era witnessed 
higher production) has been poor situation assessment (Olarinde, Manyong & 
Akintola, 2010) and crucially the lack of consideration that risk attitude of farmers 
may be domain specific and dependent on the outcomes of the prospects3.  
It has been suggested in some studies (e.g. Isik, 2002; Cervantes-Godoy, Kimura & 
Antón, 2013) that for such policies to be effective (at the same time not being an 
additional source of institutional or policy risk), it must be attuned with farmers’ 
risk attitudes. Therefore, there is a need to broaden the scope of research on small 
farmers’ risk and uncertainty attitudes in Nigeria4 across contexts and content 
domains. This motivates further investigation of farmers’ risk and uncertainty 
attitude in order to provide plausible information that will serve as a guide to policy 
makers as well as strengthen the broader literature on risk and uncertainty. 
Much has been reported about the risk attitudes of farmers in developing countries. 
However, studies on uncertainty are limited. It is evident that important farm 
decisions are taken under uncertainty as much as under risk. Several studies 
including Abdellaoui et al., (2010) and Heath & Tversky (1991) have provided 
evidence that individual DM can differentiate between risky and uncertainty 
prospects and have distinct attitude to both. It could be that the sparse research in 
this area is a result of limited number of acceptable theories on which to model 
empirical findings (e.g. De Palmer et al., 2008) on one hand, or to the proliferation 
of normative models that are unable to empirically describe the choices under 
uncertainty on the other hand.  
 
                                                          
3 The context in which ‘prospect’ is referred to here is outcomes that have probability densities 
attached to it. 
4 Currently most studies in Nigeria have focused on determinants of risk attitude (e.g. Aye & Oji, 
2007; Nmadu, Eze & Jirgi, 2012) or the effect of different variables such as income and consumption 
on risk attitude (Adewumi, Ayinde, Olatunji & Ajayi, 2012). Others estimated risk attitude from 
observed levels of products and inputs use (see Olarinde, Manyong & Akintola, 2007). Only a few 
have used psychometric scales on specific domains. 
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Making decision on behalf of others in Agriculture 
Studies in the decision-making literature have focused on risk attitudes when 
making decision for oneself. However, in many situations, people make decisions on 
behalf of others. Crucially, this aspect has not received the much-needed attention. 
Proxy decision making in this context refers to making decision for someone on 
his/her request. Although decision by proxy is not widespread in agriculture as it is 
in medicine or public policy, there are also notable cases of such in farming. For 
instance in Nigeria, owing to the limited number of extension agents small farmers 
in most cases; have to work with opinion leaders or model/contact farmer who are 
in direct contact with extension agents. These opinion leaders reach decisions that 
may be binding for farmers, who share the consequences of such decisions. Given 
the evidence that risk attitudes have significant impact on decision (e.g. as 
documented in Domingo, Parton, Mullen, & Jones, 2015; Wossen, Berger & Di Falco, 
2015; Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen, 2016); and the negative consequence of a ‘wrong’ 
decision on entire livelihoods of smallholder farmers in developing countries; there 
is need to investigate further risk and uncertainty attitudes in proxy decision-
making. 
Biological/Physiological traits and Risk/Uncertainty Attitudes 
Biological/physiological traits may influence risk and uncertainty attitudes; and 
may well be related to individuals’ decision-making behaviour. However, limited 
number of studies have investigated the links between such factors and attitudes 
towards risk and uncertainty. There is literature suggesting that individuals with 
certain mood disorders are high goal-orientated and risk seeking. For instance, it is 
reported that in contrast to non-bipolar5 individuals, those having bipolar disorder 
(BD hereafter) show impulsive behaviour (Johnson et al., 2012; Reddy et al., 2014) 
and become risk seeking/averse in certain states (Leahy, 1999). However, studies 
investigating the relationship between BD and farmers’ risk or uncertainty attitudes 
is lacking. Although this link have not been given attention in developed countries, 
                                                          
5 Bipolar Disorder (BD) commonly referred to as a mood disorder wherein episodes of both elevated 
and depressed mood is experienced by the individual and may be associated with distress and 
impairment of function (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 1994).  
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the reports that about 33% of adult Nigerians (compared to about 18.5% in the US6 
for instance) have suffered one form of mental illness (Owoyemi, 2013 as cited in 
Oyewunmi, Oyewunmi, Iyiola & Ojo 2015, Onyemelukwe, 2016; Suleiman, 2016) 
suggest the need for research in this area. More so, given the statistics that about 
37% (i.e. approximately 70 million) of the Nigerian population are farmers 
(International Labour Organization, 2017), this thesis hypothesizes that a 
significant number of those predicted to be at risk of mental health related illness7 
in Nigeria could be farmers. It therefore becomes necessary to examine from these 
perspective whether mental health factors affects the Nigerian farmers’ risk and 
uncertainty attitudes, which in turn can affect their livelihood. 
Risk, uncertainty attitudes and the implications for farm decision  
Small farmers especially in low/middle income countries are exposed to numerous 
uncertainties and risks but have fewer options to cope as formal institutions or 
policy instruments do not provide commensurate protection. Consequently, their 
livelihood is vulnerable. Off-farm employment has been documented as a significant 
risk coping strategy particularly among those who have the intent of cushioning 
production risk (Lamb, 2003) or the risk of income shortfall (Berg (2001); Mishra 
& Goodwin, (1997)).  According to van Winsen et al., (2014), risk seeking farmers 
are more proactive in their attitudes and strive towards curtailing risk through 
means such as farm diversification and farm business optimization. McNamara & 
Weiss (2001) posited that a key signal of risk aversion among farmers lies in the 
proportion of time spent on the farm enterprise and off-farm labour. However, not 
much of current research have focused on determining what links exist between 
farmers’ risk and uncertainty attitudes and their farm and off-farm decisions. The 
closest studies to investigate this relationship are Bezabih, Gebreegziabher, 
GebreMedhin & Gunnar, (2010) and Iqbal, Ping, Abid, Kazmi & Rizwan, (2016). 
However, the details of experimental procedures used in the former to characterise 
                                                          




7 Currently in Nigeria, the statistics showing the proportion of people having mental health related 
issues classified as BD is about 0.63% according to Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME), 2017. This puts BD as the fourth prevalent mental and substance use disorders behind 
depression, anxiety, and alcohol use. See Appendix 10 for statistics on bipolar disorder in Nigeria. 
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risk preference is vague while for the latter, the experiments and methodology differ 
from this thesis. 
Methodological issues 
Several authors (including Schoemaker, (1993); Huber, Wider & Huber, (1997); 
Weber, Blais & Betz, (2002); Harrison, Humphrey & Verschoor, (2010)) have found 
that different models of choice and varing analytical design leads to different 
inferences about the risk attitudes of the DM. There are several reasons for these 
disparities, which includes differences in underlying theories, methodologies and 
elicitation techniques. 
In order to model attitudes towards uncertainty of a DM, a number of methods have 
evolved in recent times. However, such theories and methods including  Expected 
Utility theory (EUT), Prospect theory (PT), Rank Dependant Utility theory (RDU), 
Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT), Choquet Expected Utility (CEU), Salience theory 
(ST) and Regret and Disappointment theories have not been exhaustively tested. As 
such, the extent to which they reflect actual behaviour under risk and uncertainty is 
not fully known. Of particular concern is the gap in extending these theories to 
continuous prospects which partly triggered the need for this study. The procedure 
of most literature has mainly been willingness to pay (or accept) or use of lottery 
choices in discrete construct. There have been very limited studies that extend these 
popular theories to continuous prospects in experimental studies with exception of 
the works of Kothiyal, Spinu & Wakker (2011) albeit for Prospect Theory; Kontek 
(2009) for Relative Utility Theory; and Rieger & Wang (2006), Rieger & Wang 
(2008), Gürtler & Stolpe (2011), Tian, Huang & Wang (2012) for CPT. 
Arising from the concerns regarding selection of the most appropriate theories and 
methodologies that best describes any DM’s attitudes as well as the suitability of 
these methodologies in laboratory or field experiments, more research is necessary 
to provide additional evidence and broaden our understanding of the psychological 
construct of risk and uncertainty attitudes. This thesis therefore employs 
methodologies and unique experiments that represent the choices that DMs make 
day-to-day. Specifically, this study employs the CPT/CEU (equivalence of both 
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theories under certain conditions is shown in section 3.4.2 in Chapter 3) to examine 
the risk and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and content domains.   
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1.2 Objectives  
The broad objective of the study is to examine the risk and uncertainty attitude of a 
farm-household decision maker. Content domain in this thesis refers to the framing 
of the choice problems as either gains, losses or mixed (e.g. in terms of money; it 
may be solely a loss of money, a gain of money or having both the possibility of losing 
or gaining some money). While contexts domain gives meaning to the content 
domains by presenting different ‘states’ of the decision problem (e.g. monetary vs 
non-monetary context). Within these settings, this thesis specifically:  
i. Examines farmers’ risk attitudes in different context (monetary & time) and 
content (gain, loss & mixed) domains 
ii. Examines farmers’ uncertainty attitudes in different content (gain, loss & 
mixed) domains but within a specific context 
iii. Compares attitudes to risk and uncertainty within content domains 
iv. Examines and compare farmers’ risk attitudes when making proxy decision 
and decisions for oneself. 
v. Examines the relationship between mental health related factors and risk 
and uncertainty attitudes 
vi. Investigates the relationship between risk and uncertainty attitudes and 
decision to participate in off-farm income generating activities. 
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study draws on the gaps that are identified in the literature in Chapters 2 and 
3 and raises the following research questions and corresponding hypotheses. 
1.3.1 Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes  
Central to the Expected Utility theory (EUT) (discussed in section 3.1 of Chapter 3) 
is the estimation of risk attitude using the curvature of the utility function. From this 
perspective, some economists have generally taken attitudes towards risk as given 
and treated them as stable across context. On the other hand the rank dependant 
(RDU) based theories (including the CPT and CEU) which relies on both the utility 
function and probability weightings to explain risk attitude suggest that individuals 
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are not globally risk-averse i.e. risk attitudes often differ across domains (the 
distinction between risk averse/seeking is presented in Section 2.1 in Chapter 2).  
The questions that arises are:  
A. Do risk and uncertainty attitudes remain consistent within content domains 
(gain, loss, mixed)?  
Increasing number of studies have shown that the way in which outcomes are 
framed influences DMs’ preferences and risk/uncertainty attitudes. DM’s are not 
expected to maintain the same attitude in different content domains i.e. being 
unswervingly risk/or uncertainty averse or seeking. Therefore, it is hypothesised in 
this research that: 
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes to risk depends on content domains 
Hypothesis 2: Attitudes to uncertainty depends on content domains 
B. Do risk attitudes remain consistent across context (monetary versus time) 
domains?  
Numerous studies suggest that risk attitude is context domain-specific. Such studies 
have provided evidence that challenges the perspective of risk attitude as a 
personality trait and shown the reason why such models are unreliable in predicting 
attitudes across context. Based on this viewpoint, the corresponding hypothesis 
that is tested is: 
Hypothesis 3: Attitudes to risk depends on context 
C. Do attitudes to risk differ from attitudes to uncertainty (within a particular 
context)? 
On one hand, there has been definitional and operational inconsistency in using the 
terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably in literature that has led to different 
conclusions while on the other hand there are studies that suggest the behaviour of 
an individual DM under risk is different from that of uncertainty. It is hypothesised 
that: 
Hypothesis 4: Attitudes to risk compared to uncertainty are different  
Although similar hypotheses have been tested (for example in Weber, Blais & Betz, 
2002; Blais & Weber 2006; Hanoch et al., 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2014; Gummerum 
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et al., 2014; Rolison et al., 2014 among others), however the experiment design, 
elicitation methods analytical techniques differ from this study.  
1.3.2 Risk Attitude in Proxy Decision 
In proxy decision-making – a case where one is permitted to make decision on 
behalf of others; the proxy is often regarded as having better knowledge or 
information in that specific domain in which the decision is to be made (Harvey et 
al., 2006). The proxy is however expected to put into consideration the risk 
tolerance of the person on whose behalf the decision is being made. For example, a 
farmer may request the veterinarian to make decision for him regarding specific 
treatment for his animals. There have been numerous justifications to back the 
reason why proxy decision may differ from personal decision within the context of 
risk. Specifically, Stone, Yates & Caruthers (2002) posit that it could be based on an 
assumption of difference in risk attitude between the proxy and recipient and the 
possibility of making the decision to meet different aims under both situations. 
Based on similar assertions, the questions that arise are: Does a proxy’s own risk 
attitude influence the decision taken for others? Do proxies categorise others as 
more risk or uncertainty averse than they are? This leads to the more specific 
research question:  
D. Does a DM’s attitude to risk differ when they take decision for others? 
The hypothesis tested from the above question is: 
Hypothesis 5: There is significant difference in a DM’s risk attitude when 
making personal vs. proxy decision. 
1.3.3  Effect of Bipolar Disorder on Risk and Uncertainty Attitude 
Leahy (1999) opines that BD individuals tend to enjoy gains more and suffer losses 
less than non-BD individuals. That is, at the manic phase, the threshold for defining 
loss (gain) is high (low) and the individual could be categorised as risk-seeking. 
Leahy (1999) further asserts that during the manic phase, individuals view 
themselves as possessing unlimited current and future resources, and trust their 
“flawless” prediction and control of outcomes. Similarly, Chandler et al., (2009) 
reports that bipolar disorder individuals are more risk-seeking for increased gains. 
In the light of these arguments, this study seeks to determine the effect of bipolar 
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disorder on risk and uncertainty attitude. The specific research question to be 
addressed is: 
E. Is there any effect of bipolar disorder on risk or uncertainty attitude? 
It is hypothesised in this thesis that: 
Hypothesis 6: DMs having bipolar disorder tendencies have significantly 
different risk and uncertainty attitude from DMs with no bipolar disorder. 
1.3.4 Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes and Off-farm Income Generating 
Activities 
According to the assertion of Reij & Waters-Bayer (2001) creative and innovative 
farmers typically farm the land to meet their needs thus do not depend to a large 
findings of Baron (2011) that overly risk-seeking individuals characteristically fail 
to diversify. Arguably, the proposition is that risk seeking farmers would be mostly 
full-time farmers who may be less likely to diversify to off-farm income activities. 
From these perspectives, the specific research question and hypothesis which is put 
forward is: 
F. Is there any relationship between the risk attitudes and the decisions to 
engage in off-farm income earning activities? 
The corresponding hypothesis that is tested is: 
Hypothesis 7: Farmers that are risk seeking in monetary context are less likely 
to engage in off-farm employment 
1.4  Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is made up of the following sections. While Chapter 1 introduces the 
study, Chapter 2 covers literature review. Chapter 3 deals with the theories of risk 
and uncertainty. In Chapter 4, research methods and models are presented while 
Chapter 5 documents the survey design and implementation. Chapter 6 reports the 
description of data, Chapter 7 covers results of CPT/CEU, Chapter 8 contains the 
results of alternative theories, Chapter 9 dwells on the implication of findings for 
farm decisions and Chapter 10 summarises, concludes and provides 









This chapter is a discourse on risk and uncertainty attitudes of a DM in the broad 
context with the focal point being attitudes to risk and uncertainty of farmers 
responsible for making farm decisions. It reviews the approaches to eliciting 
attitudes to risk and uncertainty as well as examines literature on the role of risk 
and uncertainty attitudes on farmers’ decision-making. In addition, this Chapter 
investigates how much is known about risk attitudes in proxy decision-making in 
the context of farmers in developing countries. Finally, it reviews studies on the 
relationship between mental health related  factors and farmers’ risk attitude, 
risk/uncertainty attitudes and the decision to engage in off-farm income earning 
activities and; identifies the links between risk/uncertainty attitudes and type of 
off-farm activity chosen.  
Specifically, the sections that make up Chapter 2 are as follows. Section 2.1 covers 
the meaning of risk and uncertainty and the specific context adopted for use in this 
thesis, section 2.2 focuses the empirical evidence of risk and uncertainty at the farm 
level while section 2.3 examines previous studies on risk and uncertainty attitudes 
in proxy decision making. In section 2.4, literature on bipolar disorder and risk 
attitude are discussed; while risk attitude and its relationship with off-farm 
participation are reviewed in section 2.5. Finally, the last sections in this chapter 
dwell on the elicitation tools and methods that have been reported in the risk and 




2.1 Distinction between Risk and Uncertainty 
‘Risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are fundamental terms in decision-making framework 
however different schools of thought hold different perceptions of risk and 
uncertainty. Therefore, it is difficult to have an all-inclusive definition specifically as 
the nomenclature of risk and uncertainty has not been used in a standardised way. 
Knight (1921) proposed one of the very early distinctions between risk and 
uncertainty.  Knight defined risk as a condition where a decision maker (DM 
hereafter) is faced with a situation in which the DM knows every consequence of the 
decision but does not know prior to decision-making the events that will in reality 
occur. This implies that the DM can measure the odds with accuracy to the extent 
that the prediction will be similar to any other DM having identical information and 
beliefs. Knight (1921) then distinguished risk from uncertainty from the perspective 
of incomplete knowledge by defining uncertainty as a situation in which the all 
possible outcome of a given state is unknown to a DM thus the DM cannot measure 
the odds with any accuracy due to insufficient information. Building on the 
explanation put forward by Knight (1921) this thesis adopts a definition modified 
to fit prospects with continuous distributions. Risk refers to a situation where a DM 
is faced with a scenario in which the DM knows the associated probability density 
of realising an outcome. As for the case of uncertainty, the associated probability 
density is unknown but a DM has the information that an outcome within the 
specified interval would be realised. 
To shed more light on the distinction between this definitions of risk and 
uncertainty, consider a hypothetical risky situation where a DM is presented with 
two prospects (Prospect A can earn the DM any amount between $4 and $7 and B is 
between $2 and $11). Assuming all outcomes over the interval have equal likelihood 
of occurrence, a uniform probability density is thus specified thereby making this a 
case of risk. However, for uncertainty the DM is aware that one outcome within the 
specified interval (e.g. in the above hypothetical prospects A and B) would be 
obtained but the associated probability density (as to whether outcomes were 
‘equally likely’ or not) is not given. 
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Unlike other studies (e.g. Mas-Collel, Whinston & Green, 1995 and Jehle & Reny, 
2000) that use the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably this thesis adopts the 
above definitions to distinguish risk from uncertainty. This distinction is useful 
since there is empirical evidence in some other literature that the behaviour of an 
individual DM under risk is different from that of uncertainty (see Camerer & Weber 
(1992); Tversky & Fox (1995); Dow & da Costa Werlang (1992) that empirically 
distinguished between attitudes to risk and uncertainty in their studies).  
2.1.1 Distinction between Uncertainty and Ambiguity 
Notably, numerous studies have erroneously used the terms uncertainty and 
ambiguity interchangeably. Some studies (for example Backus, Ferriere & Zin, 2015; 
Fujino et al., 2017) have argued that uncertainty consist of two main elements which 
these studies refer to as ‘risk’ and ‘ambiguity’. In the literature, the perception of 
‘information gap’ is what shapes many definition of ambiguity. Ellsberg (1961) 
argued that ambiguity is a condition that sits between two extreme conditions 
namely risk and absolute ignorance (a case where the DM has no information 
whatsoever on the relative probabilities). According to Camerer & Weber (1992) 
when important information that could be known is missing and it results in 
uncertainty about probability, this condition is referred to as ambiguity. 
Earlier studies including Meyerson & Martin (1987), McCaskey, (1982) and 
Schrader, Riggs & Smith (1993) distinguished between uncertainty and ambiguity 
by classifying uncertainty in terms of shortage of information; and ambiguity from 
the perspective of absence of clarity with reference to the functional relationships 
between variables. From the above perspective, gathering additional information 
may lead to the situation of uncertainty being resolved however, it will not lead to 
resolving ambiguity. 
Some studies8 have argued that while the probabilities in the case of uncertainty are 
either unknown or indeterminable and ascribable to randomness or data 
limitations; the probabilities of ambiguity on the other hand are either not known 
                                                          
8 These arguments can be found in studies including Dequech (2000); Camerer & Weber (1992) 
and Frisch & Baron (1988). 
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or indeterminable owing to data or model deficiency (yet with possibility in some 
cases to be known to persons other than the DM). 
It is pertinent however to differentiate between uncertainty (in the context of this 
study) and ambiguity specifically as each require different procedure for problem-
solving and behaviours differ under both (for example as reported in Schrader, 
Riggs & Smith, 1993; Saint-Charles & Mongeau, 2009). For clarification regarding 
the use of these terms in this thesis, uncertainty refers to the situation where the 
associated probability density is unknown but a DM has the information that an 
outcome within the specified interval would be realised. Ambiguity on the other 
hand viewed from the perspective of ‘uncertainty about the uncertain;’ refers to the 
situation in which the DM does not have complete information about the associated 
probability density and the specified interval from which an outcome would be 
realised. In other words, the DM lacks sufficient information to establish a unique 








2.1.2 Defining Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking9  
It is complicated to present a universally acceptable definition of ‘risk averse’ or 
‘risk seeking’ especially as different assumptions and conditions result in different 
definitions. Therefore, this section provides background on the common definitions 
in the literature and highlights their respective limitations. It concludes by clarifying 
the context in which this study refers to ‘risk averse’ or ‘risk seeking’, how this 
definitions differ from several in the literature and the justification for choosing it 
above the others. 
It is commonplace to find in the literature risk averse/seeking used loosely to 
describe DMs attitudes without acknowledging the role that context and content 
domains as well as magnitude of the prospects plays in determining the risk 
averse/seeking attitudes of a DM. This is because the premise on which such studies 
base their augments are maximisation of expected utility and global concavity or 
convexity of the utility/value function. In the absence of one or both conditions, the 
complexity around defining the terms (risk averse/seeking) increases.   
In the case of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (details in Section 3.4 in Chapter 
3) which is built around probability weighting and local convexity and concavity in 
the same value function, the meaning behind the concepts risk averse/seeking 
becomes fuzzy. On one hand, the literature have restricted the terms to the shape of 
the value function albeit acknowledging that the magnitude of the prospects 
determines risk averse/seeking attitudes. On the other hand, researchers have 
based it upon the overall attitude of DMs in connection with the actions taken when 
faced with “risky prospects”. 
What then is a risky prospect? 
Of central importance in defining risky prospect is second order stochastic 
dominance (see Appendix 7 for details of first and second order stochastic 
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then prospect A dominates B from the position of second-order stochastic 
dominance (SODs). From this perspective, risk ordering emerges such that A can be 
categorised as ‘less risky’ if A SODs B. Accordingly, definitions of risk aversion can be 
drawn.  
Definition 1 A DM is termed GLOBALLY risk averse if for any two prospects A and B 
for which A SODs B the DM will always choose A.  
However in the case of risk seeking, the converse holds if A and B have equal means. 
Thus, risk seeking is defined with respect to controlling for the mean; therefore 
making it pertinent to introduce the concept of mean preserving spread (MPS). B is 
a mean preserving spread of A 𝑖𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 A SODs B and A and B have identical 
expected values i.e. 𝐸 (𝐴)  =  𝐸 (𝐵).   
Modifying Definition 1 leads to  
Definition 2 A DM is GLOBALLY risk averse if for any two prospects A and B for which 
B is a MPS of A the DM will always choose A.  
Definition 3 A DM is GLOBALLY risk seeking if for any two prospects A and B for which 
B is a MPS of A the DM will always choose B  
Following the inference in the literature, under Expected Utility Definitions 2 and 3 
suggest global concavity or convexity of the utility function. Crucially, however, the 
curvature of the value function is not given consideration in both definitions. 
Definitions 2 and 3 can be broadened to domain specific payoffs such that if the 
payoffs of A and B are both within payoff domain 𝔻 then 
Definition 4 A DM is GLOBALLY risk averse in payoff domain 𝔻 if for any two prospects 
A and B, the payoffs of A and B are both within payoff domain 𝔻 and for which B is a 
MPS of A the DM will always choose A.  
Definition 5 A DM is GLOBALLY risk seeking in payoff domain 𝔻 if for any two 
prospects A and B, the payoffs of A and B are both within payoff domain 𝔻 and for 
which B is a MPS of A the DM will always choose B.  
These definitions also hold within the context of the EUT given that if a DM’s utility 
function is uniformly concave/convex within payoff domain 𝔻 then the DM will be 
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risk averse/seeking within that domain. The assertion above is not transferable to 
the CPT, owing to the fact that concavity/convexity over the specified domain is no 
longer sufficient for risk aversion/seeking behaviour. Thus, a DM can be risk averse 
at the same time optimistic in terms of probability weightings. 
An extension of the above definitions may require defining a probability-payoff 
domain Ω = 𝔻,ℙ resulting in 
Definition 6 A DM is risk averse in probability-payoff domain Ω if for any two 
prospects A and B, the payoffs and probabilities of A and B are both within domain Ω 
and for which B is a MPS of A the DM will always choose A.  
Definition 7 A DM is risk seeking in probability-payoff domain Ω if for any two 
prospects A and B, the payoffs and probabilities of A and B are both within domain Ω 
and for which B is a MPS of A the DM will always choose B. 
However if the sub-domains within Ω over which the DM is risk averse/seeking is 
ambiguous, then it heightens the complexity in defining risk aversion and risk 
seeking.  
Based on the above arguments, this thesis therefore adopts the definition of risk 
aversion in respect of the curvature of the value function. However, is should be 
noted that this is not equivalent to DMs choosing prospects based on mean 
preserving spreads. The rationale behind the focus mainly on the curvature of the 
value function in describing risk aversion/seeking is that the manner in which DMs 
treat probabilities (known as optimism and pessimism in the decision-making 
literature and discussed in 3.4.2 in chapter 3) is not often a reflection of DMs 
preferences per se. Therefore, a DM can be risk averse (concave in utility over the 
domain) at the same time optimistic in terms of probability weightings10 such that 
within the context of the above definitions, the DM is not risk averse. 
 
  
                                                          
10 Evidence of this behaviour is reported in Balcombe & Fraser (2015) where respondents are 
estimated to be risk averse as regards the concave value function on one hand but on the other hand 
are optimistic as to high payoffs with high probability. 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence on Risk and Uncertainty at Farm Level 
Like other enterprises, farm businesses are faced with uncertainty (and possibly 
risk) which is crucial in determining the possibility of a farmer achieving his/her 
farming objectives. Although in reality farmers deal with uncertainties far more 
often; the literature has paid less attention to uncertainty compared to risk. The 
prominence of risk studies over uncertainty has meant that empirical findings about 
uncertainty are limited. In the broader literature, (see Boehlje & Trede, 1977; 
Heifner, Coble, Perry & Somwaru, 1999; Hardaker, Huirne, Anderson, & Lien, 2004) 
the main uncertainties in agriculture have been classified into five main groups. 
First, production uncertainties arising from the uncertain natural growth processes 
of crops and livestock including weather related factors. Second, price or market 
uncertainties due to unpredictable changes in prices of both inputs and outputs. 
Third, financial uncertainties and fourth, institutional uncertainties resulting from 
uncertainties surrounding income/profit and government actions respectively. 
Fifth, human or personal uncertainties arising from problems with human health or 
personal relationships. These uncertainties in several applied literature (e.g. 
Hardaker 2004; Patrick 1998; Huirne et al., 2000); have either been erroneously 
referred to as risk or both terms have been used interchangeably. 
According to Kaan (1998), the most significant of these uncertainties are prices and 
yield variability which makes farmers perceive farming as a “gamble” since at the 
onset of the farming season there is no certainty that their efforts will pay off.  
Hoogeveen et al., (2004) find that farm households in developing countries are 
typically more exposed to uncertainties and risks compared to other enterprises 
however, the formal institutions or instruments do not provide commensurate 
protection. In Nigeria, the case is not different as smallholder farmers who are 
among the poorest in the country (Ajibefun, 2002; Asogwa, Umeh & Ihemeje, 2012) 
have to make decisions under conditions of uncertainties and risk while these small 
farmers typically have limited access to insurance markets; and market failures 
further amplify farmers’ exposure to risks and uncertainty. 
Using decision-making experiments applied to a number of methodologies, DM are 
commonly categorised as risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking. Adopting different 
theories and assuming various utility functions parameters (discussed in section 3.1 
31 
 
in Chapter 3) across a wide range of countries as summarized in Table 1, farmers 
have mostly been reported as being risk averse to risk neutral (i.e. DM being 
indifferent to risk taking). However, a few studies have also found risk-seeking 
attitude among farmers. For example as shown in Table 1, while Yesuf, & Bluffstone, 
(2007) and De Brauw, & Eozenou (2014) find that farmers in Ethiopia and 
Mozambique are risk averse, Maertens, Chari, & Just (2014) and Henrich & 
McElreath (2002), in different studies in India and Tanzania respectively document 
farmers in those regions as risk seeking. While some of these researches find 
genuine difference in the attitudes of DMs, differences in underlying theories and 
differences in methodologies could have considerable effect on the results reported.  
Table 1  
Selected studies classifying low and middle income countries farmers’ and rural 
households according to risk attitudes 




Yesuf & Bluffstone (2007)  Ethiopia EUT Risk averse 
Binswanger (1980) India EUT Risk averse 
De Brauw & Eozenou (2014) Mozambique EUT & RDU Risk averse 
Akay,  Martinsson, Medhin & 
Trautmann (2012) 
Ethiopia  Risk averse 
Vieider, Truong, Martinsson & 
Khanh (2014) 
Vietnam PT Risk Neutral 
Maertens, Chari & Just (2014) India EUT Risk Seeking 
Henrich,  & McElreath (2002) Tanzania EUT Risk Seeking 
Ullah, Shivakoti & Ali (2015) Pakistan ELCE Risk averse 
Tanaka et al. (2010) Vietnam EUT, CPT   
Liu (2013) China CPT  






Hill (2009)  Uganda EUT  
Miyata (2003) Indonesia EUT  
Wik et al. (2004) Zambia EUT Risk averse 
Dillon & Scandizzo, (1978). Brazil EUT Risk averse 
Gonzalez-Ramirez, Arora & 
Podesta (2018) 
Argentina EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Freudenreich, Musshoff & 
Wiercinski (2017) 
Mexico EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Galarza (2009) Peru EUT, CPT  
Ward & Singh (2014) India CPT Risk averse 
Liebenehm & Waibel, (2014) Mali &  
Burkina Faso 
CPT Risk averse 
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Mao, Wang, Oniki, Kagatsume & 
Yu (2016) 
China EUT Risk averse 
Love et al. (2014)  Kenya EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Kibet, Obare & Lagat (2018) Kenya EUT, CPT Risk averse  
He, Jin, Gong & Tian (2019) China CPT Risk averse 
Alvarado, Ibanez & Brummer 
(2018) 
Chile CPT Risk averse 
Serfilippi, Carter & Guirkinger 
(2015) 
Burkina Faso EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Ihli, Chiputwa, & Musshoff (2016) Uganda EUT Risk averse 
Brick, Visser & Burns (2012) South Africa EUT Risk averse 
Holden & Quiggin (2015) Malawi EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Petraud, Boucher & Carter (2015) Peru EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Orhan, Vedat, Ahmet &  Zeki 
(2016) 
Turkey ELCE Risk averse 
ZgaJnar & Kavcic (2011) Slovenia MV Risk averse 
Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi (2010) Azerbaijan EUT Risk averse 
Other studies classifying high income countries farmers’ according to risk attitudes 
Bocquého, Jacquet & Reynaud 
(2013) 
France EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Bougherara, Gassmann, Piet & 
Reynaud (2017) 
France EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Gregg & Rolfe (2017) Australia EUT, RDU, 
CPT 
Risk averse 
Tauer (1986) US EUT Mixed findings 
Roe (2015) US Self-
assessment 
Mixed findings 








Canales et al. (2015) US EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Other studies classifying DMs (non-farmers) according to risk attitudes 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) US CPT Risk averse  
Wu & Gonzalez (1996) US CPT Risk averse 
Wakker, Erev & Weber(1994)    
Harrison & Rutström (2009) US EUT, CPT Risk averse 
Stott (2006) UK CPT Risk averse 
Balcombe & Fraser (2015) UK RDU, CPT Risk averse 
Loomes & Sugden (1998) UK EUT Risk averse 
Tu (2005) Sweden CPT Risk averse 
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Hey & Orme (1994) US EUT Risk averse 
Donkers et al. (2001) Netherlands EUT, CPT Mixed findings 
Bruhin et al. (2010) Switzerland 
China 
CPT Risk averse 
Zeisberger et al. (2012) Germany CPT Risk neutral 
Toubia et al. (2013)  CPT Risk averse 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) Germany CEU, CPT Risk averse  
Booij et al. (2010) Netherlands EUT, CPT Mixed findings 
Camerer (1989)  EUT Risk averse 
EUT – Expected Utility Theory 
RDU – Rank Dependant Utility Theory 
PT – Prospect Theory  
ELCE – Equally Likely Certainty Equivalent approach 
MV – Mean-variance Expected utility 
CEU – Choquet Expected Utility Theory 
*These theories are extensively discussed in chapter 3  
      
Further, several studies have identified links between attitudes towards 
risk/uncertainty and agricultural decision-making. These links covers farmers 
decisions to adopt new technology (see Asci, Borisova & VanSickle, 2015; Liu, 2013; 
Marra, Pannell & Ghadim, 2003; Kebede, Gunjal, & Coffin, 1990). The decision to 
take insurance (see Kouame, & Komenan, 2012; Amaefula, Okezie & Mejeha, 2012), 
the decision to hedge (see Rolfo, 1980), the decision to sharecrop (Reid, 1976), the 
decision to comply with environmental policies (Ozanne, Hogan and Colman, 2001; 
Brick, Visser & Burns, 2012) – to the relationship between risk and farm 
productivity (Barrett, 1996). All of these studies have lent a hand to accentuate the 





2.3 Risk Attitudes in Proxy Decision Making 
Most of the studies in the decision-making literature have focused on risk attitudes 
when making decision for oneself. However, in many situations, people make 
decisions on behalf of others i.e. proxy decision-making wherein decision is made 
for another person on his/her request. Given the importance of some of these proxy 
decisions there are reasons to examine what similarities or differences exist when 
the decision is made on behalf of another person compared to decision for self.  
In Nigeria, farmers are sometimes in the position where they make decisions on 
behalf of other persons. Owing to the limited number of extension agents, small 
farmers in most cases have to work with opinion leaders or contact farmer who are 
in direct contact with extension agents. These opinion leaders reach decisions that 
may be binding for farmers; who share the consequences of such decisions. There 
are arguments in the literature whether attitudes in proxy decisions differ from 
personal decision within a specific context under risk and uncertainty. Studies 
including Ockenfels (2010), Chakravarty et al., (2011), Polman (2012), and Stone et 
al., (2013), provide support for the argument that a DM’s attitude to risk differs in 
proxy compared to self. On the other hand, Kvaløy & Luzuriaga (2014) and 
Humphrey & Renner (2011) have reported contrary findings. 
Social psychology lends different explanations as to why personal and proxy 
decisions might differ when approached from different perspectives. These 





Responsibility within the context of decision-making refers to a situation in which 
the decisions made affect both the decision maker and the person on whose behalf 
the decision is being made. Therefore, the proxy considers not only the processes 
and outcomes but also the consequences. It is typically in the form of a principal-
agent relationship where in several cases both the principal’s and agents payoff 
depends on the outcome of the decision taken by the agent.  For example, in farming 
context this would be a contact farmer primarily responsible for contacting and 
communicating with extension agents in addition to being responsible for making 
decision on behalf of other farmers.  
Most studies find that responsibility has a significant effect on risk and uncertainty 
attitude. For example, Kvaløy, Eriksen & Luzuriaga, (2014) reports that personal 
decisions made by individuals are different compared to those made on behalf of 
others. Charness & Jackson (2009), Fullbrunn & Luhan (2015), Bolton, Ockenfels & 
Stauf (2015) and Pahlke et al., (2015) find that proxy decision where responsibility 
was attached had significant effect on the decision made by the proxy. However the 
direction of the effect of responsibility (i.e. whether responsibility increases or 
decreases risk or uncertainty aversion) when making decisions has been mixed. As 
presented in Table 2, Chakravarty et al., (2011) and Agranov et al., (2014) studies 
show that responsibility increases risk-taking; Bolton & Ockenfels (2010), Vieider 
et al., (2016) conclude that responsibility increases risk aversion while Humphrey 
& Renner, (2011) found no effect of responsibility on risk attitude when making 
decision for others. While these differences may be genuine, there is also the 
possibility that outcomes were driven by the design of the task and the estimation 
methods. 
As for the effects of responsibility for choices specifically in the gains only domain, 
the findings in this area have also been mixed. For instance, Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2010), Humphrey and Renner (2011), Anderson et al., (2015) do not find decisions 
under responsibility to significantly influence choice behaviour in the gain domain, 
Bolton et al., (2015) and Pahlke et al., (2015) reports otherwise. Most studies have 
focused mainly on financial decisions with discrete monetary outcomes, however 
there are reasons to extend the scope, elicitation method and category of 
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respondents e.g. to DMs using continuous ‘prospects’ which is where this thesis fills 
the gap. 
2.3.2 Accountability  
According to Semin & Manstead (1983) and Tetlock (1992), accountability refers to 
the (implicit or explicit) expectation of a proxy that any decision he or she takes 
needs to be justified to the individual(s) on whose behalf the decision is being made 
prior to or post decision making. In the agricultural context, this could be a farmer 
responsible for managing and taking decisions on resources on a communal farm or 
joint enterprise. For example, in Fadama III rural agriculture project in Nigeria, the 
proxy is the project leader who make binding decisions such as the types of 
farm/off-farm investment the group engages in or whether to adopt certain 
technologies. Given the fact that the DM can be ‘blamed’ for the decision, a-priori it 
is expected that when making risky decisions for others the DM will consider this 
factor.  
In social psychology, researchers have made efforts to prove the effects of 
accountability on decision making as shown in Table 2. Holding DMs accountable 
for their decisions has been reported to be a credible means to de-biasing loss 
aversion in self-proxy relations. Studies including Pahlke, Strasser & Vieider, (2012) 
introduces accountability post-experiment while others e.g. Sutter (2008) focused 
on agent justifying any decision taken prior to decision-making. Sutter (2008) 
conclude that accountability increases risk seeking. Similarly, Schlenker (1991) 
reported amplified risk attitudes under accountability for either risk lovers who 
preferred more risky choices or risk averters who became more cautious. In 
contradiction, Humphrey & Renner (2011) findings suggest preferences of 
individuals in the gain and loss domains are unaffected by accountability. Crucially, 
the domains and size of the prospects; as well the social distance that exist between 
the proxy decision maker and the person on whose behalf the decision is being made 
may have resulted in mixed finding reported in these studies.  
37 
 
2.3.3 Self-Other Distance 
Self-Other distance – the social distance between others and self can provide some 
explanations as to why attitudes to risk may differ when taking decisions for oneself 
compared to proxy decisions. There have been proponents and opponents in the 
discourse on the effect of self-other differences in decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. Two widely mentioned explanations for self-other differences in 
decision making are social value theory11 and construal level theory12.  
The proponents of social value theory argue that when making proxy decision under 
risk or uncertainty, the individual assigns social value over and above other factors 
as opposed to decision for self where there is a mix of other elements. According to 
Stone & Allgaier, (2008) the emphasis is on what is ‘socially valued’ as opposed to 
what the individual making the decision would do in a scenario where decisions are 
not socially-sanctioned. In conditions where value is placed on risk aversion (for 
instance in outcomes with life-threatening consequences), several studies have 
documented safer decisions for others than for the self. As shown in Table 2, Stone, 
Choi, de Bruin & Mandel, (2013) findings support this expectation as they show that 
DM’s display greater risk-aversion for others than for self in situation where social 
value is placed on risk aversion. 
On the other hand Construal level theory (CLT) surmises that individual’s behaviour 
is impacted upon by psychological distance that determines the way in which future 
events are mentally portrayed. Self-other distance in this context is based on the 
concept of social distance that describes the affective closeness between the DM or 
proxy and the individual(s) on whose behalf the decision is to be made. According 
to Zhang et al., (2017), the more psychologically removed the DM is from the other 
person on whose behalf the decision is to be made, the greater the social distance. 
From this perspective, Zhang et al., (2017) found that self-other distance increased 
risk aversion. Raue, Streicher, Lermer, & Frey (2015) found that construal level does 
not have a similar effect across domain as their results show no effect in the loss 
domain contrary to what was obtained in the gain domain. However, there are 
                                                          
11 See Stone, Choi, de Bruin & Mandel, (2013) for detailed discussion  
12 In the works of Trope, Liberman & Wakslak, (2007); Trope & Liberman, (2010); Raue, Streicher, 
Lermer, & Frey (2015) the construal level theory extensively discussed and tested.  
38 
 
concerns about the psychological distance hypothesis in explaining empirical 
findings and the simplicity of the CLT to form a generally accepted theoretical 
model. 
Table 2  
Selected Literature on Risk Taking for Others (Proxy Risk) 
Studies Contexts Findings 
Chakravarty et al., (2011) Responsibility Increased risk seeking 
Pollmann,et al., (2014) Accountability Increased risk seeking 
Polman (2012) Responsibility Increased risk seeking 
Agranov et al., (2014) Responsibility Increased risk seeking 
Reynolds et al., (2009) Responsibility Increased risk aversion 
Eriksen & Kvaløy (2010) Self-Other distance Increased risk aversion 
Vieider, et al., (2016) Responsibility Increased risk aversion 
Sutter, (2009) Accountability Increased risk seeking 
Lion & Meertens, (2001) Accountability Mixed findings 
Zhang et al., (2017) Self-Other distance Increased risk aversion 
Humphrey & Renner, 
(2011) 
Responsibility No effect  
Charness & Jackson (2009) Responsibility Increased risk aversion 
Weigold & Schlenker (1991) 
Bolton & Ockenfels (2010) 





Increased risk aversion 
Increased risk aversion 





2.4 Bipolar Propensities and Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes 
Economists have generally taken attitudes towards risk and uncertainty as given; 
and treated them as stable. An alternative perspective is that the causes of these 
attitudes to risk and uncertainty is worthy of investigation. Moreover, these 
attitudes may be temporally variable and related to biological/physiological traits 
of individuals. Accordingly, decision-making behaviour is likely to be related to 
mental health related factors such as ‘bipolarism’, yet for the most part economists 
have not investigated the links between such factors and attitudes towards risk and 
uncertainty.  
With mental health issues being more prevalent than previously reported13 
(probably due to more individuals contacting mental health services as a result of 
increased awareness and reduction in stigma and discrimination); studies focused 
on examining mental health related factors and decision-making have become more 
requisite. Notable, the impact of mental health related issues is largely discernible 
in occupational functioning and a ‘wrong’ decision can threaten the entire livelihood 
of DM’s (especially many smallholder farmers in developing countries that are 
barely ‘hanging in’). Thus, examining the effect mental health related factors (with 
focus on bipolar disorder in this thesis) has on a DM’s attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty will help to better understand the potential drivers of risk/uncertainty 
attitudes as well as ensure appropriate interventions are targeted at assisting 
individuals’ with mental health problems when they are faced with making 
important decisions. 
Bipolar Disorder (BD) commonly referred to as a mood disorder wherein episodes 
of both elevated and depressed mood is experienced by the individual and may be 
associated with distress and impairment of function (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), 1994). An individual with this disorder 
experiences episodes of depression and mania referred to as bipolar I disorder (or 
hypomania – bipolar II disorder) which occur in turns (National Health Service 
(NHS) 2011). These extreme changes in mood either from highs to lows or vice versa 
can persist for hours, days or even months (Ogoke, Nduka & Nja, 2015). Chandler, 
                                                          
13 See Duncan & Prowse, (2014), Blader & Carlson, (2007). 
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Wakeley, Goodwin & Rogers, (2009) affirms that risky behaviour can be linked with 
Bipolar disorder (BD). During the period of “highs” the individual is reported to have 
increased self-esteem, increased goal-directed activities and becomes more risk 
seeking. 
According to Johnson et al., (2012); Reddy et al., (2014) one of the distinctive 
features of bipolar disorder is impulsive behaviour and increased propensity to 
work toward a reward, usually in the absence of any adequate plan. However, 
Mason et al., (2014) asserted that bipolar disorder is like a double-edged sword. It 
aids the individual to strive toward their goals and ambitions and may consequently 
lead to success. However, the fact that most decisions may be driven by immediate 
benefit usually result to adverse effect. It is also documented that during manic and 
depressive episodes, decisions made by individuals with bipolar disorder are 
typically suboptimal and can have negative long-term consequences. However, this 
argument contradicts Tremblay, Grosskopf & Yang (2010) who find evidence of 
links between bipolar disorder and occupational creativity and reports that 
productivity gains from enhanced creativity may have the capacity to outweigh 
productivity losses from bipolar illness. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to 
show that in comparison to a DM without mental health problems, the tendency 
towards risk-taking behaviour would increase the proportion of risky choices taken 
by a bipolar disorder DM.  
Although BD has received much research attention in developed countries, a very 
limited number of studies have been carried out in developing countries. In Nigeria, 
almost all studies so far has been targeted only at diagnosed and hospitalized 
patients across Federal Neuropsychiatric Hospitals (see Onyeama, Agomoh & 
Jombo, 2010; Aiyelero, Kwanashie, Sheikh, & Hussaini, 2010) with the exception of 
Gureje & Lasebikan, 2006 who carried out a large sample study on 4,948 
respondents and finds that 17.9% had at least one DSM–IV14 disorder. Aiyelero et 
al., (2010) report that, in Nigeria symptoms of all such illness are considered 
embarrassing due to stigmatization of all forms of mental illness. This situation of 
stigmatization coupled with individuals feeling less inclined to disclose their 
                                                          
14 DSM-IV refers to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
which is the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental health professionals. 
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symptoms may result in underreporting of such cases (Gureje & Lasebikan, 2006). 
However, the lack of credible statistics and other aforementioned challenges does 
not imply that this disorder is non-prevalent in Nigeria.  
Funk, Drew & Knapp (2012) reported a lopsided ratio in mental disorders among 
the rich and the poor with the latter being the most affected. Also, Negash et al., 
(2009) find that rural farmers made up nearly half of Bipolar-I disorder patients in 
Butajira, Ethiopia. Given similar statistics that characterise smallholder farmers in 
Nigeria i.e. being among the poorest and low socioeconomic groups (as reported in 
Ajibefun, 2002; Asogwa, Umeh & Ihemeje, 2012), there is reason to postulate that a 
study that concerns BD is well targeted if farmers are chosen as participants to test 
the study hypothesis.   
This study makes use of a modified Bipolar Spectrum Diagnostic Scale (by Ghaemi 
et al., 2005),15 (which is effective in addressing the concept of bipolar spectrum and 
can accurately record subtle features of bipolar illness) in identifying whether 
farmers within the spectrum of bipolar propensities have different attitudes to risk 
and uncertainty. It is necessary to point out  that this study did not aim to clinically 
ascertain or identify individuals with BD thus did not in any way provide a 
categorical response to whether or not an individual has bipolar disorder. 
Respondents were simply categorised by their scores which were cumulated and 
matched with the test scoring ranges in which the likelihood of BD propensities 
increased with a higher score as shown in Appendix 3. 
  
  
                                                          
15 Ronald Pies developed the original scale known as the Bipolar Clinical Scale. Later revised and 





2.5 Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes and Participation in Off-farm 
Income Generating Activities (OFIGA*) 
Small farmers especially in low/middle income countries are exposed to numerous 
uncertainties and risks but have fewer options to cope as formal institutions or 
policy instruments do not provide commensurate protection. Consequently, their 
livelihood is vulnerable. Off-farm employment has been documented as a significant 
risk coping strategy particularly among those with the intent of cushioning 
production risk (Lamb, 2003) or the risk of income shortfall (Berg (2001); Mishra 
& Goodwin, (1997)).  Although, studies have been carried out with focus on risk and 
uncertainty attitudes and individual decision making for instance; entrepreneurial 
decisions (Brockhaus, 1980), acquisitions (Pablo et al., 1996), asset allocation (Riley 
& Chow, 1992), market behaviours (Fellner & Maciejovsky, 2007), rate of adoption 
(Just & Zilberman, 1983), farm diversification (Eke-Göransson & Rinman, 2012). 
However, studies examining the relationship between of risk and uncertainty 
attitudes and OFIGA participation is limited.  
Other studies specific to farming that examines the role of risk and uncertainty 
attitudes in farm production, investment and management decisions (e.g. Backus et 
al., 1997; Senkondo, 2000; Haneishi et al., 2014 and Brunette et al., 2017)  have more 
often than not reported that risk and uncertainty attitudes have significant effect on 
various farm decisions. For instance Brunette et al., (2017) find a positive impact of 
the DM’s risk aversion on harvesting decisions, Gong et al., (2016) reported that risk 
averse farmers where more likely to increase pesticides application. This suggests 
possible relationship may also exist between risk and uncertainty attitudes on 
OFIGA participation. 
From a different perspective in the literature (see Reardon 1997; Bryceson & Jamal 
1997; Chuta & Liedholm 1990), farmers in very poor and developing countries 
reportedly rely on off-farm activities as a cushion for anticipated risk. Sulewski & 
Kłoczko-Gajewska, (2014) have found that farmers who plan to engage in off-farm 
income earning activity may have a slightly higher than average level of risk 
aversion than those who do not. In contradiction Iqbal, Ping, Abid, Kazmi & Rizwan, 
(2016) who find that farmers who have earn income off-farm are less risk averse.  
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According to Islam (1997), it is typical of a risk averse farmer to take the decision to 
devote some of their productive resources to off-farm activities, with less risk and a 
more stable income not minding the lower returns from such off-farm farm 
activities. Mishra & Goodwin (1997), similarly asserts that; for the risk averse 
farmers’, greater farm income variability leads to increased off-farm labour supply. 
Thus, the opportunity to compensate for the risk and uncertainty related to the 
variations in farm income is made possible by the off-farm sector. In a similar light, 
Domingo, Parton, Mullen & Jones (2015) report that progressive farmers are likely 
to take greater risk in order to achieve greater gains while the conservative will 
avoid risk. From the various perspectives, one conclusion that stands out is that; for 
risk averse farmers’ off-farm activity is an effective strategy in the reduction of 
variability, risk and uncertainty.  
Risk attitude have also been documented to influence the category of OFIGA chosen 
by DMs. King (1974) and Musetescu et al., (2007) reported that if the income 
earning activity is self-owned, the decision maker is more risk seeking. This 
corroborates Halek & Eisenhauer, (2001) findings of decreased risk aversion among 
self-employed. Further, Block, Sandner & Spiegel, (2015) that there exists a strong 
relationship between risk attitudes and the sources of work motivation. They 
conclude that in terms of necessity and opportunity, entrepreneurs show risk 
aversion towards the former and risk tolerance for the latter. Adopting similar 
approach, farmers could also be categorised into two groups. Farmers that 
participate in off-farm income activities primarily as a buffer against anticipated 
farm uncertainties and those that engaged in off-farm income activities because 
they spotted an investment opportunity.   
2.5.1 Determinants of decision to participate in off-farm activity 
Although the determinants of participation in off-farm activities have been widely 
studied (see among others the works of Mduma & Wobet (2005); Bezu et al., (2009) 
16, there is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between risk and 
uncertainty attitudes and decisions to be involved in off-farm income earning 
                                                          
16 Mduma & Wobet (2005); Bezu et al. (2009) examined the decision to participate and the 
determinants of activity choice in rural non-farm employment respectively. However, both studies 
focused mainly on other socioeconomic factors. 
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activities. In addition, the link between risk and uncertainty attitudes and the type 
of off-farm activities taken up has not been adequately examined. Ignoring this 
potentially critical factor can lead to faulty predictions and misleading conclusions 
hence the relevance of studies which addresses this gap. 
As presented in Table 3, factors considered to be determinants of farmers’ 
participation in off-farm activities are (but not limited to) age, gender, education, 
household size and income. For instance, Man (2009) found age and household size 
are significant factors influencing decision making in OFIGA among farmers in 
Malaysia. While OFIGA participation decreased with age, the opposite was the case 
for household size in several studies. Christopher (2014) findings on farmers in 
Tanzania regarding household size however was contrary to Man (2009).  
Table 3  
Selected Studies on Determinants of Off-Farm Participation Decision  




Farm Size Rahman (2013) 










































Access to credit Shehu & Abubakar (2015) Nigeria Probit Positive 














This thesis Nigeria Probit Mixed* 
* Effect depending on the different subjective value function (i.e. gain or loss) and conditions (risk or 
uncertainty) 
 
Bezabih, Gebreegziabher, GebreMedhin & Köhlin (2010) argue that the two main 
drivers of off-farm involvement decisions are disparities in wages and risk 
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associated with the off-farm option. Of relevance to this study however is the risk 
factor. Sulewski & Kłoczko-Gajewska (2014) are among the few who have examined 
off-farm participation as a risk management strategy that is dependent on farmers 
level of risk aversion. They report that there was difference (though marginally 
above the average level) in risk aversion between farmers who planned to engage 
in off-farm income generating activities than farmers who did not. However, 
Sulewski, & Kłoczko-Gajewska (2014) did not examine uncertainty and estimated 
‘risk attitude’ from simple descriptive statistics. The gap is filled in this thesis using 
parametric approach and estimating econometric models from which reliable 
empirical evidence is provided.  
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2.6 Risk and Uncertainty Elicitation- Lottery-Style Experiments  
Lottery-style experiments have featured significantly in studies of both normative 
and descriptive decision theories. Numerous studies adopting different methods 
have designed their lotteries payoffs as either real17, hypothetical or both. It has 
been argued that using hypothetical payoffs as opposed to real payoff determines 
the quality of the result (see Kroll & Vogt, 2008). However Kahneman & Tversky, 
(1979), Irwin, McClelland & Schulze, (1992), Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & 
Perner, (2002), Etchart-Vincent & L’Haridon (2011) suggest that individuals know 
how they would behave in actual situations and therefore they have no cause to 
conceal their genuine preferences. 
As presented in Table 4, a considerable number of authors have applied, modified 
or adopted the Ordered Lottery Selection design (OL), Multiple Price List (MPL) 
design, Becker, Degroot & Marshak (BDM) Design among others in real and 
hypothetical cases. Notably, researchers have applied lottery type experiments to a 
wide range of methodologies; and to address different objectives. While Holt and 
Laury (2002) (HL) employed their lottery approach within the framework of the 
EUT, Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) (TCN) relied on the PT. Other studies 
such as Bocquého, Jacquet & Reynaud (2014) compared preference from EUT and 
CPT using both single and mixed domain real payoff lotteries. In the discussion that 






                                                          
17 For real payoffs, the DM at the end of the experiment will be offered some payment reflective of 
the outcome of the DM’s choices during the experiment e.g. a DM can earn some physical money; 
while for hypothetical payoffs the none of the outcomes are real.  
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Table 4  
Selected Popular Lottery Methods of Eliciting Risk and Uncertainty attitudes 
Design Studies where adopted Lottery type 
The Ordered Lottery 
Selection (OL) Design  
Binswanger (1980) Real & Hypothetical  
Clarke & Kalani, (2012) Hypothetical 
Kouamé, (2013) Real & Hypothetical 
 Eckel & Grossman (2002) Real & Hypothetical 
The Multiple Price List  
(MPL) Design  
Holt & Laury (2002) Real & Hypothetical 
Deck, Lee, Reyes & Rosen (2008) Real 
 Couture, Reynaud, Dury, & Bergez, 
(2010) 
Real & Hypothetical 
 De Brauw, & Eozenou, (2014) Hypothetical 
 Clist, D’Exelle, & Verschoor, (2013) Real 
 Reynaud & Couture, (2012). Hypothetical 
Tanaka, Camerer & 
Nguyen (TCN) Design 
Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen (2010) Real 
Liu & Huang, (2013) Hypothetical 
 Love, Magnan & Colson, (2014) Real 
 Bocquého, Jacquet & Reynaud (2014) Real 
Becker, Degroot & 
Marshak (BDM) Design 
Becker, Degroot & Marshak (1963) Real 
Isaac & James, (2000) Hypothetical 
Harrison, (1989) Hypothetical 
The Random Lottery 
Pair Design  
Hey and Orme (1994)  
Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul (1990) 
Hypothetical 
Real & Hypothetical 
Couture,Reynaud, Dury, & Bergez 
(2010) 
Real & Hypothetical 
Mixed Methods Glöckner & Pachur (2012)  Hypothetical 
 Donkers, Melenberg & Van Soest 
(2001) 
Hypothetical 
Bespoke methods Hsee and Weber (1997)  
Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015) 
Hypothetical 





The Ordered Lottery Selection design (OL)  
The Ordered Lottery Selection design (OL) by Binswanger (1981) approach shown 
in Table 5 where a number of 50-50 lotteries are presented to participants from 
which they are required to pick just one pair to play. While this method is simple 
and permits parametric estimation, however the potential of deducing risk seeking 
behaviour is limited. Consequently, this method over-estimates risk aversion. In 
addition, the 50/50 lottery structure makes it difficult to draw conclusions on 
warping of probabilities, since identification of warping requires variability in 
probabilities.   
Table 5  
Binswanger (1980) version of the OL 
Lottery A            Lottery B 
p  ₹ p  ₹ 
0.5 50 0.5 50 
0.5 45 0.5 95 
0.5 40 0.5 120 
0.5 35 0.5 125 
0.5 30 0.5 150 
0.5 20 0.5 160 
0.5 10 0.5 190 
0.5 0 0.5 200 
Reprinted from “Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement  
in rural India”. Binswanger, H. P. (1980). American journal of  
Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395-407. 
 
Multiple Price List (MPL)  
In this case the DM has to choose between two lotteries with varying probabilities 
and fixed payoffs where the expected value of the lottery with the higher variance 
increases as the experiment progresses. The design of the Multiple Price List (MPL) 
shown in Table 6 is organised such that a participant is faced with pairs of a given 
number of lotteries from which the decision maker states preference between each 
pair (say A and B) for all given paired lotteries. While the payoff of each lottery pair 
is fixed, the probability however varies. With the onset of the task, the expected 
value of A is greater than B and the expected value of each pair increases as 
participants move down each row until it gets to a point where B exceed A. 
Consequently, the point at which the participants switches determines the risk 
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attitude. This method has been popularised by HL and is applied in numerous 
studies as it is arguably ease to use. However, results from some studies have shown 
that the HL-MPL may not be the most suitable method of eliciting risk attitude in 
developing countries as the multiple switching behaviours have been persistently 
documented. For example studies carried out in Peru (see Galarza, 2009), Rwanda 
(see Jacobson & Petrie, 2009) Mozambique (see De Brauw & Eozenou, 2011), South 
Africa (see Brick et al., 2012), Senegal (see Charness and Viceisza, 2012) each show 
different rates of inconsistencies among participants who switched choice at least 
once. Other limitation is that the MPL design leads to systematic framing which coax 
respondents to pick the lottery on the middle row of the table. 
Table 6  
Holt & Laury (2002) version of the MPL 
Lottery A Lottery B 
p € p € p € p € 
0.1 2 0.9 1.60 0.1 3.85 0.9 0.10 
0.2 2 0.8 1.60 0.2 3.85 0.8 0.10 
0.3 2 0.7 1.60 0.3 3.85 0.7 0.10 
0.4 2 0.6 1.60 0.4 3.85 0.6 0.10 
0.5 2 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.85 0.5 0.10 
0.6 2 0.4 1.60 0.6 3.85 0.4 0.10 
0.7 2 0.3 1.60 0.7 3.85 0.3 0.10 
0.8 2 0.2 1.60 0.8 3.85 0.2 0.10 
0.9 2 0.1 1.60 0.9 3.85 0.1 0.10 
1 2 0 1.60 1 3.85 0 0.10 
Reprinted from “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.”  
Holt, Charles, A., & Susan K. Laury. 2002.   
American Economic Review, 92 (5): 1644-1655. 
 
 
The Becker, Degroot & Marshak (BDM)  
The Becker, Degroot & Marshak (BDM) design presented in Table 7 has been applied 
in both real and hypothetical studies including Becker, Degroot & Marshak (1963), 
Isaac & James (2000), Harrison, (1989). The BDM is built around bidding where 
participants’ are handed a number of lotteries from which they could only sell if the 
selling price (Si) demanded by the participant is equal or less than a randomly 
picked buying price (Ci) in which case the participant is paid price Ai. On the 
contrary, where the randomly picked buying price is greater, the participants gets 
Bi. However, the BDM however depends on the assumptions that participants are 
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expected utility maximizers otherwise, their true certainty equivalents of lotteries 
will not be disclosed. 
Table 7  
Becker, Degroot & Marshak (BDM) design 
Stages i Ai Bi Ci Si U(si) Stages i Ai Bi Ci Si U(si) 
1 0 100 50 S1 ½ 13 S4 100 50 S13 7/8 
2 0 100 75 S2 ¼ 14 S7 S8 75 S14 43/64 
3 0 100 25 S3 ¾ 15 S5 S4 50 S15 ½ 
4 S1 100 50 S4 ¾ 16 S9 100 50 S16 13/16 
5 0 S1 50 S5 ¼ 17 S6 S7 75 S17 7/16 
6 S2 S3 75 S6 3/8 18 S9 S13 50 S18 ¾ 
7 S2 S1 25 S7 5/8 19 S11 S8 75 S19 5/8 
8 100 S3 25 S8 13/16 20 0 S13 50 S20 7/16 
9 S5 100 590 S9 5/8 21 0 S4 50 S21 5/8 
10 S5 S1 50 S10 3/8 22 0 S8 25 S22 ¾ 
11 0 S3 25 S11 9/6 23 0 S4 50 S23 3/8 
12 S2 100 75 S12 7/16 24 0 100 75 S24 42/64 
Reprinted from “Measuring utility by a single‐response sequential method.” Becker, G. M., DeGroot, 
M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 9(3), 226-232. 
 
Bespoke methods 
Some studies have employed lottery experiments that do not directly fit in to the 
categories mentioned above. Hsee & Weber (1997) and Pahlke, Strasser & Vieider 
(2015) are typical examples. In Hsee & Weber (1997) design, participants were 
presented with a sure vs. 50-50 risky option from which a risk preference index was 
calculated depending on the participant choice in each group of experiment. Pahlke, 
Strasser & Vieider (2015) elicitation method features lotteries having a sure amount 
vs a 50-50 risky lottery for seven (7) out of eight (8) pairs; and one in which the 
lottery consisted of a 50-50 safe option vs a 50-50 option. The demerits of these 
methods i.e. lottery vs. sure option is that it does not permit controlling for chances 
that dissimilarity in complexity of the lottery constitute preference. Also it cannot 
model many real day-to-day problems. 
Overall, the findings from authors who have adopted the lottery style approach to 
elicit attitudes to risk and uncertainty particularly among the individuals in 
developing countries leaves fundamental gap for further research particularly as 
the results from experimental techniques applying such lotteries is contentious on 
one hand. For example, Reynaud & Couture (2012) in their comparison of Eckel and 
Grossman vs. Holt and Laury report that risk preference measures are affected by 
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the lottery approach used. Similarly, Anderson & Mellor (2009); Ihli, Chiputwa & 
Musshoff (2013) corroborate this argument by documenting evidence of instability 
of elicitation methods. Since neither of the approaches is a win-all, this calls for 
further research in designing and testing alternative lottery-style experiments. On 
the other hand, these lottery experiments are mostly restricted to monetary payoffs 
and framed in a way that do not reflect everyday problems. 
Non-Lottery based elicitation methods 
Besides the stated preference method (such as using lottery experiments as 
discussed above) which relies on direct elicitation from experiments or 
questionnaire; other authors’ have elicited DMs’ attitudes using revealed preference 
method to examine the relationship between DMs’ behaviour in real 
risky/uncertain scenarios. However this method have been criticised on the issue 
of external validity.  
One of the risk estimation approach that gained popularity in the agricultural 
economics literature is the Just & Pope (1977, 1978) model based on EUT. This idea 
behind the model is to examine how output level and output risks are concurrently 
affected by production inputs. According to Just & Pope (1978), splitting the 
stochastic production function into mean and variance terms make it possible to 
isolate the effects of inputs on the mean of output and risk i.e. the econometric 
estimation of the production function relies on aggregating the level and variability 
of production output thus permitting production inputs to be either risk-increasing 
or risk-decreasing. Other studies have relied on this model to estimate risk and risk 




2.7 Summary of Research Gaps Guided by Literature 
Although numerous studies have been conducted on risk and a few focusing on 
uncertainty, this research identified the following gaps based on the literature 
reviewed in this chapter. 
First, studies carried out on risk attitudes of farmers’ specifically in developing 
countries have produced contrasting results – from reports of risk aversion to 
documentation of risk seeking behaviour. There is evidence that inconsistency in 
behaviour arises from adopting different theories and employing diverse 
experimental procedures. Therefore, there is the need for more research on the 
interaction between contextual or procedural factors and the processes through 
which individual responses are obtained. 
Second, several of the more popular methods adopted in most studies have their 
respective limitations ranging from the way the experiments are designed which 
introduces significant cognitive burden; to format and framing that does not 
adequately reflect everyday problems. In addition, the potential of many leading 
theories especially non-EU based theories (discussed in Chapter 3) have not been 
exhaustively examined.  
Third, risk and uncertainty attitudes have more often been measured using either 
the choice list, ranking or allocation procedures. The most popular procedure – the 
choice list, has relied on binary choices designs in which the outcomes are discrete. 
There are limited studies that have shown the potential of extending popular 
theories using continuous binary choices. 
Fourth, risk attitudes in proxy decision i.e. situations where people make decisions 
on behalf of others have not been widely researched in Agricultural Economics 
compared to personal decisions. Crucially, in the literature, findings about whether 
attitudes in proxy decisions differ from personal decision within the context of risk 
and uncertainty are mixed. More so only a minute number of studies in this area 
have been targeted at agriculture in developing countries.  
Fifth, there is limited investigation on the possible temporal variability in 
risk/uncertainty attitudes; and the effect the biological/physiological traits of a 
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decision maker has on these attitudes. Specifically, although mental health related 
factors are reported to influence decision-making behaviour, yet for the most part 
economists have not investigated the links between such factors and context 
specific attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. 
Sixth, numerous studies on participation in off-farm activities have focused on other 
determinants or drivers of the decision to participation in off-farm income earning 
activities without extending the determinants to accommodate risk and uncertainty 
attitudes. Currently, there is scarce empirical evidence on risk attitudes and the 
relationship between the decision to engage in off-farm income earning activities on 
one hand; and the link between risk attitudes and nature or type of off-farm activity. 
Lastly, there is dearth of studies addressing the issues above in developing countries 
where empirical evidence are much need as farmers risks their livelihoods by being 
exposed to arguably much larger risks/uncertainties than farmers in developed 





Theories of Risk and Uncertainty– Preference 
Functional and Decision Rules  
3.0 Introduction 
Theories that characterize choices under risk and uncertainty are numerous – from 
normative to descriptive. A considerably large number of authors have introduced, 
adopted or modified the approach of the Expected Utility theory (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), the Subjective Expected Utility theory (Savage, 1954) or the 
Weighted Expected Utility model (Chew & MacCrimmon, 1979; Fishburn, 1983). 
The non-EU theories that have shaped the agricultural economics literature 
includes Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Rank Dependant Utility 
theory (Quiggin, 1982), Cumulative Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), 
Salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2011) and Regret and Disappointment theories (Bell 
1985; Fishburn, 1984; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). In the Chapter, both EU and non-
EU theories are reviewed extensively. 
Chapter 3 is split into three components namely: EUT, the non-EU theories and 
other alternative theories. Precisely, section 3.1 is a general review of the EUT, 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 focuses on non-EU theories, sections 3.4 to 3.8 are expositions 




3.1 The Expected Utility (EU) model 
Expected Utility (EU) Theory (EUT) arguably remains the benchmark theory of 
decision-making under risk. The earliest record of the EUT dates back to the work 
of Bernoulli (1738). Broadly, EUT has tended to have two applied versions, one built 
around the element of wealth or income in which case the DM’s utility is a function 
of disposable income or wealth; and one which does not include initial wealth 
around which utility is evaluated. According to Cox & Sadiraj, (2002) the expected 
utility function is linear in probabilities whether decisions are taken under risk or 
uncertainty and a rational decision maker will choose options that maximize their 
expected utility. 
According to von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) (VNM hereafter), the EU model can 
be specified as: 
EU(𝐿)  =  ∑𝑝𝑖𝑢(𝑥𝑖)                                       (3.1.1) 
or in the case of just two payoffs,      
EU(𝐿)  =  𝑝1𝑢(𝑥1) + (1 − 𝑝1)𝑢(𝑥2)                    
Where L refers to the probability 𝑝1 of getting payoff 𝑥1 and 𝑝2 of getting payoff 𝑥2 
and 𝑢(. ) is the utility function. Given any two lotteries18 where ≻ represent 
preference, it is assumed that L1 ≻ L2 if EU(L1) > EU(L2).  
According to von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) the expected utility of any 
rational decision maker is derived from four axioms. These axioms are: 
Completeness:  establishes preference ordering for any comparison of a pair of 
lotteries. That is a decision maker either prefers one to the other or is indifferent 
between lotteries (Aumann, 1962).  
 
For any pair of A and B either A ≽ B or A ≼ B. 
 
Transitivity: implies that a decision maker maintains a consistent preference. If A is 
preferred to B and B to C; then A is equally preferred to C. 
 
Given A, B and C if A ≽ B and B ≽ C  then it is expected that A ≽ C. 
                                                          




Continuity: Given lotteries A and B then C; and A is preferred to B, B preferred to C 
then there exists a probability p such that B is equally attractive as [A, C; p, (1-p)] 
thus the decision maker becomes indifferent. 
 
A ≽ B ≽ C then ∈ p such that B ∼ [A, C; p, (1-p)] 
 
Independence: also known as the sure-thing principle states that if each of two 
lotteries are mixed with a third in the same way, the preference ordering remains 
independent of the third. That is, given lotteries A and B an agent who prefers A to 
B also prefers the possibility of A to the possibility of B, wherein the other possibility 
in both cases is some C. 
A ≽ B then, for all C, [A, C; p, (1-p)] ≽ [B, C; p, (1-p)] 
Any “rational” decision maker ought not to violate these axioms in which case his 
complete, transitive and continuous preferences can be represented by a utility 
function   
, where A ≽ B if and only if U(A) ≽ U(B). 
According to the EUT, the shape of the utility function determines the risk attitude.  
For a concave (convex) utility function, the DM is reported to be risk averse 
(seeking) while a DM with linear utility function is categorised as risk neutral.  
In estimating the utility function, several parametric forms have been widely used 
in the literature as presented in Table 1 in Chapter 2. Popular among these are the 
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) and Absolute Risk 
Aversion (ARA). The ARA provide details regarding the manner in which risk 
aversion change with  different wealth level while RRA show the way risk aversion 
changes when risky prospect and wealth level are changed by equal proportion. 
Assuming a DM having a Bernoulli utility function denoted 𝑈(𝑌) that is twice 










= 𝑌𝐴(𝑌)                               (3.1.3) 
In constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function the relative risk aversion 
is assumed to be the same irrespective of wealth level (𝑌). Here the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (𝛾) is the parameter of interest. The greater the value of  𝛾, the 
stronger the risk aversion.  
For  𝛾 = 1, the utility function of CRRA is given by: 
𝑈(𝑌) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑌)                                            (3.1.4)    




                                               (3.1.5)  
The key characteristics of the specified CRRA are (I)  in the event that 𝛾 < 1 the CRRA 
utility function is increasing in 𝑌1−𝛾 and  vice versa if  𝛾 > 1 (II) whenever 𝛾 → 1, the 
utility function coincides with 𝑙𝑛𝑌, (III) 𝑈′′′𝑌 > 0. The popularity of this function 
arises from the necessity of estimating only a single parameter. 
With regards to the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, the 
absolute risk aversion is determined on the supposition that 𝜌 is a positive constant 
which does not depend of wealth. In this case, adjustments to a DM’s preference as 
risk aversion becomes greater can be estimated subject to a known value of absolute 
risk aversion.  
The utility function of CARA is specified as:  
𝑈(𝑌) = −𝑒−𝜌𝑌                                         (3.1.6) 
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion 𝜌 > 0  implies risk aversion,  𝜌 = 0  implies 
risk neutral and  𝜌 < 0  implies risk seeking. One of the main criticisms is that 
assumption of CARA does not reflect real behaviour as it does not take into 
consideration any wealth effects.  
Other functional forms include the quadratic form also known as the Increasing 




𝑈(𝑌) = Y − 𝜌𝑌2                                  (3.1.7) 
In which case the parameter to be estimated is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (𝜌).  
One utility function that can accommodate in special cases other utility functions 
including the CARA and CRRA is the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk-Aversion (HARA). A 
utility function exhibits HARA in the case where  








            (3.1.8) 
Where 𝛾 → −∞, 𝑏 > 0 or 𝛾 < 1, 𝑏 = 0 then HARA reduces to CARA and CRRA 
respectively. Unlike CARA and CRRA which permits variation in the magnitude of 
risk aversion, HARA permits positive or negative slope of the risk aversion 





Violations of the axioms of the EUT – Allais paradox (Common Ratio & 
Consequence) 
EUT continues to have support as a theory about how rational decision makers 
should act. However, it has less support in terms of a descriptive theory of how 
decision makers act. Empirical evidence have shown that a DM’s attitude is 
inconsistent with the EUT predictions. The axiom that has been criticised most is 
the independence axiom. The paradoxes of Allais (1953, 1979) provided evidence 
that an individual decision maker can be inconsistent with EU theory. According to 
the observations of Allais (1953) preferences are influenced by introducing an 
independent event into a set of prospects thereby nullifying the validity of the 
independent axiom. The Allais paradoxes have been categorised as common ratio 
and common consequence paradoxes (see Levi, 1986; Starmer & Sugden, 1989; 
Birnbaum, 1999; Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger & Ortoleva, 2013 for details).  
Common Ratio Paradox 
The paradox is illustrated using the following Allais experiment. An individual is 
asked to make a choice between the following lotteries: 
Lottery 1: Would you prefer A or B? 
A: 100% chance of winning $3,000 B:  80% chance of winning $4,000  
                    20% chance of winning $0 
Lottery 2: Would you prefer C or D? 
C: 25% chance of winning $3,000  D: 20% chance of winning $4,000 
 75% chance of winning $0   80% chance of winning $0 
Presented with the first set of lottery, most individuals preferred option A to B. 
However, when presented with the second lottery majority prefer D to C. It is worth 
mentioning that lottery 1 is reduced by a proportion of 0.25 to obtain lottery 2 
however unlike the decision made in lottery 1(where the sure option is chosen); the 
more risky option (D) becomes the most attractive in Lottery 2. This behavior is 
irrational as for larger probabilities; more weight was attached to the larger of the 





Common Consequence Paradox 
Individuals were presented with lotteries 3 and 4 and were told to make their 
choices. 
Lottery 3: Would you prefer E or F? 
E:  100% chance of winning $.5 Million F:  10% chance of winning $1 Million 
                  89% chance of winning $.5 Million 
            1% Chance of winning $0 
Lottery 4: Would you prefer G or H? 
G: 11% chance of winning $.5 Million  H:  10% chance of winning $1 Million 
     89% chance of winning $0         90% chance of winning $0 
When presented with such scenario the rational decision maker who prefers E over 
F in lottery 3 should prefer lottery G over F in 4 implying E ≻F and G ≻ H. Also given 
that the expected value of E and F are approximately $.5 Million, $.55 Million and G 
and H are $.06 Million $.1Million respectively, judging from this criteria the 
expected utility maximizer preference should be E ≺ F and G ≺ H. However, most 
individuals chose E over F in lottery 3 implying ‘risk dislike’ since the “sure” win is 
chosen. In a contradictory choice pattern, most individuals preferred H to G, which 
implies ‘risk loving’ thus clearly violating the EU axiom. It becomes obvious that 
when making decisions on the outcome of a “sure” lottery an individual places high 
value on such lottery as against a case where the payoff have probabilities attached. 
The common consequence paradox therefore highlights the fact that in certain 
scenarios people would prefer choices that were earlier rejected. Such case 
questions the strength and validity of the VNM (1944) EU theory.  
Other characteristic of the expected utility function that raises concern among 
researchers is the linear handling of probabilities. In reality, DMs do not appear to 
weight probabilities linearly. It has been shown in several studies (e.g. Birnbaum, 
1999; Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994; Tuthill & Frechette, 2002 and Neilson, 2001) 
that the expected utility theory cannot accommodate non-linear probability 
weighting. This limitation results in the EUT being unable to reflect accurately the 




3.1.1 Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU).  
One popular variant of the EUT is Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU). The SEU 
amalgamates the DM utility function and probability distribution. There is 
difference between the SEU and EUT regarding how probabilities are perceived. As 
discussed above under the EUT, probabilities are given objective evaluation while 
the SEU decision maker perceives probability subjectively in situations where there 
is difficulty defining objective probabilities. The SEU model suggest that DMs act in 
a manner that suggests they estimate the expected utility of each act then chooses 
the act assumed to have the highest utility. In other words, prospects and their 
associated probabilities are given subjective evaluation. Several popular axioms 
include Savage (1954), Anscombe & Aumann (1963), Machina & Schmeidler (1992) 
dominate the literature. Economist have often adapted and employed the 
conceptual and computational composition of the SEU in methodologically 
examining decision making under uncertainty.  
According to Savage (1954), given that ≽ represents preference relation on F that 
defines the set of all acts (𝑓: 𝑆 ↦ 𝐶) where S and C are set of states and consequences 
respectively. Then  ≽  satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
representation of the preference relation19 𝑖𝑓𝑓 a unique probability measure 𝑃 that 
is nonatomic, finitely additive on the set of states 𝑆 and a cardinally unique utility 
function 𝑢: 𝐶 → ℝ exist such that ≽ is 
𝑓 ↦ ∫𝑢(𝑓(𝑠))𝑑𝑃(𝑠)
𝑠
          (3.1.11)    
This implies that should a rational DM satisfy the axioms; the DM converts any 
uncertainty regarding the states to a subjective probability measure that represents 
the DM’s belief. In addition, consequences are ordered in a manner corresponding 
to a utility function that portrays the taste of the DM and acts appraised based on 
the expected utility criterion. Although the SEU and its axiomatizations are 
relatively less complicated and intuitive, however like the EUT it also has its 
shortcomings mostly concerning its descriptive ability. Notably the SEU fails to 
                                                          
19 These axioms include ordering, sure-thing, independence, comparative probability, non-




accommodate uncertainty aversion. An example of this limitation is captured in the 
popular Ellsberg (1961) paradox. 
Violation of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) – Ellsberg Paradox 
The paradoxes of Ellsberg brought to light the fact that DMs prefer events with ‘sure’ 
payoffs over those with ‘uncertainties’ in what Ellsberg (1961) referred to as 
ambiguity aversion (i.e. a case where the DM acts like there is no clear-cut objective 
or subjective belief distribution). An example of Ellsberg (1961) experiment is 
presented. There are 90 coloured balls in an urn and it is known for sure that the 
number of red balls is 30. The remaining 60 balls are green and yellow in unknown 
proportion. 
Individuals were required to make a choice between lotteries A and B  
A: Win $100 if you pick a red ball 
B: Win $100 if you pick a green ball 
Individuals were required to make a choice between lotteries C and D  
C: Win $100 if you pick a ball that is not green ball 
D: Win $100 if you pick a ball that is not red ball 
Most participants choose lottery A over B and D over C which contradicts Savage 
(1954) sure-thing principle20 which stipulates, an agent who prefers A to B should 
also prefers C to D. In lotteries A, given that the DM has information on the 
proportion of red balls, the DM can then attach probability 1 3⁄  to picking a red ball 
however in terms of the probability of picking a green ball in lottery B, the much the 
DM  knows is that the probability does not exceed 2 3⁄ .  Also for lotteries D, the DM 
is sure of the probability 2 3⁄  of not picking a red ball but the probability of not 
picking a green ball in lottery C is not known. These situations according to Ellsberg 
prompt DMs to choose the options with known probabilities over those with 
uncertainties regarding their probabilities. 
                                                          
20 Savage stated that if a DM has to choose between two acts A and B, the DM’s preferences is 
determined by the values of the difference in value of acts A, B. 
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In the light of the above, other decision theories which overcome the limitations of 
the EU and SEU theories and are poised to accommodate decision-making behaviour 
uncertainty are reviewed to assess their suitability for this study.                                                     
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3.2 Rank Dependent Utility model 
The Rank dependent Utility (RDU) theory was first introduced in the works of 
Quiggin (1981, 1982) to accommodate the defects of the EUT with respect to 
decisions making under risk (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994). Rank dependent utility 
is built on the foundation that the value of an outcome depends both on probability 
of the outcome and how favourable it appears when ranked with the other possible 
outcomes (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994; Tuthill & Frechette, 2002). According to 
Quiggin, a DM compares random outcomes based on the DMs’ expected utility under 
probability warping.  
For illustration purposes assume that a DM is faced with 𝑛-lotteries. Assuming the 
lottery 𝐿 = (𝑥1;  𝑝1;  𝑥2;  𝑝2;  … 𝑥𝑛;  𝑝𝑛) generate the consequences 𝑥𝑖 with probability 
 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2…;𝑛  where the consequences are ranked  𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2  ≥ ⋯ ≥  𝑥𝑛 . The RDEU 
of lottery L is denoted as:  
𝑅𝐷𝑈(𝐿)  =∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑢(𝑥𝑖)  
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                       (3.2.1)                
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑝1 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑖) −  𝑤(𝑝1 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑖−1)       (3.2.2)     
𝜋𝑖  denotes decision weights and  𝑤 is a uniquely determined weighting function.  
One distinctive characteristic of the RDU is the non-linear probability weighting 
function 𝑤: [0,1]  →  [0,1]  that strictly increases and fulfils the condition 𝑤(0) =
0 and 𝑤(1) = 1  (Jindapon & Shaw, 2008; Wakker, 2010). As shown in Diecidue & 
Wakker, (2001) it is the shape of the uniquely determined weighting function that 
brings about optimism and pessimism21 when a DM evaluates a prospect 
subjectively. 
The RDU have proven valuable in explaining the Allais paradox; a well-known 
violations of EU theory (Segal 1987, Quiggin, 1991). Referring to the lotteries earlier 
presented in common consequence paradox under the EUT; in the first set of 
options (A and B) although there is a 10% chance of getting a higher outcome ($1m 
as compared to a sure $0.5m) most decision makers place more value on  the sure 
payoff rather than gambling to win more (or nothing). However, in the second set 
                                                          
21 See Section 3.4 for a discussion of these terms 
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of options (C and D), the individual places more importance on the likely increase 
in size of payoff (from $0.5m to $1m). Since there is no sure-win the DM is prepared 
to sacrifice a small percentage for the chance to win more. It becomes evident that 
a percent increase in the probability of getting $0 in both lotteries is weighed more 
heavily in the choice between A and B than in the choice between C and D. Thus for 
large probabilities, more weight is attached to the larger of both while for small 
probabilities, more weight is attached to the smaller. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
found that judging by the decision weights used by individuals, low probabilities are 
over-weighted and high probabilities under-weighted. 
Given the response obtained in Lottery 1 as discussed in the common ratio paradox 
presented in section 3.1, 
           A ≻ B ⇒  𝑢(3000) > 𝜋(0.8)𝑢(4000)                          (3.2.3) 
           C ≺ D ⇒  𝜋(0.25)𝑢(3000) < 𝜋(0.2)𝑢(4000)           (3.2.4)   
The violation of VNM expected utility is clearly present as there do not exist any 
utility function in which both A ≻ B and C ≺ D can hold simultaneously. Assuming 
the functional form by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) in equation 3.4.7 is adopted i.e. 
𝜋(𝑝) =  
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾+(1−𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
  where 𝛾 = 0.61, the corresponding values are 𝜋(0.8)  = 0.61,  
𝜋(0.25) = 0.29 and 𝜋(0.2) = 0.26. The respective RDU’s for Lotteries A, B, C and D 
can then reconcile the Allais paradox. 
RDUA = 𝑢(3000) = 3000 
RDUB = 𝑢(0) +  𝜋(0.8)(𝑢(4000) − 𝑢(0)) =2440 
RDUC = 𝑢(0) +  𝜋(0.25)(𝑢(3000) − 𝑢(0)) =870 
RDUD = 𝑢(0) +  𝜋(0.2)(𝑢(4000) − 𝑢(0)) =1040             (3.2.5)   
This then justify having both A ≻ B and C ≺ D holding simultaneously. For 
cumulative weighting function (𝜋), 
                𝜋 (1) – 𝜋 (.8) ≥ 𝜋 (.25) – 𝜋 (.20)                                          (3.2.6)   
Equation (3.2.6) holds under diminishing sensitivity i.e. when the change in 
probability around 0 or 1 has more impact than similar change in the middle area. 





Notably, the RDU preserves first order stochastic dominance because in appropriate 
conditions, a rightward shift in the probability distribution mass from one outcome 
to a strictly higher outcome will leads to a corresponding homogenous shift in the 
transformed probability distribution (Quiggin 1991; Prigent, 2008). This is made 
possible since it is the cumulative distribution function that is transformed thus 
assuring stochastic dominance (Quiggin 1982; Allais 1987; Eide, Von Simson & 
Strøm 2011, Neilson, 2001). The RDU is closely related to the CEU wherein the RDU 
is referred to as a special case of the CEU albeit for risk. However, the main 
limitations of the RDU are its inability to accommodate the Ellsberg paradox 
(detailed in section 3.1) as well as handle mixed domain lotteries among others 




3.3 Mean-Standard deviation Theory 
Markowitz (1952) paper popularised the mean-variance utility model. The crux of 
the mean-standard variance (MSD) model is in the measurement of risk by its 
standard deviation (SD) i.e. the presumption that weighted sum of a lottery’s EV and 
SD determines the utility a DM obtains from that lottery. Markowitz (1952) 
argument is that; in selecting a portfolio an investor aims at maximizing expected 
return while minimizing the variance. In other words, it is based on the presumption 
that when a rational DM is presented with risky (or uncertain) choices, he/she 
selects the payoff with the highest mean (expected value) while simultaneously 
minimizing variance. It is on this premise that the (static) mean Standard deviation 
model is built. The model specifies that 
𝑢(𝑥) =  Ω +  𝜇(𝑥) −  𝑏𝜎(𝑥)                              (3.3.1) 
Where 
𝑢(𝑥)  = Utility of a prospect 𝑥 
𝜇(𝑥)  = Expected value of 𝑥 
𝜎  = Standard deviation  
𝑏   = Risk tolerance parameter (b>0, risk averse and b<0,risk loving) 
             Ω            = Constant 
 
According to the tenets of mean-variance criterion, when faced with a scenario that 
involves risk and the DM has to choose between say X and Y the DM should prefer X 
whenever the expected value of 𝑥 is greater and variance is smaller than Y. Similarly, 
the DM should prefer X if the expected value of 𝑥 is greater even when both have 
equal variance. In the case where the variance of 𝑥 is smaller and both have equal 
expected value, the DM should also choose X. The manner in which risk aversion is 
estimated in the MSD theory is distinct from that of the EUT. As shown in the 
equation 3.3.1, risk aversion is the consequence of the penalty foisted on risk. The 
utility depends on a trade-off between expected value and variance thus the higher 
the risk parameter 𝑏, the greater the risk aversion. The EUT is equivalent to the MSD 
for an exponential utility function and approximate for quadratic utility function. 
The mean variance model22 has been applied to numerous studies including travel 
time (Börjesson, Eliasson & Franklin, 2012), portfolio selection (Stone, 1973; Kroll, 
                                                          




Levy & Rapoport, 1988), movement tasks (Nagengast, Braun & Wolpert, 2011), risk 
attitude (Mengel, Tsakas & Vostroknutov, 2011). A few studies have attempted to 
compare the MSD theory with other leading theories. For instance, Nagengast, 
Braun & Wolpert (2011) test for sensitivity to the variance instead of only the 
average level of movement and compared the MV model with the CPT and report 
that their findings favour the MV model. Similarly, Best & Grauer, (2011) paper 
which focused on examining the behaviour of individuals with extreme risk 
attitudes under different situations using prospect-theory, power-utility and MV 
portfolios find that the performance of the MV is superior to prospect-theory. 
However, De Giorgi & Hens (2009) making similar comparison have reported 
contrary findings.  
Mengel et al., (2016) applied the MV model to estimate risk attitude over monetary 
and non-monetary outcomes across risk, ambiguity and unawareness however 
their design was restricted to a fixed versus varying sure outcomes. This thesis 
however applied the MV model to estimate risk and uncertainty attitudes from a set 
of non-degenerate prospects. 
The main merits of the MV theory are the absence of complication that would 
otherwise arise from having to estimate several parameters. Also it has the 
advantage of corresponding to EU maximization under certain conditions. Despite 
these advantages, there have been many criticisms of the MV model. For instance, 
its inability to satisfy first order stochastic dominance and accommodate cases of 
infinite mean/variance. In addition, the MV cannot adequately handle a situation 
where prospects have equal mean and variance leading to the conclusion of 
indifference when in actual sense such prospects may not be equally appealing to 




3.4 The Prospect and Cumulative Prospect Models 
The prospect theory (PT) proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) caters for the 
descriptive limitations (including the widely documented Allais paradox) of the 
VNM expected utility theory. The PT assigns value to gains and losses as opposed to 
final wealth; and substitutes decision weights for probabilities. In other words, a 
DM’s action pivots on the possible value of losses and gains (instead of the final 
outcome) which is reference point dependent. According to the proposition of the 
PT, two steps are involved in the decision making process. A DM first edits and codes 
the prospect; then proceeds to evaluate it before reaching any decision. 
Assuming ℘ = (𝑝1𝑥1, 𝑝2𝑥2; 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 − z) represents a prospect which has 
𝑝1 probability at 𝑥1, 𝑝2 probability at 𝑥2  and 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 at z in which case x1 >
x1 > z ≥ 0. Here prospects are appraised by 
𝑉(𝑝1, 𝑥1; … ; 𝑝𝑖, 𝑥𝑖; … ; 𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚) =  ∑  
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝜋(𝑝𝑖)𝑣(𝑥𝑖)                        (3.4.1) 
Where 𝑣  which represents the function that assigns value to payoffs and 𝜋 
represents decision weights. The original prospect theory recorded its own 
setbacks both in terms of the way it handled non-additive probabilities and 
subjective editing operations which results in its violation of first order stochastic 
dominance23. In addition, the specification of the probability weighting function is 
weak and it poses a challenge when applied to larger results. 
The Cumulative Prospect theory thereafter put forward by Tversky & Kahneman 
(1992) combines the concepts of the rank dependant utility theory and the original 
prospect theory24. The foundation of the CPT primarily relies on the prospect theory 
paper of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) which was built on two major elements – 
wherein the cumulative functional are applied separately to gains and losses; and 
the transformation of probabilities. Kahneman & Tversky (1992) then incorporated 
                                                          
23 Assuming lottery A for any payoff Y result in a higher probability of a DM getting a payoff equal to 
or greater than Y under lottery B, then lottery A is regarded as having (first-order) stochastic 
dominance over B. Details of first and second order stochastic dominance in Appendix 7. 
24 Similar to the prospect theory, the value function however displays reference dependence, 
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion (Bui, 2009). However, unlike the PT; the CPT preserves 
first order stochastic dominance by using cumulative probabilities. 
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the Rank Dependant Utility theory (RDU) where the objective probability is 
transformed and the decision weights are determined by the cumulative 
probabilities. The tenets of the CPT are that DMs judge ‘riskiness’ of a prospect in 
relation to a reference point, do not have the same risk attitude for gains and losses 
and tend to distort cumulative distributions. 
Assuming a prospect with probabilities 𝑝1…𝑝𝑛 with outcomes  𝑥1 ≤ ⋯𝑥𝑚 ≤ 0 ≤
 𝑥𝑚+1 ≤ 𝑥𝑛. The overall valuation of a prospect ℘ is presented as:  
𝑉(℘)  =  ∑ 𝑣(𝑥𝑖)𝜋𝑖







            (3.4.2) 
For which 𝑣 is the value function for payoffs and 𝜋+ and 𝜋− represents decision 
weights for gains and losses respectively. The value function in Kahneman & 
Tversky (1992) takes the form of a power function in which responsiveness to gains 
and losses are distinguished by means of the coefficient25 (λ). Wherein λ > 1 
suggest that the weight attached to loss exceeds that attached to gain. For the gain 
and loss domains, the value function specified as in power form is given as: 
             𝑣(𝑥) = {
𝑥𝛼  
– λ(−𝑥)𝛽         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥<0
       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥≥0
                       (3.4.3)  
Where the curvature of the value function for gains and that of losses are obtained 
form the parameters α and β respectively. In conformity with diminishing 
sensitivity, 0 < 𝛼, 𝛽 < 1 implies concave shape in the gain domain and convex 
shape in the loss domain. Other value function forms include the exponential form 
for example in Köbberling & Wakker (2005) and Rieger & Bui (2010) given by: 
         𝑣(𝑥) = {
1 − 𝑒−𝛼𝑥 
– λ + λe𝛽𝑥         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥<0
       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥≥0
                         (3.4.4)  
Or the quadratic value function adopted in Giorgi et al., (2004) and Zakamouline & 
Koekebakker (2009). The quadratic value function is given by: 
                                                          












𝑥2,   
      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥≥0
       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥<0
                             (3.4.5)  
The probability weighting function (PWF) of Quiggin (1982) and Kahneman & 
Tversky (1992) ‘combines’ probability weighting with EU such that for a prospect 
(𝑥−𝑛 <  0 < 𝑥𝑚) with corresponding probabilities (𝑝−𝑛, 𝑝𝑚), the decision weights 
which are sign-dependent are expressed as  
𝜋𝑚
+ = 𝑤+(𝑝𝑚) 
𝜋𝑖
+ = 𝑤+(𝑝𝑖  +  …+ 𝑝𝑚) − 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑖+1  +  …+ 𝑝𝑚)   𝑛  < 𝑖 < 𝑚 
𝜋1
− = 𝑤−(𝑝1)  
𝜋𝑗
− = 𝑤−(𝑝1  +  …+ 𝑝𝑗) − 𝑤
−(𝑝1 + …+ 𝑝𝑗−1 )   1 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛            (3.4.6)  
While 𝑤(. ) is the probability transformation function with characteristic of 
𝑤: [0,1]  →  [0,1]  that strictly increases and fulfils the condition 𝑤+(0) =  𝑤− (0) =
0 and 𝑤+(1) =  𝑤− (1) = 1. Each segment of the gain and loss equations are forms of 
the RDU. This implies that the CPT consist of the summation of RDU of  𝑝+ with 
respect to 𝒲+  and RDU of  𝑝− with respect to the dual of  𝒲 –. The curve of the  𝒲+ 
and 𝒲− function fitted in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) takes the form of  
       𝒲+(𝑝) =  
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
     𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                                         
      𝒲−(𝑝) =  
𝑝𝛿
(𝑝𝛿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛿)1/𝛿
𝑖    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0                         (3.4.7)  
Where domain sensitivity to differences in probability is represented by the 




Goldstein & Einhorn (1987) suggested a linear-in-log-odds function wherein the 
parameters that captures separately the curvature (γ+, γ−) and elevation (δ+,  δ−) 
of the PWF are obtained 





+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛾
+                                               





+ (1 − 𝑝)𝛾
−                                 (3.4.8)  
Smaller values on 𝛾+and 𝛾− translates to reduced sensitivity to changes in 
probabilities. On the other hand, the parameters 𝛿+ and 𝛿− (both > 0) which 
determine the attractiveness of the prospect suggest that larger (resp. smaller) 
values of 𝛿+ (𝛿−) suggests greater elevation of the PWF for gains (losses). This 
corresponds to the behaviour reported in the literature as optimism for gains and 
losses. Another widely applied two-parameter weighting functions in which the 
probability weighting curvature is distinct from the elevation is Prelec (1998) 
probability weighting functions (Prelec I and II hereafter).  
Prelec II is represented by:  
𝒲+(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛿+(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾+)       𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                                  
𝒲−(𝑝) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛿−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾−)       𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0             (3.4.9)  
 
However, Prelec I PWF takes the form of:  
𝒲+(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾+)        𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                                  
   𝒲−(𝑝) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾−)        𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0              (3.4.10)  
 
While the power PWF: 
             𝒲+(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑖
𝛾+         𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                                                       
                        𝒲−(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑖
𝛾−          𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0                                       (3.4.11)           
 
In order to model noise in data, an estimation of outcome sensitivity in the 




     𝑃(𝑉(𝐴), 𝑉(𝐵)) =
1
1 + 𝑒− 𝜑(𝑉(𝐴)−𝑉(𝐵))
                                (3.4.12)   
where the 𝑃(𝑉(𝐴), 𝑉(𝐵)) specifies the probability that Prospect A will be chosen 
over B. The parameter φ (response/choice sensitivity parameter) measure 
arbitrariness in the DM choice while 𝑉(𝐴) and 𝑉(𝐵) represents the subjective 
values of the prospects. The closer 𝜑 is to zero, the greater the randomness of 
choices. (For details of different value, weighting and choice functional forms; see 
Stott (2006) and Balcombe & Fraser (2016)). In summary, the CPT’s combination of 
reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity, perception of loss with respect to 
gain and non-linear probability weighting distinguishes its predictions with that of 
the EUT. 
Table 8 summarizes the value and probability weighting functional forms and the 
results obtained from selected literature in which CPT parameters were estimated. 
These studies estimates various value functions (ranging from power to 
exponential) and probability weighting functions (including Prelec I & II, Tversky & 
Kahneman, Goldstein & Einhorn) under different parametric forms. As shown in 
Table 8, Tanaka et al., (2010) and Toubia et al., (2013) estimated a single parameter 
PWF, Abdellaoui et al., (2005), Booij et al., (2010) and Bruhin et al., (2010) estimates 
at least two parameters probability weighting functions. Regarding the shape of the 
value and PWF, several domain specific CPT studies have reported concave shape 
in the gain domain and convex shape in the loss domain i.e. 0 < 𝛼, 𝛽 < 1 and 
inverse-s shape PWF 𝛾 < 1. However, studies including Wilcox (2015), Balcombe & 
Fraser (2015) have reported S-shaped or approaching purely concave or convex 
PWFs. For detailed estimates of studies that employed different parametric 
functional in CPT refer to Stott (2006) for Classical and Balcombe & Fraser (2015) 





Table 8  
Estimates of utility and probability weighting functions from selected literature 
Author(s)                                          Findings 
α β λ 𝛄+ 𝛄− 𝛅+ 𝛅− 
 Value function 
Power 
Probability weighting function 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 0.88  0.88 2.25 0.61 0.69   
Wu & Gonzalez (1996) 0.50   0.71    
Harrison & Rutström (2009) 0.71  0.72 1.38 0.91 0.91   
Stott (2006) 0.19   0.96    
    Goldstein & Einhorn (1987) 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) 0.91 0.96  0.83 0.84 0.98 1.35 
Stott (2006) 0.19   1.4  0.96  
    Prelec I (1998) 
Tu (2005) 0.68 0.74 3.2 1.00 0.77   
Donkers et al. (2001) 0.61 †  0.41 0.41   
  Prelec II(1998)   
Stott (2006) 0.19   1.00  1.00  
Bleichrodt &  Pinto (2000) 0.77   0.53  1.08  
Bruhin et al. (2010) 0.94 1.14  0.38 0.40 0.93 0.99 
Zeisberger et al. (2012) 1.00 0.91 1.42 0.86 0.82   
Toubia et al. (2013) 0.46 † 1.78 0.53    
 Exponential Karmarkar (1979)  
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) 0.09 0.05  0.74    
Booij et al. (2010) 0.68 0.83 1.58 0.62 0.59 0.77 1.02  
Lobel et al.  (2017) 0.28 0.09 1.17 0.91    
† indicates β = α  
 
Notably, while there are observable differences in the estimates in Table 8, the 
parameters for the gain and loss domains in each of the studies are very similar as 
regards the shapes of the value and probability weighting function. 
Figures A and B below replicates plots of the value functions of Tversky & 
Kahneman (1992) and Harrison & Rutström (2009) respectively. The value function 
defined by the deviations from the reference point for the former is steeper than the 




Figures A and B: Value functions for different values of α, β and λ defined by 
deviations from the reference point  
       Figure A 
 




3.4.1 CPT for Continuous Distributions 
Using CEU under additivity of the discrete subjective probability measures there is 
a direct correspondence with discrete CPT, and thus under additive continuous 
densities CEU can be thought of as a generalisation of CPT to continuous densities. 
This generalisation is discussed in the Section 3.4.2. The CPT as postulated in 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) can also handle continuous distribution. For 
continuous prospects the CPT evaluation takes the form  
𝑉(𝑥𝑐) = ∫ Γ−[𝐹(𝑥)].  𝑓(𝑥)𝑣−(𝑥)𝑑𝑥  
0
−∞




                                                                                                                       (3.4.13) 
Where 𝐹 and 𝑓 represents CDF and PDF respectively, 𝑣(. ) denotes the function that 
assigns value to outcomes and Γ = 
𝑑𝑤(𝑝) 
𝑑𝑝
.   
Recall the PWF function fitted in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) presented in equation 
3.4.7 substituted into equation 3.4.13 yields the following: 
𝑑𝑤(𝑝) 
𝑑𝑝
= 𝛾𝑝𝛾−1[𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾]
1
𝛾 − 𝑝𝛾[𝑝𝛾−1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝛾−1] [𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾]
−
(𝛾+1)
𝛾   
                                                                                                                                  (3.4.15) 
There are a number of studies in the literature that have extended CPT to 
continuous outcome26 distributions; however it is limited. De Giorgi et al. (2004) 
tested for consistency of the continuous CPT with the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
Davies & Satchell (2004) extends binary to continuous prospects with the aim of 
modelling individual asset allocation, while behavioural portfolio selection under 
CPT was the centre of attention in the studies of He & Zhou (2011), Pirvu & Schulze 
(2012) and Jin & Zhou (2008). Also, Davies & Satchell, (2007) examined the level to 
which a DM’s actions contradict the beliefs about his/her risk attitude while Nardon 
& Pianca, (2014) focused on examining European financial options in the bounds of 
continuous CPT. Most of these aforementioned works have drawn conclusion that 
the continuous CPT model generalizes the discrete specification.  
                                                          




Form a different approach, Kothiyal, Spinu & Wakker (2011) provides a preference 
foundation to define the CPT for continuous distributions; Rieger & Wang (2008) 
appraise the analytical composition of the CPT particularly on conditions 
encompassing continuous outcome distributions. As a build-up on earlier works, 
Rieger & Wang (2008) formulated a non-discrete variant of the CPT while retaining 
its positive properties. Barberis & Huang (2008) examined asset pricing under CPT 
with particular interest on the probability weighting component while Connors & 
Sumalee, (2009) and Tian, Huang & Wang (2012) in separate studies within the 
framework of the CPT examined individual route choice behaviour and risk 
perception on arrival time respectively in a network whose route travel times is a 
continuous distribution.  
Notably, none of these studies have focused on extending CPT to pairwise 
continuous outcome primarily with the aim of examining risk and uncertainty 
attitude using pure monetary ‘gambles’ across different content domains and 
targeted at farmers. Closest to this study in some perspective is the paper of Kontek 
(2009) where the author examined risk behaviour using both discrete and outcome 
having continuous distributions within gains, loss and mixed domains. The author 
compares relative utility theory and prospect theory and argues in favour of the 




3.4.2 Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)  
Most of the theories in the literature have been targeted at decision making under 
risk with very few showing potential to accommodate uncertainty. One theory that 
has been credited for its efficient handling of uncertainty is that of Schmeidler 
(1982, 1989) and Gilboa (1987) which spearheads Choquet expected utility based 
studies. According to the CEU theory, a DM behaves as though the utility function is 
cardinal, holds subjective non-additive beliefs; and estimate the expected utility of 
each act from which the DM chooses the act assumed to have the greatest expected 
utility. Thus, the CEU is a special generalization of the EUT that permits the 
integration of VNM function with regards to non-additive probability measures 
(Zimper, 2009). The CEU has sufficient and extensive properties to accommodate 
several preference models including the Subjective Expected Utility and the Maxmin 
and Maxmax Expected Utility.   
The CEU model adequately deals with conditions in which objective probabilities 
are unknown and the DM a-priori is unable to extract subjective probabilities over 
the state space (Warshawsky-Livne et al., 2012). The Choquet based models has 
been proven to be flexible and resolve known paradoxes while permitting for 
distinct discernment of uncertainty from outcome valuation. Chateauneuf, (1994) 
provided a simple framework which integrates the various axiomizations of CEU 
independently put forward by Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler (1986, 
1989). Unlike EUT which estimates risk via the curvature of the utility function, the 
Choquet expectation of the utility function is taken with respect to a capacity27 (in 
lieu of probability) which is non-additive (Eichberger, Grant & Kelsey, 2010). The 
work of Chateauneuf, Dana & Tallon (2000) shows the capability of the CEU in 
handling the DM’s preferences in situation of prevalent “ambiguity.” 
Given a DMs’ capacity measure is a function 𝑣 ∶ 2𝑠 → [0,1] that conforms 
with 𝑣(∅) = 0, 𝑣(𝑆) = 1 and 𝑋 ⊆ 𝑌 ⟹ 𝑣(𝑋) ≤ 𝑣(𝑌)for all 𝑋, 𝑌 ∈ 2𝑠 . Where S 
represents the finite states of nature, 2𝑠 designates σ-algebra on S respectively; and 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 the 'state' that s will occur. Then according to the CEU the DM ranks acts 𝑓 ∶
                                                          




𝑆 → ℝ under the assumption of a continuous strictly increasing and cardinal utility 
function  𝑈:ℝ+ → ℝ. Thus the Choquet expectation of 𝑓 with respect to a neo-
additive capacity 𝑣 is defined by: 







In estimating the CEU of an act, the DM typically ranks the different states 𝑠𝑖 
according to their attractiveness that could differ from one prospect to another. The 
preference of one act over another say given two acts 𝑎 and 𝑏 follows that 
 𝑎 is chosen over 𝑏 (𝑎 ≿ 𝑏 ⇔  𝐶𝐸𝑈(𝑎, 𝑣) ≥ 𝐶𝐸𝑈(𝑏, 𝑣)) when the CEU of the former 
is larger compared to the latter.  
The distortions of probabilities in the Choquet expected utility normally results in 
“pessimism” or “optimism” in which case the distortion function 𝑣 of the former 
takes a convex shape while for the latter it is concave (Bassett, Koenker & Kordas, 
2004). A convex capacity within the context of the CEU is represented by:  
𝑣(𝑋) + 𝑣(𝑌) ≤ 𝑣(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌) +  𝑣(𝑋 ∪ 𝑌)      𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  X;  Y ∈ 2s,     (3.4.17)    
While a concave capacity is given by:  
𝑣(𝑋) + 𝑣(𝑌) ≥ 𝑣(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌) +  𝑣(𝑋 ∪ 𝑌)      𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  X;  Y ∈ 2s,    (3.4.18)  
This implies that an optimistic DM overweight good outcome while a pessimistic 
DM overweight bad outcomes.  
Although the differences between the CPT and CEU are notable in the separate 
treatment of gains and losses in CPT and the way capacities are used to calculate 
decision weights; however the CEU share several similarities with the CPT. The 
capacities attached to events in the CEU are analogous to the probabilities (with 
weights attached) in CPT. Crucially, the CPT reduces to a special case of the CEU28 
𝑖𝑓𝑓 the capacities are additive and preserve first order stochastic dominance. To 
show that both theories coincide, recall that estimating prospects 𝑥1, 𝑋, 𝑥2 within 
the context of the CEU where  𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2, the value of the prospect is 
                                                          
28 For in-depth discussion, see the papers of Sarin & Wakker (1992, 1994) and Ghirardato & 




𝜋1. 𝑢(𝑥1) + 𝜋2. 𝑢(𝑥2)                             (3.4.19) 
Such that the decision weights 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 represented by 
𝜋1 = 𝑣(𝑋) and 𝜋2 = 1 − 𝑣(𝑋)              (3.4.20) 
are based on how the outcomes are ranked under the assumption of a continuous 
strictly increasing and cardinal utility function  𝑢:ℝ+ → ℝ.  Recall in the case of CPT, 
the utility function meets condition 𝑢(0) = 0 and the decision weights are obtained 
via separate weighting function for gains 𝑣+(. ) and losses 𝑣−(. ). In scenario where 
the prospect is strictly in the gain domain, 𝑣+(. ) takes the place of 𝑣(. ) in 
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3.4.20) while  𝑣−(. ) takes the place of 𝑣(. ) when the prospect is strictly 
in the loss domain. However in the case where prospects is in mixed domain the 
𝜋1 = 𝑣
+(𝑋) and 𝜋2 = 1 − 𝑣
−(𝑆 − 𝑋). Therefore, if for all events X, the utility 
function satisfies 𝑢(0) = 0 under the condition of duality 𝑣−(𝑋) = 1 − 𝑣+(𝑆 − 𝑋) 
then CPT reduces to CEU. 
The advantages of the CEU that makes it suitable to be adopted for this research 
includes its significance in handling uncertainty, the thoroughness of its axiomatic 
foundation, the simple but flexible representations that permits separate 
discernment of uncertainty/risk from outcomes valuation and most importantly its 
capability of handling continuous distributions.   
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3.5 Heuristics and Associated Biases under Uncertainty 
Heuristics gained its popularity in psychology possibly from Newell and Simon 
(1972) application of the word to portray uncomplicated processes that substitute 
complex algorithms. Heuristics are mental shortcuts often applied to speed up 
decision-making process. Although these mental processes may be expedient in 
decision-making where information is imperfect and time is a constraint. Heuristics 
lower the cognitive burden that abound in decision-making (Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008). It is argued that without applying heuristics in decision-making, simple day-
to-day task will result in mental exhaustion if every decision was subjected to deep 
thinking and evaluations. However, systematic bias and judgement errors have 
been associated with DMs applying heuristics in decision-making. Several types of 
heuristics have been described. A selection of the most documented heuristics are 
discussed as follows.  
3.5.1 Representativeness heuristic 
According to Tversky & Kahneman (1974), the representativeness heuristic is a case 
where the DM’s judgement of probability is based on stereotypes or similarities. A 
typical instance is the propensity to use the semblance of a sample as a prediction 
of the likelihood of an occurrence in the parent population. For instance, when faced 
with a decision problem say A with limited information, and A shares some 
attributes of problem B then it is assumed that problems A and B are identical. For 
example, one might assume that a well-dressed man walking past one’s street has a 
white collar job because it fits one’s mental prototype of an individual who works a 
white collar job. Other biases associated with representativeness heuristic includes 
underestimating the probability of preceding event recurring termed the ‘gamblers 
illusion’ e.g. a favourable outcome is imminent the more the preceding outcomes are 
unfavourable. On the other hand  a DM could cling to the misconception that events 




3.5.2 Availability heuristic 
In this case, decision maker evaluates the present based on an experience of the past 
and make judgment that are dependent on the ease with which an event can be 
recalled (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)29. As such, a DM becomes inclined to react 
more to risk in cases where previous occurrence of such risk can be readily called 
to mind. According to Tversky & Kahneman, (1997) the availability heuristic is often 
applied under judgement with comparative basis that entails estimating 
probabilities. For example, if an individual is asked whether the chances of getting 
malaria in greatest in the April and May, he or she will reflect on experiences over 
the past years and the response will reflect his or her most recent experience. The 
consequences of using this heuristics in decision making often result in violating 
probability rules leading to systematic biases and underestimating or 
overestimating outcome probabilities. For instance, Kunreuther (1996), reported 
significant increase in take up of insurance after a natural disaster by DMs that had 
prior to the event considered it unnecessary.  
3.5.3 Anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
Anchoring heuristics stems from the propensity of evaluating unknown values and 
making decision by anchoring on initial point. Research has shown that individuals 
do make estimates beginning with a starting point and subsequently adjust this 
starting point to attain the final estimate (Holtgraves & Skeel 1992; 
Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2011). A typical example is a fish monger who puts a price 
(usually above the “actual value”) on his product with the aim of anchoring the 
buyer to a high price and haggling downwards until the buyer feels the lower price 
(in comparison to the higher price) reflects a good bargain. 
Some biases have been shown to have links with anchoring heuristics. For instance, 
DMs can become risk seeking (due to ‘overconfidence’) after recurrent favourable 
outcome. Such overconfidence arises from the propensity to set excessively 
optimistic prediction of uncertain events. Evidence of anchoring and adjustment in 
lottery task has been documented. For instance, Holtgraves & Skeel (1992) show 
that in lotteries that had same probabilities of wining; respondents perceived a 
                                                          
29 The availability heuristic is discussed in-depth in Tversky & Kahneman (1973) paper. 
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higher probability of winning when the lottery was based on 1/10 compared to 
10/100 or 100/1000. 
3.5.4 Affect heuristic 
The affect heuristics embodies decision-making driven by ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’ 
with reference to a stimuli such that subjective impressions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ feeling 
act as heuristics and influences the decisions made by a DM. For instance if a specie 
of a crop failed in a particular season, a farmer might be unhappy and decide not to 
cultivate the crop again generalizing the crop as a failure and disregarding statistics 
which proves otherwise. This implies that the farmer’s previous experiences is 
linked with negative affect that may result in the perceived level of risk being 
overweighted. 
The representations of events in a DM’s memory are marked to different extent with 
affect. During decision-making, DMs depend on the “affect pool” that holds all the 
good and bad tags intentionally or unintentionally connected with the 
representations. Some researchers have asserted that more affective reactions to 
stimuli are more noticeable in situations where a DM lacks time or resources to 
reflect. Thus, it is typically the foremost reactions, occurring spontaneously then 
eventually guiding the manner information is processed and decisions made. 
Several studies have highlighted the role of heuristics in farm decision making. For 
instance, Diggs (1991), Rachlinski (2000) and Menapace, Colson & Raffaelli (2012) 
studies covered issues on heuristics in perception and judgment. These studies 
found that farmers rely on availability and representative heuristic in evaluation of 




3.6  Decision Rules under Uncertainty 
Decision rules are procedures that guides a DM during decision-making particularly 
when faced with a number of non-stochastically dominated choices under situations 
in which there may be no possibility to apportion valid estimates of probabilities to 
the set of payoffs. Two commonly discussed decision rules are the optimist (e.g. 
maximax) and pessimist (e.g. minimax) rules popularised by Wald (1985). 
3.6.1 Maximax Rule 
Using the maximax criterion, the DM assesses decision based on the highest payoff 
possible. The aim is to maximize the maximum payoff given the DM presumption 
that for all alternatives, the outcome with the maximum payoff will occur. This rule 
is referred to as an optimist approach. The sequence of decision involves isolating 
the maximum payoff of all available options then choosing the option with the 
highest maximum payoff.  
The maximax criterion (𝔪∗) is defined by 
𝔪∗ = max
𝑓∈𝐹
𝔪𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓)                  
and 
    𝔪𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓) = max𝑠∈𝑆𝑢(𝑓(𝑠))                (3.6.1) 
Where 𝑆, 𝐹, 𝑢 represents the state of nature, set of acts and utility function 
respectively. 
For example, a farmer faced with the options of cowpea variety to sow based on the 
yield in different weather conditions as presented in Table 9 will pick Cowpea B, 
which has the highest of the maximum payoff (i.e. ₦4000). 
Table 9  






 State of nature (₦/ha)                   
  Good  Average  Bad  
Cowpea A 3000 1500 -1500 
Cowpea B 4000 1750 -2250 




Although this criterion has the advantage of being easy to apply, the shortcomings 
of the maxima rule include the insensitivity to relative differences in outcomes that 
might adversely affect the decision criteria. 
3.6.2 Maximin Rule 
In the case of maximin, the DM is most concerned with avoiding the worst possible 
outcome of the worst-case scenario with the belief that the chance that the worst 
case in any event will happen is high. Unlike the maximax, the sequence of decision 
for the maximin DM involves identifying the worst possible outcomes then choosing 
the option that is best among the worst.  
The maximin (𝔪∗) criterion is defined by 
𝔪∗ = max
𝑓∈𝐹
𝔪𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑓)                    
and  
𝔪𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑓) = min𝑠∈𝑆𝑢(𝑓(𝑠))                (3.6.2) 
 
With reference to Table 9, the maximin DM believes that the worst state of nature 
(“bad yield”) will occurs thus the DM will pick Cowpea C which maximizes the 
minimum outcome (i.e. -₦1000). Similar to maximax, one criticism of this criterion 
for relying on an overly conservative strategy that depends simply on ranking.   
Other common decision rules includes the minimax regret and the LaPalace 
criterion. For the former, the attention is on that states of nature where the DM’s 
minimizes potential regret while considering opportunity that is forgone. The 
LaPlace-Bayes criterion simply compares prospects based on their averages or 
mean. For instance, a rational LaPlace-Bayes decision maker will choose option B in 
Table 10 as its average returns over all three weather conditions is greater than 




3.7 Regret and Disappointment Theories 
These theories are built on the premise that DMs undergo emotions after decision-
making. Thus, anticipated emotions are factored into the decision making process 
which systematically shapes the DM’s choice.  
The Regret theory is based on the premise that post-decision making, the DM makes 
comparison of outcomes between the choices made and otherwise if other available 
alternatives are chosen. With the assumption that the rational DM is 
characteristically regret averse, regret models are hinged on modifications of the 
regret-minimax proposition in which case the DMs objective is to minimise their 
maximum regret by seeking the alternative which results in the least possible 
regret. The works of Bell, (1985), Fishburn, (1984) and Loomes & Sugden (1982) 
were at the forefront in the proposition of decision theory of regret which was 
aimed at justifying decisions taken under uncertainty. According to Loomes & 
Sugden (1982) the sad (happy) feeling which the DM is feels after finding out that 
other available options would have yielded a more (less) desirable payoff is termed 
regret (rejoice).  
There are a number of studies that suggest risk is bi-faceted and is comprised of 
conventional and regret risk. Thus, a utility function is dependent on prospective 
payoff and corresponding regret effect (Somasundaram & Diecidue, 2015; Fox, 
Erner & Walters, 2015). In other words, an individual factors into the utility of the 
preferred prospect, the feeling that arises thereafter from not obtaining the payoff 
of other alternative prospect; this element in the decision making process is 
overlooked by the EUT.  This amalgamates elements of minimax and EU theories in 
the Regret theory. 
Assume 𝑈 constitutes an expected utility representation of preferences and follows 
the regret theory specification that DMs’ aim to optimize expected value. Given that 
the DM choses 𝑎 over 𝑏 then, 
𝑈(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑢(𝑎) + 𝑔(𝑢(𝑎) − 𝑢(𝑏))                (3.7.1) 
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Where  𝑢(. )  represents a Bernoulli utility function which satisfies the conditions 
𝑢′ >  0  and 𝑢" < 0; g: ℝ → ℝ symbolizes the regret function which is determined 
by the difference in outcome 𝑎 and 𝑏 wherein 𝑎 >  𝑏 results in disutility.  
Whether regret leads to risk aversion or risk seeking has been debated and findings 
in the literature are mixed. For instance, Josephs, Larrick, Steele & Nisbett (1992); 
Kardes (1994) Richard, Pligt & Vries (1996) reported that regret increases risk 
aversion while Bell (1985) findings suggests risk seeking. Interestingly, Zeelenberg 
et al., (2006) documents both risk averse and seeking behaviours depending on the 
condition of feedback. Simonson (1992) showed that anticipated regret prompted 
risk averse-like behaviour in consumers.  
From a different perspective Zeelenberg, Beattie, Van der Pligt, & de Vries (1996) 
found that DMs choices were driven by regret-minimizing rather than risk-
minimizing. Zeelenberg & Pieters, (2007) asserted that regret aversion can be 
clearly distinguished from risk aversion; and both together and separately has an 
effect on the DM attitude. 
The papers of Bell (1985) and Loomes & Sugden (1986) popularised the theory of 
disappointment that explains a phenomenon wherein a DM experiences a feeling 
that occurs as a result of the outcome falling short of the DM expectation. The feeling 
is driven by the preconceived expectation that the best payoff will be achieved 
within a specific prospect. However, when the outcome is less desirable than 
anticipated the feeling of disappointment sets in. To determine the extent of 
disappointment, the expected utility of a lottery serves as its reference point. 
For instance, given the states of the world that is a finite set S for which the 
probability distribution is known prior to the event and a prospect 𝜑 is a function 
𝑆 → 𝑅. Assuming the payoff if a DM picks prospect 𝜑 and states 𝑠 occurs, then 
𝜑(𝑠) =  (𝜑(𝑠)) + [ 𝑑(𝜑(𝑠) − (𝜑(𝑠))]                (3.7.2) 
Where >0 represents a constant indicating the extent to which the DM is impacted 
by a unit of disappointment. 𝑑: 𝑅 → 𝑅 meets the assumptions that: when the 
expectation of the DM is met, disappointment does not occur i.e. 𝑑(0) = 0, the rise 
in disappointment is disproportionate to the difference between what occurs and 
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what was expected. If the shape of 𝑑 is concave on (−∞, 0), convex on (0,∞), 
disappointment looms larger than elation i.e. −𝑑(−𝑥) ≥ 𝑒(𝑥). 
Although some studies have used both regret and disappointment interchangeably, 
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead & der Pligt (1998) in line with other studies have 
reported statistical difference in how these two differ in the manner it is 
experienced. To distinguish between regret and disappointment, imagine a farmer 
faced with two prospects A and B as presented in Table 10. Let Si represents all the 
possible states of nature the farmer faces. The farmer experiences regret if he or she 
chooses prospect B and state S2 occurs (50kg) because the farmer would otherwise 
have had 100kg had he or she chosen prospect A. On the other hand, if the farmer 
chooses prospect A and states S1 (50kg) occurs, he or she experiences 
disappointment since the outcome is less than S2 (100kg) even though the outcome 
of S1 is as good as the best outcome in prospect B. 
              Table 10  
Hypothetical Payoff table 
                                                  States of Nature 
Prospects S1 S2 S3 
A 50kg 100kg 0kg 
B 25kg 50kg 25kg 
 
In this case, the difference between regret and disappointment is that the emphasis 
of the former is comparing across alternative while the latter is within alternatives. 
This study therefore regards both concepts from these perspectives.  
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3.8 Salience Theory 
The phenomenon “salience” according to Taylor and Thompson (1982) refers to 
information being distorted by the DM as a result of concentrating on the ‘most 
noticeable’ region of the outcome thereby resulting in unbalanced weighting of the 
decision. Salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012) is designed to model a DM’s context-
dependent representation of lottery choices under risk where decision weights 
(warped to the advantage of salient payoffs) substitute objective probabilities. The 
idea revolves around DMs overweighting of outcomes with large differences, which 
is modelled via event weighting. In Bordalo et al., (2012) salience is determined 
through a function which examines the similarities and differences of the 
characteristic of a lottery in respect of a reference level with the aim of ascertaining 
the extent to which that characteristic is distinctive and attracts the DM’s attention. 
Bordalo et al., (2012) expound that given lottery choices dilemma where 𝑆 
represents states of nature for which the likelihood of occurrence 𝑝𝑠 of each state 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is objective and known i.e. ∑ 𝑝𝑠 = 1 𝑠∈𝑆  and assume a pair of lottery ℒ1 and ℒ2 
that result in outcomes of 𝑥𝑠
𝑖  and 𝑥𝑠
𝑗
 in each state 𝑠. Given that lottery ℒ𝑖  are risky; 
the DM distorts the weights attached to the lottery’s greatest salience states in the 
states of nature 𝑆. For lotteries ℒ𝑖 and ℒ𝑗  (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), the salience of state 𝑠 is specified 
as a bounded continuous function 𝜎(𝑥𝑠
𝑖  and 𝑥𝑠
𝑗
) that fulfils conditions of: 
Ordering: The distance between the lottery payoff  𝑥𝑠
𝑖  and its alternative 𝑥𝑠
𝑗
 









𝑚𝑎𝑥  is a subset of 𝑥?̃?
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑥?̃?
𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 
Diminishing sensitivity: A uniform increase in the absolute payoff levels across 
lotteries results in a decline in the salience i.e. 𝜎(𝑥𝑠
𝑖+ 𝜖, 𝑥𝑠
𝑗




𝑛 > 0 
for 𝑛 = 1, 2, then for 𝜖 = 0. 
Reflection: It is not the payoff domain (gain or loss) that controls salience but rather 












)  for 
any 𝑥𝑠
𝑛,  𝑥?̃?
𝑛 > 0. 















                  (3.8.1) 
Where 𝜃 > 0 modulates salience of states when the payoff of a lottery is zero.  A DM 
that is a salient thinker calculates the value of a lottery by 




𝑖)                   (3.8.2) 
Given that 𝑘𝑠 ∶ 𝑘𝑠  ∈ {1, … , |𝑆|}  represent the salience ranking of state 𝑠 for ℒ1 and 




2)]. If 𝛿 < 1 (i.e. the 
parameter that determines the degree to which salience distorts the weights 
attached to decisions), the DM chooses ℒ1 when its payoff is greater than ℒ2 in the 
states having the most salience.  
Bordalo et al., (2012) salience theory does not rely on the shape of the value 
function30 like the CPT. Rather it is dependent on whether the lottery up and 
downsides are salient i.e. a DM is expected to be risk averse and risk seeking for the 
former and latter respectively. In addition, in salience theory a pair of lotteries from 
which choice is to be made is not considered independent as with the case of the 
CPT. For instance, given the lottery choices: 
Lottery Choices: Would you prefer A or B? 
A: 10% chance of winning $400 B: 10% chance of winning $400 
 30% chance of winning $0   30% chance of winning $60 
 60% chance of winning $200  60% chance of winning $170  
For lotteries A and B, the lowest probability (10%) has the highest possible outcome 
($400). For CPT, lotteries A and B are assumed to be independent thus the DM 
distorts the small probabilities attached to the high outcome. However, because the 
outcome of both lotteries are the same (i.e. $400), the salience of the 10% chance of 
winning $400 in lottery A negates the 10% chance of winning $400 in lottery B; and 
the DM choice is not influenced by the likelihood of winning $400. 
Tsetsos, Chater & Usher (2012) concluded that the factors that affect salience are 
liable to influence the process of decision-making. They further pointed out that in 
                                                          
30 The authors assume that the value function 𝑣  is linear. 
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a typical scenario where the prospect with the largest outcome might be more 
conspicuous or noticeable, the decision maker may fail to consider the lower 
outcome on the left section of the tail and as a result may even choose prospects 
with larger variance. Similarly, Madan, Ludvig & Spetch (2014) and Ludvig, Madan 
& Spetch (2014) pointed out the propensity of individuals to hold fast to salient 
events, which could result in memory bias particularly for extreme outcomes and 
overweighting of similar outcomes in subsequent decisions. This provides 
evidence of extreme outcome rule wherein the probabilities of the largest gains 
and losses are overestimated.  
Bordalo, Gennaioli & Shleifer (2010) study aimed at explaining the role of salience 
on local thinking argues that what holds the attention of the individual is the 
salience of the payoff rather than probabilities. Shleifer, Bordalo & Gennaioli, (2012) 
and Mersinas, Hartig, Martin & Seltzer (2015) found that the EV or variance does 
not matter once the payoff of the choices the DM faces are salient or extreme as the 
focus typically will be on the salient payoff. Chetty, Looney & Kroft (2009) paper on 
salience and taxation further emphasises the crucial role of salience in consumer 
reaction to taxation. 
According to Dertwinkel-Kalt & Köster (2015), susceptibility to salience can explain 
deviations from a number from axioms of expected utility theory. Dertwinkel-Kalt 
& Köster (2015) showed that their extended salience theory can address one of the 
limitations of the CPT; first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) thereby justifying 
the argument in the literature that the salience theory is a credible alternative 
theory. As with several theories however, there are limitations to Salience theory. 
For instance, since the core of Salience theory is intransitivity, it questions its 
widespread applicability in economics and finance. In addition, the two-variable 





In summary, chapter 3 considered leading theories and models of decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. This chapter was split into three components namely: 
EUT, the non-EU theories and alternative theories. Specifically, the chapter covered 
Expected Utility theory, Mean-Standard deviation theory, Rank Dependant Utility 
theory, Prospect theory, Cumulative Prospect theory, Salience theory, Regret and 
Disappointment theories and decision rules and heuristics. The merits and demerits 
of each theory is highlighted and their application in different scenarios appraised.  
As observed from the literature reviewed in this chapter, several of these theories 
are linked through certain important properties they share. For instance, the EUT 
being equivalence to the MSD for exponential utility function and approximate for 
quadratic utility function or the direct correspondence with CPT and CEU under 
additivity of the discrete subjective probability measures. In addition, the RDU is 
closely related to the CEU wherein the RDU is referred to as a special case of the CEU 
albeit for risk. However, they do not coincide in a several aspects such as treatment 
of reference points, probability transformations, and properties of the value 
function such as global vs. local convexity/concavity. Crucially among these 
theories, the CPT has received much encomium in decision theory literature as a 
reliable alternative to many popular theories including the Expected utility theory. 
In addition, the intuition behind CPT (and equivalent CEU) are credible and can be 
adapted to several different conditions.  
Another key conclusion drawn from this review chapter is that the findings on risk 
and uncertainty attitudes is influenced by the choice of different theories and 
methodologies. In addition, although the EUT arguably remains the benchmark 
theory of decision-making under risk, this theory and several other popular theories 
have their limitations. Several limitations discussed are addressed by the CPT. 





Research Methods and Models 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter covers the conceptual framework and the econometric models and 
methods used to test hypotheses and achieve the objectives earlier discussed in 
Chapter 1. To achieve the objective of estimating farmers’ attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty in different context and content domains, this thesis uses both non-
parametric methods - relating to the patterns that characterise participant choices 
and their determinants; and parametric models – based upon CPT as it extends to 
continuous prospects. Specifically, the Bayesian mixed logit is adopted for this 
purpose.  
The Mean-Standard deviation model is used to estimate the determinants of 
prospect choice. The objective of examining the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk 
attitude are determined from estimating multivariate regression while the 
relationship between risk attitude and decision to engage in off-farm income 
generating activities are determined from probit and multinomial probit models 
respectively. 
Specifically, Section 4.1 describes the conceptual framework; section 4.2 explains 
the CPT model, section 4.3 discusses the Bayesian hierarchical model, section 4.4 
describes the Mean-Standard deviation model, section 4.5 details the Simultaneous 




4.1 Conceptual Framework 
Conceptually the framework for this research pivots on theories of decision-making. 
The thesis examined the capabilities and extent to which the intuition behind the 
selected decision-making theories and models corresponds to actual behaviour of 
DMs’ under risk and uncertainty. It also links issues separately examined in 
previous studies e.g. it connects risk/uncertainty attitudes and decision-making 
behaviour to mental health related factors; and links attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty obtained from parametric estimation as a determinant of farm decision 
making in an econometric model. A graphical representation of the framework 
showing the various components of this study and the hypotheses tested is 
presented in Figure 1.  
Specifically, the hypotheses tested in H1 and H2 are whether attitude towards risk 
and uncertainty depends on content domains. H3 tests if attitude towards risk 
depends on context while H4 tests whether attitudes to risk and uncertainty differ 
within content domain. H5 tests if significant differences exist in a DM’s risk attitude 
under personal and proxy context, H6 whether risk and uncertainty attitude is 
affected by bipolar disorder and H7 farmers risk attitude (in the monetary domain) 
drives decision to engage in off-farm employment  
As reported in chapter 2, several findings based on Non-expected Utility theories 
suggest that individuals are not universally risk-averse i.e. risk attitudes often differ 
across domains. Thus, this thesis tests whether a DM attitude maintains the same 
attitude in different context and content domains using elicitation methods and 
experiments detailed in Chapter 5 that differs from previous studies that have 







Figure 1. Conceptual Framework  
 
The link between off-farm participation is based on the findings from studies 
examined in section 2.5, which reported that risk and uncertainty attitude 
influences farmers’ decision-making; and specifically literature which are 
predominantly based on the models of risk taking behaviour that have examined 
risk as a determinant of off-farm participation. From this perspective, there is 
literature that suggest that farmers who engage in off-farm income earning activity 
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may have a slightly higher than average level of risk aversion than those who do not. 
While a few report that risk attitude has no significant influence off-farm 
participation decisions. Thus, the proposition tested here is that risk-seeking 
farmers do not participate in off-farm income activities.  
The effects of BD on risk attitude as examined in section 2.4 suggest that individuals 
with BD tend to ‘enjoy’ gains more and ‘suffer’ losses less. Specifically, for an 
individual at the manic phase, the risk orientation is mostly reported to be risk 
seeking. Based on the concept that mental health factors influences risk attitude, 
this study tests the hypothesis that farmers with bipolar disorder are risk and 
uncertainty seeking. 
In summary, the conceptual framework is designed to build on previous studies that 
examines domain-specific risk and uncertainty attitudes and the decision to 
participate in off-farm activities separately. This study goes a step further in linking 
these farm related issues in a single study. Further, it combines researches on 
bipolar disorder (e.g. Yechiam et al., 2008; Martino et al., 2011) with research that 
has been carried out on risk/uncertainty attitude and decision making.  
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4.2 CPT  & CEU Models 
To achieve objectives (i) and (ii) which aims at estimating farmers’ attitudes to risk 
and uncertainty in different context and content domains; the cumulative prospect 
theory parameters as it extends to continuous prospects is estimated using the 
Bayesian mixed logit. Drawing from the literature discussed in Chapter 3, the model 
for this study is built on the CPT and CEU theories. Using Choquet expected utility 
under additivity of the discrete subjective probability measures there is a direct 
correspondence with discrete CPT, and thus under additive continuous densities 
CEU can be thought of as a generalisation of CPT to continuous densities. Thus, in 
discussing the CPT model hereafter this thesis also implies the equivalent CEU 
model. 
Consider that each farmer is presented with a pair prospects with payoff 𝑧𝑖 having 
probability 𝑝𝑖 where 𝑧𝑖 > 𝑧𝑗  ⇔ 𝑖 > 𝑗  and the probability distribution 𝑓 =
(𝑧1, 𝑝1; … ; 𝑧𝑛,𝑝𝑛),  𝑧1 ≤ ⋯ ≤  𝑧𝑘 ≤ 0 ≤  𝑧𝑘+1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑧𝑛 stipulates the chances of 
choosing a prospect. In line with the discussions in Chapter 3, the overall value of a 
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Then expressing the decision weights as  
                 𝜋+(𝑧) ≡ 𝑤+(1 − 𝐹(𝑧))    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑧 ≥ 0                                               
                 𝜋−(𝑧) ≡ 𝑤−(𝐹(𝑧))           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑧 < 0                                 (4.2.3)  
From which the continuous CPT form is derived as: 
𝑉(𝑧𝑐) = ∫ Γ−[𝐹(𝑧)].  𝑓(𝑧)𝑣−(𝑧)𝑑𝑧  
0
−∞






Where 𝐹 and 𝑓 represents CDF and PDF respectively, 𝑣(. ) denotes the function that 
assigns value to outcomes and Γ = 
𝑑𝑤(𝑝) 
𝑑𝑝
.  𝑤(. ) is the probability transformation 
function with characteristic of 𝑤: [0,1]  →  [0,1]  that strictly increases and satisfies 
𝑤+(0) =  𝑤− (0) = 0 and 𝑤+(1) =  𝑤− (1) = 1. The weighting function 𝑤+ and 𝑤− 
function fitted in this study is Prelec II (Prelec, 1998). The justification for choosing 
this specification is hinged on its ability to adapt to either inverse S-shaped or S-
shaped probability weightings.  As presented in Chapter 3, the discrete Prelec II 
PWF takes the form of:  
𝒲+(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛿+(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾+)       𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                             
𝒲−(𝑝) =  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛿−(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑖))
𝛾−)       𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0               (4.2.4)  









      𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0                 







    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0       (4.2.5)   
The parameters 𝛾+ and 𝛾− determines the curvature of the weighting function while 
δ+ and δ− controls the elevation of the weighting function31 in the gain and loss 
domains respectively.  
Following with the deterministic form of the CPT, the prospect having the highest 
subjective value is invariably expected to be chosen by the DM. In reality however 
this is not always the case, therefore supplementing the deterministic form (which 
lacks the capacity to produce choice probabilities) with an error theory via choice 
rule makes it possible to explain stochastic choice of a DM.  In line with several 
studies this study adopts obtaining f ( ) from P ( ) in a pairwise choice 
𝑓(𝐴|𝐵, 𝜃)  =  𝑃(𝑉(𝐴), 𝑉(𝐵))                                                (4.2.6) 
Where f ( ) is the probability with which the model predicts choosing prospect A 
over an alternative prospect B given a set of parameter values θ. 
                                                          
31 The strength of the s-shaped curve increases with decreasing value of 𝛾. Increasing values of 𝛿 
on the other hand increases the elevation of the PWF. 
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For choices between pairs of prospect, the logistic choice function appropriately 
maps properties of prospects onto choice probabilities (see Stott, 2006). Thus the 
probability that Prospect A will be chosen over B is determined by  
𝑃(𝑉(𝐴), 𝑉(𝐵)) =
1
1 + 𝑒− 𝜑(𝑉(𝐴)−𝑉(𝐵))
                               (4.2.7) 
where the parameter φ (response/choice sensitivity parameter) measure 
arbitrariness in the DM choice, 𝑉(𝐴) and 𝑉(𝐵) represents the subjective values of 
the prospects. The closer 𝜑 is to zero, the greater the randomness of choices. 
Following the recommendations of Stott (2006) and Balcombe & Fraser, (2015) 
regarding the best combination of value, weighting and choice functions; the 
estimation of the CPT parameters in this study relies on a combination of value form 




4.3 Bayesian hierarchical parameter estimation 
The model estimated in this thesis is hierarchical such that it has parameters that 
describes the tendencies of each participant on one hand and parameters that 
accounts for to the distribution of each participants’ parameters within a group on 
the other hand. Thus, the model permits that data from other participants within a 
group has an effect on parameter estimates for each member participant. This 
hierarchical estimation is implemented using Bayesian procedure in Python. The 
choice of hierarchical estimation is to ensure that participants’ risk and uncertainty 
attitudes are not only reliably estimated but maximizes the fit of the data and make 
the most of its potential in connection with out-of-sample data. 
The interpretation accorded probabilities in Bayesian reasoning differs from the 
frequentists’ as probability in the former is interpreted as the degree of belief in the 
likelihood of an event occurring. This approach also permits for the inclusion of 
prior knowledge in the estimation of probabilities by applying Bayes’ theorem. In 
Bayesian reasoning, probability distribution is used to quantify the degree of 
uncertainty and make probability statements about the parameters under the 
assumptions of fixed data and random unknown parameters.  
Assuming the parameter 𝜃 and a data set 𝑌 having distributions Ɣ and 𝑝 such that: 
                𝑌 ∼ Ɣ(. |𝜃), 𝜃 ∼ 𝑝(𝜃)                                        (4.3.1) 
Under Bayesian rules,  
                𝑝(𝜃|𝑌) =  
𝑝(𝑌|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃)
𝑝(𝑌)
                                      (4.3.2) 
From the equations above, it becomes possible to calculate the posterior probability 
distribution 𝑝(𝜃|𝑌) for the parameter 𝜃 (in lieu a single value for each parameter as 
with the case of classical models) taking into consideration the data 𝑌 from some 
prior probabilities for the parameter value 𝑝(𝜃) and the likelihood function 𝑝(𝑌|𝜃). 
Since the marginal likelihood 𝑝(𝑌) only performs a normalizing role, the posterior 
probability distribution can then be represented as: 
                        𝑝(𝜃|𝑌) ∝ 𝑝(𝑌|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃)                                (4.3.3) 
Where the marginal likelihood is  
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                      𝑝(𝑌) = ∫𝑑𝜃 𝑝(𝑌|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃)                           (4.3.4) 
Assuming that the data 𝑌 is described a model having two parameters 𝜃 and 𝜗. The 
hierarchical specification of the joint distribution is given by 
          𝑝(𝑌|𝜃, 𝜗)𝑝(𝜃, 𝜗) = 𝑝(𝑌|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃|𝜗)𝑝(𝜗)                   (4.3.5)      
Following Bayesian reasoning, suppose for person j, 𝑌𝑗   represents observations, 
𝜃𝑗  constitute parameters at unit level that determines observation 𝑌𝑗 . 𝜂 represents 
common parameters with prior density 𝑝(𝜂|𝜗) while 𝜗  is the hyper-parameter that 
determines the distribution of exchangeable parameters 𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑗  obtained from a 
general population; then the stages in the hierarchy corresponds to a sequence of 
measurements, underlying process and parameter stages.  
From the data collected from the experiment described in Chapter 5, 𝑌𝑖𝑗   𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑖  
are independent given 𝜃𝑖  having a distribution 𝑝(𝑌|𝜃𝑖). There is reasonable basis to 
suggest the some similarities between the 𝜃𝑖′𝑠. Using a prior distribution where the 
𝜃𝑖′𝑠 are considered as samples originating from a common population distribution, 
the population distribution of the 𝜃𝑖
′𝑠 can be estimated. 
For 𝑌𝑗   corresponding to all responses by the 𝑗𝑡ℎ individual, the hierarchical model 
is given by:  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 1 (𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟):   𝑌𝑗|𝜃𝑗 ∼ 𝑝(𝑌𝑗|𝜃𝑗) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐾                   
          𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 2 (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟):    𝜃𝑗|𝜂 ∼ 𝑝(𝜃𝑗|𝜂) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐾                          .  
        𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 3 (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟):    𝜂 ∼ 𝑝(𝜂|𝜗)                        (4.3.6)                    
In which case the posterior distribution is proportional to 




With a joint posterior is presented as: 
           𝑝(𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑚, 𝜂|𝜗, … , 𝑌𝑚, 𝜗) ∝  [ ∏ 𝑝(𝑌𝑗|𝜃𝑗)𝑝(𝜃𝑗|𝜂)
𝑗
] 𝑝(𝜂|𝜗)     (4.3.8) 
Given that  𝜃𝑗  represents arbitrary model parameter of respondent j under k 
condition. 
                                    𝜃𝑗𝑘 =  ℊ(𝜇𝑘
𝜃 + 𝜈𝑗𝑘
𝜃 )                                                          (4.3.9)  
Where 𝜇𝑘
𝜃 and 𝜈𝑗𝑘
𝜃  represent the group average and the deviation of respondent j 
form the group average. The link function ℊ( ) maps groups and single contributions 
on the range of value which determines  𝜃𝑗𝑘 is. A logit-link function that allows for a 
range of parameters between 0 and an upper limit is used. By formulating a 
Bayesian prior (truncated normal32) distribution on the vector of parameters 𝜃, this 
study simultaneously estimates the parameters for the participants. The prior 
parameter distributions used in this study draws from studies of similar nature. For 
instance using Bayesian hierarchical estimation several authors have impose 
parameter restriction on the CPT parameters. Nilsson, Rieskamp & Wagenmakers, 
(2011) imposed 0 < α ≤ 1; 0 <  β ≤ 1; 0 <  λ  ≤ ∞; 0 < γ ≤ 1; 0 < δ ≤ 1; 0 <  ϕ  ≤ ∞. Suter, 
Pachur & Hertwig, (2013) priors ranged from 0 < α ≤ 1; 0 < γ ≤ 1; 0 < δ ≤ 10; 
0 < φ ≤ 10. Similarly, Broomell & Bhatia (2014) priors ranged from 0 < α ≤ 1; 1 <  λ 
 ≤ 10; 0 < γ ≤ 1; 0 < φ ≤ 1. Parameter ranges in other studies include Toubia, Johnson, 
Evgeniou & Delquié, (2013) 0.05 ≤ α ≤ 2; λ  ≤ 10; 0.05 ≤ γ ≤ 2; Haffke & Hübner, 
(2014)  0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1.5, 0 < δ ≤ 4, and 0 < φ ≤ 10 and Glöckner & Pachur (2012) 
that restricted their parameter values to 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < λ ≤ 10, 0 < γ ≤ 1, 0 < δ ≤ 4,  0 
< φ ≤ 10. This thesis adopts 0.05 ≤ α ≤ 2; 0.05 ≤  β  ≤ 2; 0.05 ≤  λ  ≤ 3; 0.25 ≤  γ  ≤ 2;  
0.25 ≤  δ  ≤ 2;  0 <  ϕ  ≤ ∞. Since the version of CPT in this study is sign-dependent, a 
vector of 8 parameters (α, β, 𝜆 , 𝛾+, 𝛾,− 𝛿+, 𝛿−, 𝜑) is estimated. Implying that the 
entire vector of unknown parameters at group-level is given by:  
         𝜃 = 𝜇𝛼 , 𝜇𝛽 , 𝜇𝜆, 𝜇𝛾, 𝜇𝛿 , 𝜎𝛼 , 𝜎𝛽 , 𝜎𝜆 , 𝜎𝛾 , 𝜎𝛿 , 𝜎φ                              (4.3.10)  
                                                          
32 The truncated normal distribution in this case refers restriction of the upper and lower domains 




This methodology adopted in this study follows two steps. First, in line with Nilsson 
et al., (2011), individual parameters are obtained from independent group-level 
with logarithm having a normal distributions represented as;  
𝛼𝑗~ 𝑁(𝜇𝛼, 𝜎𝛼);  𝛽𝑗~ 𝑁(𝜇𝛽 , 𝜎𝛽 ); 𝜆𝑗~ 𝑁(𝜇𝜆, 𝜎𝜆 );  𝛾𝑗~𝑁(𝜇𝛾, 𝜎𝛾 );
    
𝛿𝑗~ 𝑁(𝜇𝛿 , 𝜎𝛿 );φ𝑗
~𝑁( 𝜇φ, 𝜎φ )      
                                                                                                                    (4.3.11)  
As regards the group means a standard normal priors is used. The link function 
specified in equation (4.3.9) ensure that transformation result in prior values that 
are uniformly distributed between the lower and the upper boundaries. The next 
step involves the derivation of the posterior distribution of the CPT parameters 
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms that make it possible to 
approximate the posterior distribution within the context of Bayes' theorem. The 
number of iterations, burn-ins and retained posterior draws are reported in section 
7.1 of Chapter 7. 
Overall, given that some relationships are complex to model, a flexible model like 
the Bayesian hierarchical models can be very reliable. In addition, considering that 
any differences across and similarities between individuals are at the same time 
accommodated in hierarchical models, it is capable of addressing the shortcomings 
of the estimates derived from averaging data or participant level parameter 
estimation. According to Nilsson et al., (2011) and Steyvers & Lee, (2006), 
hierarchical models recognises that while individuals may differ, they may also 
share some similarities; thus each single DM’s parameter estimate in a model is 
believed to have meaningful dependencies on others included in that model.  
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4.4 Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) Method 
In order to examine the association between the choices made by subjects, the 
magnitude of the prospect (in terms of mean and variance) and domain of the 
prospects; this study uses the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) (popularised 
by Liang & Zeger, 1986 and Zeger & Liang, 1986). Liang & Zeger (1986) applied the 
GEEs as an extension of the generalized linear model that could accommodate 
within-subject or within-cluster correlation while producing estimates that are 
reliable and results that are robust. The GEE suits the data analysed in this study for 
the reasons that there may be tendency that the participants’ choice of prospect per 
task have same correlation across observation thereby contravening the 
independence assumptions upon which other regression models are built. Crucially, 
the goal is to reveal differences in the population average response. 
Assuming there exist some correlation between (and independence across) 
responses from participants; we then estimate a model where the dependent 
variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗 indexes the 𝑖𝑡ℎ response (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛𝑖) for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ participant 𝑗(𝑗 =
1, 2, … , 𝐾) with a response vector of  𝑌𝑗 = (𝑦𝑗1, … ; 𝑦𝑗𝑘)′, the mean vector denoted by 
𝜇𝑗 = (𝜇𝑗1, … ; 𝜇𝑗𝑘)′ and corresponding covariates 𝑋𝑗 = (𝑥𝑗1, … ; 𝑥𝑗𝑘)′. The 
assumptions of the marginal regression approach of GEE are that the expected value 
take the form of 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗) = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 and variance  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑗) = 𝜙𝑣(𝜇𝑖𝑗). The 
relationship that exists between the covariates and the marginal mean is 
determined the function: 
ℊ(𝜇𝑖𝑗) = 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑗ℬ                                                          (4.4.3) 
 
Where the probit link ℊ(𝜇𝑖𝑗) = Φ
−1(𝜇𝑖𝑗) with a variance of 𝜈(𝜇𝑖𝑗) = 𝜇𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝜇𝑖𝑗) 
and 𝜙 = 1. ℊ, 𝜈, 𝜙, and Φ represents the link function, variance function, dispersion 
parameter and inverse standard normal cumulative distribution function 
respectively.  
The estimation of ϱ parameter is necessary towards obtaining estimates of GEE. 
Thus for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ farmer, the specification of the working variance–covariance matrix 
for 𝑌𝑗  is: 
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2                                                     (4.4.4) 
where 𝐴𝑗and 𝑅𝑗(ϱ) represents 𝑛 x 𝑛 diagonal and working correlation matrices 
defined by the vector of parameters 𝛼 respectively The regression parameter 𝛽 in 







[𝑉(ϱ̂)]−1 (𝑦𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗) = 0         (4.4.5) 
The working correlation assumed for the data type is an exchangeable correlation 
structure 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑌𝑖𝑗 , 𝑌𝑗𝑘) =  ϱ implying that the 𝑗𝑡ℎ person has matching  
correlation at each estimation point.  
The GEE model estimated in this study examines the effect of the mean (ℬ1) and 
standard deviation (ℬ2) of the prospect outcomes on the probability of participants 
j choosing the outer prospect (𝑌) while controlling for prospects (lottery) design33 
(ℬ3 𝑡𝑜 ℬ11). The estimation model specification is: 
𝑌𝑗(1 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟 (′𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦
′) 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡)
= ℬ0 + ℬ1𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 +  ℬ2𝑆𝑡𝑑  + ℬ3𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑆𝐷 + ℬ4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑑 + ℬ5𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 
+ℬ6𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 + ℬ7𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 +  ℬ8𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 
+ℬ9𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 +ℬ10 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 
+  ℬ11 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑                                                     (4.4.6) 
Where, 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 = 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 
𝑺𝑫 = 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵  
𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛  
𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛  
𝒎𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑐𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠  
𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅_𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒓_𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  
𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅_𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒓_𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 
=  1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘, 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  
                                                          





= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  
𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓_𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅_𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒓_𝒎𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑, 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  
 
Recall that the justification for the estimation model is based on the proposition of 
M-SD. When faced with a risk/uncertain scenario the DM should prefer B whenever: 
the expected value of 𝐵 is greater and SD is smaller than 𝑎; the expected value of 𝐵 
is greater even when 𝐴 and 𝐵 both have equal SD; and (or) the variance of 𝐵 is 
smaller even when both have equal expected value. The preference for standard 
deviation over variance in this specific model is to ensure uniform units of both EV 





4.5 Probit Model  
In order to achieve objective (v) which is to investigate the relationship between 
risk and uncertainty attitudes and decision to engage in off-farm income generating 
activities (OFIGA), a probit model parameters is estimated. As a special case of the 
Generalised Linear Model, the probit model (Bliss, 1934; Fisher, 1935) is a non-
linear probability econometric model suitable for fitting binary response model by 
defining a function 𝑓(∗) using the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. The elicitation of the probability 𝑃𝑟 of choosing to participate 
in OFIGA is performed as follows. Let 𝑦𝑗  represent a random variable with Bernoulli 
distribution having probability  
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑗 = 1|𝑥) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑗
∗ > 0|𝑥) 
     = 𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑗
′ℬ + 𝑗 > 0|𝑥) 
                                    = 𝑃𝑟( 𝑗−𝑥𝑗
′ℬ|𝑥)                           (4.5.1) 
Given the assumptions of independently and normally distributed error 
𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0,1) 




) , σ ≡ 1 
                                            = Φ(𝑥𝑗
′ℬ)                                (4.5.2) 
Φ represents the standard normal CDF and 𝛽 denotes 𝑘𝑥1 vector of coefficient 
Consider the regression model, 
    𝑦𝑗
∗  = 𝑋𝑗
′ℬ + 𝑗    
                                                             𝑦𝑗 = {
1       𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑗
∗ > 0                                                       
               
0     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                  (4.5.3)                       
 
Where 𝑦𝑗
∗ in the case of this study represents farmers’ choice regarding 
participation in off-farm income generating activities, the vectors of explanatory 
variables (described in Table 11) are denoted by 𝑋𝑗; ℬ  is the model coefficients 
representing the magnitude of the explanatory variables.  
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Let 𝑥 denote 𝑘𝑥1 vector of output and 𝑁𝑥1 vector of input represented by 𝑦; the 
product of the likelihoods of the individual observations results in the likelihood of 
the whole sample because observations are independent and identically 
distributed. 
𝑓(𝑦|𝑥, ℬ) =∏Φ(𝑥𝑗
′ℬ)𝑦𝑗 [1 − Φ(𝑥𝑗
′ℬ)](1−𝑦𝑗)     
          𝑓(𝑦|𝑥, ℬ) =∏Φ
𝑗
𝑦𝑗(1 − Φ𝑖)
1−𝑦𝑗                 (4.5.4) 
The Log likelihood function is given by: 
         𝑙𝑛𝐿 =∑𝑦𝑗
.
𝑗
𝑙𝑛Φ𝑖 + (1 − 𝑦𝑗) 𝑙𝑛(1 − Φ𝑗)             (4.5.5) 
To obtain the average marginal effect for a continuous variable assuming other 
variables are kept at a constant 𝑃𝑟(𝑌 =  1|𝑋 =  𝑥):  










                                         (4.5.6) 











= 1) −  Φ(𝑥𝑗
′ℬ|𝑥𝑗
𝑘 = 0)]     (4.5.7) 
While the marginal effect at means for a continuous variable and discrete variables 







𝑘 = 1) −  Φ(𝑥𝑗′̅ℬ|𝑥𝑗
𝑘 = 0)]           (4.5.8) 
The independent variables and their expected signs drawing from earlier studies 
discussed in Chapter 2 are presented in Table 11. A-priori it is expected that age, 
gender, farm size and ownership of farm have a negative effect on OFIGA while 
marital status, education and farm hours either have a positive or negative 
relationship with OFIGA. As for the relationship between risk and uncertainty 
attitudes variables and OFIGA, the expectation was a negative relationship exist 
between  α, 𝛾+ and OFIGA.  
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Table 11   
Definition of Variables subjected to Probit and multinomial Probit Regression Models 
Variable ID Description Expected Sign 
Dependent     
𝑌𝑗 1= Farmer engages in off-farm income 
generating activities, 0=otherwise 
  
Independent    
α Numerical value (Lower values = greater 
risk aversion for gains) 
-  
𝛿+ Numerical value (Lower values = higher 
pessimism for gains) 
-/+  
𝛾+. Numerical value (Lower values = inverse S-
shape)  
-/+  
𝛽 Numerical value (Lower values = greater 
risk seeking for losses) 
+  
𝛿− Numerical value (Lower values = higher 
optimism for losses) 
-/+  
𝛾−. Numerical value (Lower values = inverse S-
shape)  
-/+  
Age Number of years -  
Gender 1 male , 0 otherwise -/+  
Marital Status 1 married , 0 otherwise -/+  
Household size Number living in a farm household   
No Education 1 no formal education, 0 
otherwise(Reference) 
-  
Primary Edu. 1 primary education, 0 otherwise +  
Secondary Edu. 1 secondary education, 0 otherwise +  
Tertiary Edu. 1 tertiary education, 0 otherwise  +  
Farm size Number of hectare -  
Farmtenure 1 farm owner, 0 otherwise -  
Farmtype 1 one cycle,  0 otherwise +  
Farmhours Number of hours spent on farm/day -  
Location 1 Rural, 0 otherwise - 
Cooperatives  1 member, 0 otherwise -/+ 
 
Given the variables defined in Table 11 that are guided by the relationships 
identified from literature and discussed in section 2.5 in Chapter 2, the probit model 
estimated in this study examines the effect of risk and uncertainty attitudes and 
socioeconomic characteristics on the probability of farmers’ participation in OFIGA 
(𝑌𝑖). This relationship is tested through estimating the specified probit model 





𝑌𝑗(1 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑂𝐹𝐼𝐺𝐴, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)  








  +  ℬ7𝑎𝑔𝑒
+  ℬ8 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +  ℬ9 𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +  ℬ10 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑢 +  ℬ11 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢 
+  ℬ12 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢 +  ℬ13ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  ℬ14𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  ℬ15𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
+   ℬ16 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  ℬ17𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 +   ℬ18𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
+  ℬ19𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
+   ℬ20𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙                                                                        (4.5.9)  
 
Five (5) models were estimated to determine the effect of selected variables on 
OFIGA participation. Model I estimated the effect of bipolar tendencies alone on 
OFIGA participation, Model II estimated the effect of risk attitudes on OFIGA 
participation while Model III incorporates bipolar tendencies, risk attitudes and 
socioeconomic characteristics in the estimation. Models IV and V are similar to 
Model III and IV respectively but for uncertainty. 
4.5.1 Multinomial Probit Estimation 
In order to identify the determinants of preference for the type of off-farm income 
generating activities, this thesis employs the Multinomial Probit estimation (MNP 
hereafter). The OFIGA types which make up the dependent variable are categorised 
into worker, self-employed and employee with No-OFIGA participation as the base 
outcome  𝑖. 𝑒.  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, 3 where 0 = 𝑁𝑜 𝑂𝐹𝐼𝐺𝐴 , 1 = 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 , 2 =
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 and 3 = 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 as such a farmer 𝑗 engages in an OFIGA 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈
𝑁). Assuming the farmer seeks to maximize utility on the types of OFIGA, 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is 
determined by the farmers’ characteristics ℬ′𝑋𝑖𝑗 as well as random error 𝑖𝑗 
presented as: 
                                                 𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  ℬ
′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 ~ 𝑁[0, Σ]                               (4.5.10) 
Thus the choice of OFIGA 𝑖 that maximizes the utility of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ farmer is: 
                             𝑈∗(𝜓) =  𝑈[𝜅𝑏(𝜓)𝜅𝑐(𝜓)]                                                       (4.5.11) 
Where 𝜓, 𝜅𝑏 , 𝜅𝑐 represents the farmers’ characteristics, the base outcome 
occupation (No OFIGA) and the set of OFIGA alternatives. Thus, the probability of 
choosing OFIGA 𝑖 by the 𝑗𝑡ℎ farmer is: 
𝑃(𝑂𝐹𝐼𝐺𝐴 = 𝑖| ℬ, 𝑋𝑖𝑘, Σ













∗           (4.5.12) 
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In which case the PDF of the multivariate normal distribution is obtained from 𝑓(.) 





2 𝜎12 … 𝜎1𝑛
𝜎12 𝜎2  
2 ⋮
⋮ ⋱
𝜎1𝑛 ⋯ 𝜎𝑛  
2 )
  
Thus, the model estimating the determinants of preference for the types of off-farm 
income generating activities is presented as: 
𝑌𝑗(1 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, 2 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟,3 = 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)  








  +  ℬ7𝑎𝑔𝑒
+  ℬ8 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +  ℬ9 𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +  ℬ10 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑢 +  ℬ11 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢 
+  ℬ12 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢 +  ℬ13ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  ℬ14𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  ℬ15𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
+   ℬ16 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  ℬ17𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 +   ℬ18𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
+  ℬ19𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
+   ℬ20𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙                                                                                          (4.5.13) 
The socio-economic and risk/uncertainty variables are defined in Table 11 above. 
Similar to the probit model, five (5) models estimated using python were used to 
determine the effect of selected variables on the types of OFIGA engaged in by 
farmers. Model I estimated the effect of bipolar tendencies alone on types of OFIGA, 
Model II estimated the effect of risk attitudes on types of OFIGA engaged in while 
Model III incorporates bipolar tendencies, risk attitudes and socioeconomic 
characteristics in the estimation. Models IV and V are similar to Model III and IV 





4.6 Multivariate Multiple Regression  
The objective of examining the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk attitude are 
determined from estimating a multivariate regression model. This model was 
chosen because there was the need to predict multiple response variables 
determined by more than two independent variables taken into consideration 
simultaneously. In addition, unlike the ordinary least square regression the 
multivariate multiple regression has the advantage of allowing tests of the 
coefficients across the different response variables to be carried out. 
Recall from section 4.3 that the farmer risk and uncertainty attitude CPT parameters 
(α, β, 𝜆 , 𝛾+, 𝛾,− 𝛿+, 𝛿−, 𝜑) is determined by the farmers’ mental health related factors 
(bipolar disorder and mood) and other farmer specific characteristics. Thus, in 
general form the multivariate multiple regression model is specified as 
                                                       𝑌 =  ℬ𝛵𝑋                                                       4.6.1 
Where  
Y = row vector of 8 CPT parameters 
X = row vector of bipolar disorder, mood and other farmer specific characteristics 
ℬ = matrix of coefficients obtained from the estimation  
In multivariate multiple regression, each response variable is determined by its own 







 ℬ01 +  ℬ11 𝑋1 +  ℬ21 𝑋2 +⋯+  ℬ𝓋1 𝑋𝓋
 ℬ02 +  ℬ12 𝑋1 +  ℬ22 𝑋2 +⋯+  ℬ𝓋2 𝑋𝓋
⋮






)            4.6.2 
Where the dependent variable is 𝑌𝑗  
𝛵 = (𝑌𝑖0, 𝑌𝑖1, … ; 𝑌𝑖𝓌), predictor variable values 
𝑋𝑖 = (𝑋𝑖0, 𝑋𝑖1, … ; 𝑋𝑗𝓋) and regression coefficients   ℬ𝑖 = (ℬ𝑖0, ℬ𝑖1, … ; ℬ𝑖𝓋). 





]) = 0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ( ) = Σ, the multivariate normal distribution 














(𝑌𝑗 −   ℬ𝑋𝑗)
𝛵
 𝛴−1(𝑌𝑗 −ℬ𝑋𝑗))            4.6.3 
The matrix ℬ of least-squares estimates of the regression coefficients is obtained 
from 
                                    ℬ̂ = (𝑋𝛵𝑋)−1( 𝑋𝛵𝑌)                                                  4.6.4 
Specifically, the model estimated to examine the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk 
attitude is presented as:  
𝑌(𝐶𝑃𝑇 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠) =  ℬ0 +  ℬ1𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 +  ℬ2𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 +  ℬ3𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑑 





4.7 Summary  
This chapter begins with a conceptual framework that show how this thesis is 
designed to build on previous studies but goes further to link issues separately 
examined in previous studies. Specifically it shows how the study is able to examine 
the risk/uncertainty attitudes of participants and the connection between decision-
making behaviour. It also highlights the procedure and methodologies employed to 
link attitudes to risk and uncertainty with mental health related factors.  
To achieve the objective of estimating farmers’ attitudes to risk and uncertainty in 
different context and content domains, this thesis uses both non-parametric 
methods - relating to the patterns that characterise participant choices and their 
determinants; and parametric models – based upon cumulative prospect theory as 
it extends to continuous prospects. This chapter shows how the CEU model 
estimated in this study has direct correspondence with CPT specifically under 
additivity of the subjective probability measures. It describes the steps involved in 
estimating the individual parameters from a Bayesian procedure and rationale 
behind the methods used to make inferences about the parameters. 
In addition, Chapter 4 explains the generalized estimating equations procedure 
used to estimate the determinants of prospect choice. The objective of examining 
the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk attitude are determined from estimating 
multivariate multiple regression while the relationship between risk attitude and 
decision to engage in off-farm income generating activities are determined from 





Experiment Design and Implementation 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter covers details of the steps and processes of designing the experiment 
to the implementation of the field experiment. The data used in this study was 
obtained using two data gathering tools – experiment and questionnaire. First, data 
relevant to estimating choices and attitudes under conditions of risks and 
uncertainties was collected using an interval ‘lottery-style’ lab-in-field experiment 
that is as realistic as discrete lotteries but more indicative of the kind of choices 
made by farmers on a day-to-day level. Second, a two-part questionnaire was given 
to participants to obtain information relevant to achieving the research objectives. 
The first section of the questionnaire captured socioeconomic characteristics while 
the second section covered bipolar disorder using a modified Bipolar Spectrum 
Diagnostic Scale (by Ghaemi et al., 2005).  
The sections that make up Chapter 5 are as follows. Section 5.1 details the concepts 
on which the experiment pivots, section 5.2 explains the experimental design, 
section 5.3 reports the implementation processes and section 5.4 documents the 




5.1 Continuous or Discrete Prospects? 
This section explains the rationale behind the design of the prospect choice 
experiment before proceeding to explain key concepts associated with the 
experiment. 
The studies reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that the literature is replete with discrete 
lottery choice problems. However, continuous choices problems arguably better 
reflect everyday real world problems. Everyday examples include our daily 
commute time to work, the yield of a crop, the change in an asset price, the interest 
rate on a loan etc. The following examples put in context a typical discrete and 
continuous lotteries in the risk case: 
While a discrete lottery is typically presented as 
Lottery Choices: Would you prefer A or B? 
A: 10% chance of winning $2   B: 10% chance of winning $3.85 
 90% chance of winning $1.6   90% chance of winning $0.10 
 
The continuous lottery on the other hand takes the form of  
Lottery Choices: Would you prefer A or B? 
A: Equal likelihood of winning any B: Equal likelihood of winning any 
 amount between $1.6 and $2              amount between $0.1 and $3.85 
The main distinction between the continuous and discrete lotteries is that the 
number of possible values that the distribution of the continuous lottery has is 
infinite. Thus, the ‘probability’ that the payoff will assume a particular value is zero. 
Despite the prevalence of continuous choices problems in everyday problems, risky 
and uncertain real-life decisions have typically not been modelled using continuous 
lotteries. Instead, researchers relied on lotteries that have discrete probabilities 
attached to outcomes. To bridge this gap, the experiment in this study is based on 
interval prospect-choice design which takes into consideration key factors that 




5.1.1 Reality viewpoint 
While this study acknowledges that in economics it is impracticable to exhaustively 
represent reality with pinpoint accuracy in an experiment, however being certain 
that the findings will reflect real life decisions is only possible if the structure of the 
experiments corresponds to the what participants encounter in real life. To bring 
into context the above argument, below is a typical instance where farmers in 
Nigeria were presented with hybrid maize: 
“…under good management and weather, IITA maize hybrids A0905-28 
and A0905-3 are reported to have the capacity to produce 6-9 tons/ha 
(Seed Management Enterprise Institute (SEMI), 2012)”.  
While farmers are also aware that the competition hybrid Oba 98 have potential 
yield of 6.5 – 8 tons/ha. The farmer in reality may (or not) have equally likely chance 
of obtaining a yield between the minimum and maximum ceteris paribus. Presenting 
this information as a discrete lottery for instance say - an equal chance lottery with 
50% chance of 6tons/ha and 50% chance of 9tons/ha will be misleading as it does 
not capture all other yield possibilities in-between. 
One of the arguments often put forward by the proponents of simple discrete 
outcomes in explaining risk attitude is the complexity of the model needed to 
adequately handle experimental designs where lotteries take the form of 
continuous distributions over outcomes since most of the leading theories were 
originally developed to handle discrete outcomes. However, this currently does not 
pose a problem as extensions of most of the leading theories (including the CPT and 
CEU as discussed in Chapter 3) can sufficiently handle such cases. In the light of this 
assertion and particularly as the participants of this study (farmers) are constantly 
being faced with information where possible outcomes are styled as interval 




5.1.2 Cognitive perspective 
Popular elicitation methods have reported inconsistencies when various elicitation 
tools are applied to artefactual experiments in developing countries (see Charness 
& Viceisza 2015; Brick, Visser & Burns 2012). It has been argued by some studies 
(e.g. Jacobson & Petrie, 2009) that inconsistencies arise from cognition among 
several popular elicitation techniques. Even comparison between methods using 
the same participants has resulted in significantly different effects. For instance the 
EG method discusses in Chapter 2 has been reported (see Dave, Eckel, Johnson & 
Rojas, 2010) to outperform the HL task in terms of ease of comprehension and 
reliability. Albert & Duffy (2012) criticised the EG task based on its complexity and 
low intuitiveness in the way it is portrayed to participants. Similarly, Coot et al., 
(2013) have reported high percentage of misunderstanding in a modified HL task 
even when effort was made to modify the task to the level of participants. Csermely 
& Rabas (2015) corroborates this finding and reported that varying both the 
possible outcomes and probabilities imposes cognitive burden, which leads to 
inconsistencies. 
In the works of Sutter et al., (2015) and Dasgupta et al., (2016) the importance of 
taking into consideration the cognitive load at the design phase such that the 
experiments are simple enough to comprehend while simultaneously presenting 
little or no difficulties to implement is emphasised. However, experiments 
(especially the MPL’s) can only be successful if participants show good 
understanding of basic probability concepts. Researchers have made significant 
efforts to simplify the process using techniques such as coloured marbles in a bag 
(see Humphrey &  Verschoor  2004; Harrison et al., 2010) balls in an urn (Tanaka et 
al., 2010; Abdellaoui, Klibanoff & Placido, 2015). However, the explanation of 
probabilities still proves difficult to communicate to participants with low level of 
education. The quest to simplify some of the aforementioned techniques has pushed 
the design even further away from reflecting day-to-day real problems. 
Consequently, this thesis is built on evidence that changing probabilities while 
keeping the outcomes fixed is not the most suitable elicitation instrument to be used 
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in developing countries given the complexity this design possess34. In addition, 
graphical compared to tabular presentation and numerical probabilities enhances 
cognition35 and retains concentration. Therefore, the need for a tailored experiment 
that is realistic and suits the level of cognition of the participants was one of the 
drivers of this study. As discussed in section 5.2 this thesis strips the ‘lottery’ design 
of changing probabilities and fixing outcomes (e.g. as in Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Similarly, this study avoids fixing (discrete) probabilities and changing outcomes 
(for example in Jacobson & Petrie, 2007). This study altogether circumvent such 
mathematical jargon36 by replacing lotteries that have discrete probabilities with 
lotteries having continuous probability distribution. 
In summary, the applied work in this thesis is motivated by the fact that continuous 
lotteries are at least as realistic as discrete lotteries and more indicative of the kind 
of choices made by farmers on a day-to-day level.  Moreover, continuous lotteries 
appear not to be any more cognitively demanding than discrete lotteries. Indeed, 
they may be even simpler to comprehend. 
  
                                                          
34 Brick, Visser & Burns (2012) is one of the literature that provides such evidence. 
35 Further evidence in favour of this arguments can be found in Bodemer & Gaissmaier, (2012); 
Visschers, Meertens, Passchier & de Vries, (2009), Armel, Beaumel & Rangel, (2008); Krajbich, Armel 
& Rangel, (2010) and Dambacher, Haffke, Groß & Hübner (2016). 
 
36 By using simple concept such as “equally likely” it was possible to avoid the cognitive load that 




5.1.3 The “equally likely” Concept 
For a continuous prospect under risk, the density needs to be specified. The simplest 
way to do this is to specify a uniform distribution thereby making the term “equally 
likely” a key concept in this thesis. The term equally likely was communicated to 
participants as a case where all events of a sample space have the same likelihood 
of occurring. Notably the context in which this term was used in this thesis differ 
from the discrete case with finite outcomes e.g. “50/50” prospect in which a 
probability mass function is specified. Rather the focus here was on a uniform 
distribution in which infinite number of outcomes are equally likely to occur. For 
equally likely lotteries with uniform continuous outcomes, the chances of any one 
payoff value occurring is zero (i.e. for all values of 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) = 0) since the 
possibilities of any real number within the interval say [a, b] is infinite.  
Attitudes towards risk as opposed to uncertainty, were elicited by specifying that 
all outcomes over the specified interval were ‘equally likely’. Uncertainty was 
communicated by indicating to farmers that one outcome within the specified 
interval would be realised but without the specification of an associated probability 
density. For example, Figure 3a in section 5.2 below is a uniform continuous 
distribution in which prospect A is equally likely to take any value in the range of 
[₦4,280 to 7,358]. While prospect B is equally likely to take any value in the range of 
[₦5,361 to ₦6,315] (thus specifying a uniform probability density). It was 
emphasised and demonstrated to participants’ that in the case of risk, each prospect 
resulted in an infinite number of possible payoffs within the given range [i.e. ₦4280 
to ₦7358 for prospect A and ₦5,361 to ₦6,315 for prospect B]. Thus, there was no 
reason to believe that the frequency of occurrence differ for any value within the 
given interval of values. As for the case of uncertainty, when the set of continuous 
prospects are presented, the information about probability density is withheld. 
Details of the techniques used to distinguished risk from uncertainty in the field in 
a manner that participants understood the tasks under both conditions is discussed 





5.2 The Design 
The experiment used in this study was designed to examine the risk and uncertainty 
attitudes of participant by observing their preference over a series of prospect pairs. 
The seven (7) types of prospect pair are presented in Figure 2. Of each of the seven 
(7) types of prospect pairs, the top prospect (prospect A hereafter) was more ‘risky’ 
and had a greater variance than the bottom (prospect B hereafter).  
 
Figure 2. Types of prospect pairs 
Type 1 is unconstrained in the gain domain. As an illustration under conditions of 
risk, the set of prospects presented in Figure 3a is Type1 and shows that a DM is 
equally likely to earn any amount between ₦4280 and ₦7358 if he/she chooses 
Prospect A; while for Prospect B he/she is equally likely to earn any amount between 
₦5361 and ₦6315. Type 2 has the lower bound of the outer prospect at zero in gain 
domain. For example, the set of prospects presented in Figure 3b is Type2 and shows 
that a DM is equally likely to earn any amount between ₦0 and ₦8662 if he/she 
chooses Prospect A; while for Prospect B he/she is equally likely to earn any amount 
between ₦3579 and ₦6108. Comparing Type 1 to Type 2 it becomes clear that while 
both are within the gain domain, the lower limit of prospect A in Type 1 never drops 
to zero unlike Type 2 where the lower limit of prospect A is always ‘pegged’ at zero. 
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Similarly, for the time context under risk; the set of prospects presented in Figure 
3c is Type3 and shows that a DM is equally likely to lose 54 minutes and 8 hours 36 
minutes should the DM choose prospect A or equally likely to lose 4 hours 36 
minutes and 5 hours 24 minutes if the DM picks prospect B. On the other hand, the 
set of prospects presented in Figure 3d is Type4.  The difference between Type 3 to 
Type 4 is that while both are within the loss domain, the lower limit of prospect A in 
Type 3 never drops to zero unlike Type 4 where the lower limit of prospect A is 
always ‘pegged’ at zero. Details of the manner in which the entire experiment was 
presented to respondent is reported in Appendix 3. 
 
 
Figure 3a. Sample of Type 1 prospect in monetary context (gain domain)  
 
  
Figure 3b. Sample of Type 2 prospect in monetary context (gain domain)  
 
Figure 3c. Sample of Type 3 prospect in time context (loss domain) 
 
 







In summary, Type 1 is unconstrained in the gain domain. Type 2 has the lower bound 
of the outer prospect at zero in gain domain. Type 3 is unconstrained in the loss 
domain. Type 4 has its upper bound of the outer prospect at zero in the loss domain, 
Type 5 - unconstrained in the mixed domain, Type 6 has the inner prospect of the 
lower bound constrained to zero in the mixed domain, Type 7 has its inner prospect 
upper bound constrained to zero in the mixed domain. The essence of the different 
types37 was to cover as many domains of interest to this study and as wide a range 
as possible38. 
The prospects were computer generated random uniform lotteries on the 0 -100 
interval.   A large number of prospects pairs of each of the 7-types where generated 
in the first instance. The certainty equivalents of each of the prospect pairs were 
then calculated under expected utility for a ladder of “symmetric” power utilities 
across the gain and loss domains. These spanned from substantial risk seeking to 
strong risk aversion (2|2, 1.25|1.25, .99|.99, .5|5, .1|.1, .05|.05). Prospects pairs were 
kept only if there would be a switch from one of the prospects to another over this 
range of preferences. Thus, a prospect pair were retained when there was a 
difference in the certainty equivalents that would ensure there would be a 
difference in the choices made by participants’ with different “risk profiles”. Then, 
the prospect pairs where ranked according to those where switches would be made 
at different points in risk preference ladder (for all 7-types). Finally, a subset of the 
prospect pairs were chosen that had a range of switching points at different points 
in the ladder. 
Each participant had to make a choice between Prospects A or B in which case 
Prospect A was by nature more ‘risky’ than B since prospect B is always contained 
in Prospect A and Prospect A always had a higher variance. This process continued 
along the choice tasks beginning with Prospect A having a smaller EV compared to 
Prospect B, as such a risk averse participant is expected to choose Prospect B over 
A. As the EV of Prospect A becomes larger than B in subsequent choice pairs, a risk 
                                                          
37 Note.  Type1 and Type2 are subtasks framed as a gain and jointly referred to hereafter as gain 
domain task. Similarly, Type3 and Type4 are subtasks framed as a loss and jointly referred to 
hereafter as loss domain task while Type5, Type6 and Type7 are subtasks which consist of both 
gains and losses and jointly referred to hereafter as mixed domain task. 
 
38 The entire experiment is presented in Appendix 3. 
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averse participant is expected to switch to Prospect A from B. Using both parametric 
and non-parametric approaches, the study estimates risk and uncertainty attitudes 
from the choice of the prospects of participants and the switching point of each 
participant. 
Monotonic switching is not imposed in this study. One of the main reason for this 
was to ensure participants behaviour were observed when faced with real problems 
without imposing added assumptions on preferences. Further, it provides the 
platform to possibly examine any inconsistencies in choices. The proportion of 
participants that violated monotonic switching was minimal (accounting for only 
about 6%). This low percentage suggest that it was the innate behaviour of 
participants was captured rather than artefacts of the experiment. 
The participants were expected to choose between a pair of prospects under each 
condition as shown in Figure 3. The conditions (risk and uncertainty) consisted of 
decision task covering monetary and non-monetary39 context; across the gains, 
losses and mixed content domains as presented in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Conditions, Contexts and Contents domains 
 
Each participant was presented with 90 pairs of prospect choice tasks spread across 
the different context and content domains under risk and uncertainty.  Specifically, 
                                                          
39 The non-monetary context was not tested under conditions of uncertainty as the resources needed 
by the researcher and mental effort on the respondents would have been enormous given the large 
number of choice task each respondent would have had to be presented with. 
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10 tasks was allocated to the gain content domain under proxy-monetary context, 
10 task each to gain and loss content domains under self-monetary context and 15 
tasks to the mixed content domains under self-monetary context. For the time 
context, 10 tasks was allocated to the loss content domain. Similar proportions to 
the self-monetary context under conditions of risk was allocated to the content 
domains under uncertainty. The pattern of experiment for risk and uncertainty was 
largely similar. However, the difference was the introduction the “equally likely” 
concept (as discussed in 5.1.3 and detailed in the questionnaire in appendix) for the 
risk experiment while in the case of uncertainty this information was not provided.  
Finally, a questionnaire (details in Appendix 4) which covered socio-demographic 
characteristics and information on participation in off-farm income generating 
activities as well as bipolar disorder tendencies was also administered to 





This section documents the activities carried out prior to and during the field 
survey. Specifically it covers the preparation and procedure employed during the 
pilot survey and data collection. 
5.3.1 Survey Location 
The survey location was Edo and Delta State of Nigeria as shown in Figure 5a. The 
coordinates for Delta and Edo States are 5.5325° N, 5.8987° E and 6.5438° N, 
5.8987° E respectively. 
  





5.3.2 Selection of participants 
The study relied on data obtained from 160 small farm households with the target 
respondent being the household heads since they are responsible for decision-
making. Multistage sampling technique was used to obtain the respondents of the 
study. As shown in Figure 5b, the first and second stages depended on purposive40 
selection of the country Nigeria and then two states (Delta and Edo) within Nigeria.  
 
Figure 5b. Stages in Obtaining Respondents 
Stage 3 involved the random selection of 4 Local Government Areas (LGA’s) form 
each of the States (bringing the total LGA’s to 8) while in stage 4, twenty (20) 
farmers each form the 8 LGA’s were randomly picked to obtain the final sample size 
of 160 respondents.  
5.3.3 Training of enumerators 
Enumerators that assisted in carrying out the survey were trained by the researcher 
to ensure that they were familiar with the research and survey objectives as well as 
understood the questionnaire. They were also trained on how to make use of all 
supporting materials and administer the survey accurately and consistently without 
introducing any form of bias or noise. Overall, the researcher was fully responsible 
for coordinating the survey team. 
                                                          
40 Delta State is purposively selected because part of the funding for the PhD research is provided by 
the Delta State University, Nigeria whose primary research interest lies within Delta State, while Edo 
State is chosen because it is broadly classified as having similar farming systems and agro-climatic 
conditions to Delta State but have its distinct cultural background. Hsee & Weber, (1999) find that 




At the early stages of designing the experiment, a pre-pilot was conducted using 
volunteers from different background i.e. 4 farmers, 9 PhD students and 6 
pensioners. The main reason for this was to obtain feedback from respondents of 
different education level on the simplicity and clarity of the experiment. The 
feedback obtained was used to further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the data collection instrument.  
A pilot survey was conducted (using the target group i.e. smallholder farmers in 
Nigeria in this case) to determine how well the questions were understood and 
whether the content of each question was consistently given the same meaning by 
each respondent. This made it possible to identify ambiguous areas in the 
experiment. In addition, the pilot survey made it possible to estimate the resources 
and time required for each respondent to complete the experiment and 
questionnaire. 
To achieve the objectives of conducting the pilot, the survey was completed by 30 
farmers randomly selected from two communities via a recruitment process 
facilitated through extension agents and community leaders. The average time 
taken to complete the questionnaire was 1hour and 4 mins. The results for the 
pilot41 is presented in Appendix 10. The main findings from the pilot were that 
participants’ choices differ across content (i.e. gain, loss, mixed) domains. 
Specifically, under conditions of risk or uncertainty; majority of participants find the 
inner prospect more attractive for gains (and mixed task) and the outer prospect 
more attractive for losses. The proportion of participants that violated monotonic 
switching was minimal accounting for only about 11%42.  
The main feedback received was regarding the initial challenges in transiting from 
risk to uncertainty choice tasks. That is, some participants found it difficult to ‘erase’ 
from their memory equal likelihood when the instruction for subsequent choice 
task did not provide information regarding the specification of an associated 
                                                          
41 Participants that took part in the pilot study were excluded from the main study and no data 
from the pilot study was included in the main results. 
 
42 This proportion reduced to 6% after incorporating feedback from the pilot. 
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probability density. In other to address this issue and assist with smooth 
transitioning between concepts; the demonstration using a wheel spinner (as 
discussed in section 5.4.2) was introduced to reflect the relevant concepts until 
respondents showed full understanding. Although this approach was time 
consuming as it increased the average completion time to 1hour 22mins, however 
it proved to be efficient and reliable as respondents’ choices were their reflected 
uninfluenced independent decisions.  
In addition, in response to the feedback from the participants, each of task was 
presented in the response sheets showing upper and lower bounds (an 
improvement to the initial blank answer sheet provided in the pilot) on which 
participants ticked their chosen options.  
The observation on the field that continuous prospects are less cognitively 
demanding than discrete prospects and more related to decision problems farmers 
face on a day-to-day basis, the success in recruiting participants and in executing 
the experiment in line with the research plan jointly indicated that the main 




5.4 Data collection procedure 
Two sessions of data collection (morning and afternoon) ran per day with each 
session consisting of five participants. At the end of data collection, a total 158 
respondents fully participated in the survey. The procedure adopted during the field 
survey consisted of four main sections namely; arrival and documentation check, 
introduction and briefing, choice task and decision experiment and submission. 
5.4.1 Arrival and documentation check 
Each meeting with respondents took place in a familiar location in each community 
were participants were drawn from. The field team that consisted of the PhD 
researcher and four (4) enumerators (who were trained by the researcher to assist 
in data collection) were responsible for welcoming participants. Each participant 
was required to present evidence of invitation (household ID number) provided by 
the local extension agent.  
5.4.2 Introduction and briefing  
The research aims and terms of participation were communicated to the 
participants in English and local languages after which the participants were asked 
if they understood and that they consented to these terms. At the beginning of the 
experiments a detailed explanation of the necessary concepts (described in section 
5.1.3) relating to the choice task were explained using an unbiased wheel spinner. 
For the case of risk, a uniform probability density was specified by informing 
participants that all outcomes over the specified interval were ‘equally likely’. Then 
the example in Figure 3b (which specifies that a DM is equally likely to earn any 
amount between ₦0 and ₦8662 if he/she chooses Prospect A) was repeatedly spun 
on the spinner. This demonstration continued for about 10 rounds until participants 
were sufficiently convinced from the outcome of the spins that every payoff point 
between ₦0 and ₦8662 was equally likely to occur and remains so if the spinner is 
spun repeatedly. For uncertainty, a similar demonstration to that of the conditions 
under risk was made however the key difference was that while the proportions on 
the spinner remain fixed for all 10 rounds under the risk demonstration, the 
proportions was repeatedly changed before each spin under uncertainty. 
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Specifically, participants’ were told that they could earn any amount between ₦0 
and ₦8662 if he/she chooses Prospect A but the associated probability density was 
not specified. Thus, each time before the dial is rotated the proportions ‘allocated’ 
to the payoffs between ₦0 and ₦8662 was varied. Such that in some cases it was 
possible for payoffs around the middle or within the boundaries (₦0 and ₦8662) to 
have greater likelihood of occurring (signifying ‘not equally likely’) as well as some 
rounds in which all payoffs within the interval had equal likelihood of occurrence. 
Through this demonstration, participants grasped the concept that under 
uncertainty there was no specific information about the probability density as it 
could take any form ranging from uniform (equally likely) to non-uniform (not 
equally likely) should the spinner be spun repeatedly. This step was necessary to 
prevent noise that otherwise arose from cognitive barrier in the pilot.  
Further, it was emphasised that there was no right or wrong answer. Thus, it was 
expected that participants provided genuine answers regarding their choice among 
the task. Participants were also informed that one of their prospect choices would 
determine payment for participation at the end of the experiment for those who 
completed the interview. Thereafter, participants were requested to work 
independently. 
5.4.3 Choice task and decision experiment 
For the experimental sessions, the farmers were randomly placed in groups. Each 
group consisted of five (5) farmers who performed the tasks independently. 
Participants were presented with coded cards which determined the order43 in 
which each set of experiment was presented. The set of experiments consisted of 
series of lottery-styled choice list from which participants were required to make 
choices between prospects. Each task was presented to respondents one after the 
other in the form of choice cards. This process ensured that respondents made their 
                                                          
43 The 6 orders of experiment designed were ABCD, ABDC, ACBD, ACDB, ADBC and ADCB where A 
= Risk in monetary domain (gain, loss, mixed) B = Uncertainty in monetary domain (gain, loss, mixed)  C 
= Risk in time domain (loss only)  D = Risk in proxy monetary domain (gain only). There was no order 
effect in results reported in Chapters 6 and 7 tested using multivariate regression to examine the effect 




choice on a particular prospect before proceeding to the next. Four trial questions 
preceded the actual experiment to test respondents’ understanding and if 
respondents asked questions and raised concerns this were addressed by the 
enumerator.  
With the onset of a new set of choice tasks such as from gains to losses respondents 
attention were drawn by the researcher and necessary explanations made (e.g. 
reminding participants that they have finished a gain domain task and are now 
moving to a task framed as losses). Further, moving from risk to uncertainty 
participants were also reminded of the outcome of the demonstration using the 
wheel spinner in order to ensure that no issues arising from comprehension of the 
concepts were created when participant progressed from one condition, content or 
context domain to another. This was also necessary to forestall the earlier 
challenges reported in the feedback from the pilot regarding transitioning between 
concepts as discussed in 5.3.4. However, care was taken to avoid causing a gain vs. 
loss or risk vs. uncertainty effect by making sure the reminder was subtle and 
emphasising that there was no wrong or right answer so participants are free to 
report their genuine preferences. 
Furthermore, a two-part questionnaire was given to participants to obtain 
information relevant to achieving other research objectives. The first section of the 
questionnaire captured socioeconomic characteristics while the second section 
covered bipolar disorder using a modified Bipolar Spectrum Diagnostic Scale (by 
Ghaemi et al., 2005). 
5.4.4 Submission and payment procedure 
For the sake of establishing incentive compatibility, participants were told 
beforehand that after the experiment they would be paid according to the choices 
they had made earlier in the experiment for one prospect chosen at random44. Due 
to practical and ethical issues one of each participants’ choice from the gains only 
domain was selected and played using a uniform random number generator in 
                                                          
44 Similar to the findings from other studies, Azrieli, Chambers & Healy (2018) test for incentive 
compatibility in lottery based experiment and reports that selecting and paying for one randomly-
chosen problem stands out as more often than not as a credible incentive compatible mechanism. 
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which the integer had a value between (and inclusive of) the upper and lower 
bounds of the prospect selected. As for uncertainty, payment was determined from 
the gains only domain using a using a Gaussian random number generator. On 
average, the payment to each participant based on the prospect selected was ₦3245 
(£7.20). In addition, participants were also given monetary payment by the 
researcher. The payment they received was equivalent to an average two days wage 
as compensation for time spent during the experiment. Notably, participants were 
not told beforehand that they would be compensated for their time to ensure that 
only those genuinely interested in participating in the experiment took part and to 
avoid any effect the payment will have on their decision. The total amount spent on 
the monetary for compensation of all 160 respondents for their time was ₦464,000 
(£1031).  
Participants were also provided with contact details of the researcher should they 
wish to be informed about the findings from the research. Two respondents 
withdrew during the survey without providing the reason for withdrawal since 
respondents were under no obligation to do so. However, no respondent indicated 
interest to withdraw post-field survey. Overall, the field survey response was 




5.5 Summary  
In summary, Chapter 5 sets the context for the choice of continuous over discrete 
prospects, discussed the steps in designing the experiment and its implementation 
in the field. This study relied on cross-sectional primary data collected from 
farmers’ using a combination of lab-in-the-field experiment and questionnaire. The 
experiments depended on continuous prospects, which is less cognitively 
demanding than discrete prospects and more related to decision problems farmers 
face on a day-to-day basis. Attitudes towards risk as opposed to uncertainty, were 
elicited by specifying that all outcomes over the specified interval were ‘equally 
likely’. Thus, specifying a uniform probability density. Uncertainty was 
communicated by indicating to farmers that one outcome within the specified 
interval would be realised but without the specification of an associated probability 
density. With the aid of the experiment (split into Types 1-7 prospects that spread 
across the gain domain, loss domain and mixed domains); data relevant to achieving 
objectives I-III i.e. evaluating risk and uncertainty attitudes was obtained. Also, 
questionnaires that covered both socio-demographic characteristics and bipolar 












Data Description  
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data obtained from farmers that participated in the 
experiment. It consists of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
sample as well as a detailed description of the farmers’ preferences with respect to 
choice task experiment. 
Chapter 6 uses graphs, proportions and non-parametric tests to describe and 
explain the choices made by participants during the experiment. In line with the 
Mean-Standard deviation theory discussed in Chapter 3 participants’ choices under 
risk and uncertainty attitudes is estimated using GEE and Probit regressions. 
The results reported here covers participants’ choices patterns in different content 
(gain, loss & mixed) domains under conditions of risk and uncertainty. It also 
includes participants’ choices in monetary & time context under risk. It concludes 
with results showing the effect of attributes of the interval prospect experiment on 
participants’ choices.   
Chapter 6 comprises three main sections. Section 6.1 is made up of summary 
statistics of demographic and socioeconomic variables, section 6.2 describes the 
choices over gains, losses and mixed prospects under risk and uncertainty while 





6.1 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics 
The data analysed in this section was obtained from the questionnaire 
accompanying the experiment as discussed in Chapter 5. As reported in section 5.4, 
160 framers participated in the experiment of which 2 farmers withdrew before 
collation of the results. Therefore, the summary statistics presented in Figures 6-9 
and Table 12 is obtained from the sample of 158 farmers. As shown in Figure 6, the 
age range of subjects is between 27 to 87 years with the largest population of age 
group falling into the 51-60 years category. The average age of 56 years suggests 
that farmers in this region are middle aged. As presented in Figure 7, there were 
more males (70%) than females (30%) in the sample. This dominance of males 
could be attributed to selection of participants based on household head who are 
the main decision makers.  
 
 









Figure 8. Household size distribution. 
 
Figure 9. Education distribution. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, farmers have an average household size of five (5) members. 
Figure 9 is a plot of the distribution of educational level attained. It shows that the 
level of formal education attained is low with about 65% completing primary 
education at the most. As presented in Table 12, the predominant primary 
occupation is farming accounting for about (95%). The average farm size was 
approximately one (1) hectare. About 88% of farmers’ own their farms thus were 
directly responsible for making important economic decisions for the farm 
business. As shown in Table 12, the predominant categories of secondary 
occupation are employee, self-employed and worker. On average, the number of 
years in which farmers have engaged in farming is about 18 years while the average 
number of years that farmers have had secondary occupations was 10 years. This 
relatively long duration in occupation is a reflection of the fact that the sample 





Table 12  
Farmers’ Economic Characteristics 
Characteristics Frequency Distribution (%) 
Primary Occupation Type   
Farmer 150 95.0 
Others 8 5.0 
Ownership of Primary Occupation   
Own business 139 88.0 
Family (wage) 1 0.6 
Family (unpaid) 8 5.1 
Private Enterprise 7 4.4 
Government owned 2 1.3 
Others 1 0.6 
Secondary Occupation   
Yes 116 78.5 
No 42 21.5 
Secondary Occupation Type   
Employee 36 31.0 
Worker 43 37.1 
Self employed 37 31.9 
 
Years in Primary Occupation 
Years in Secondary Occupation 
Farm Size (ha) 
Mean        SD 
 18.49       12.40 
 10.18          8.74 
    1.08         0.59 
Min Max 
  2.0 54 
  1.0 54 
   0.2 4.0 
 
In comparison to the most comprehensive agricultural data currently available in 
Nigeria i.e. Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) - Integrated Surveys on 
Agriculture in Nigeria45; the sample characteristics in this study is representative of 
the farming population characteristics reported in the 2015/2016 LSMS. For 
instance, the LSMS reports that mean age is 49 years while the findings of this study 
is an average age of 56 years. According to the LSMS, 71% of the farming household 
head are male. This is similar to the 70% found in the sample data for this study. 
The LSMS reports average household size is 4 persons which also is similar to the 
average household size (of 5) recorded in the sample in this study. Finally, the 
average farm size as reported by the LSMS is 1.25 ha per household while the 
average farm size for farmers interviewed in this study was approximately 1ha per 
household.  
                                                          
45 The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics and Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development carried out the survey in 2015/16 with support from the World Bank. 
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6.2 Description of choice over gains, losses and mixed prospects 
under risk and uncertainty 
Prior to presenting results obtained from a model-based analysis, preliminary 
results which categorises farmers as ‘risk or uncertainty liking’ or ‘risk or 
uncertainty avoiding’ based on their preference in the experiments (without taking 
into account any functional form or model) is presented. As deduced from the 
review of literature in chapters 2 and 3, in terms of estimating a DM’s risk and 
uncertainty attitudes no estimation method is without limitations. Thus, applying a 
non-model based analysis will provide preliminary indication of the risk and 
uncertainty attitude of farmers’ without the restriction that arises from assuming a 
specific model. Therefore, this section uses graphs, proportions and non-parametric 
methods to describe and explain the choices made by participants during the 
experiment. 
6.2.1 Statistics of choices under risk and uncertainty (pooled subtasks) 
The results presented in this section describes participants’ choices under risk and 
uncertainty when participants were presented with the experiment described in 
Chapter 5. Recall, the experiment was designed such that participants had to make 
a choice between Prospects A or B wherein Prospect A was by nature ‘more risky 
(uncertain)’ than B since prospect B is always contained in Prospect A.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the nature of the prospects to which participants’ choice 
was elicited is such that there was a difference in the certainty equivalents that 
would ensure there would be differences in the choices made by participants’ with 
different “risk profiles”. In addition, the prospect pairs where ranked according to 
those where switches would be made at different points in risk preference ladder 
e.g. as the EV of Prospect A becomes larger than B, a risk averse participant is more 
likely to switch to Prospect A from B.  
A-priori it was expected that participants switch at some point (i.e. change their 
preference from Prospect A to Prospect B or vice versa as the experiment 
progressed) across all domains. However, not all the choices made by participants 
were in conformity with a-priori expectations. In addition, participants’ choices 
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differed across context and content domains as discussed in the sections that 
follows.  
For the pooled subtask choices, all subtasks46 within each specific domain are 
aggregated (pooled) into content (gain, loss, mixed) domain tasks. For example, the 
monetary task in the gain only domain consist of two subtasks. Recall in Chapter 5, 
Figure 2 showing the 7 types of prospect pairs; in the gain domain there are two 
types of prospect pairs i.e. Types 1 and 2 which are each subtasks in the gain domain 
and jointly referred to as gain domain task in the pooled results. In the loss domain 
there are also two types of prospect pairs i.e. Types 3 and 4. These loss domain 
subtasks (Types 3 and 4) are jointly referred to as loss domain task; while in the 
mixed domain there are three types of prospect pairs i.e. Types 5, 6 and 7 that consist 
of subtask spanning both gains and losses simultaneously and jointly referred to as 
mixed domain task in the pooled results presented in Figure 10. 
A graphical presentation of the choices made by participants in conditions of risk 
and uncertainty is presented in Figure 10. A priori it was expected that participants 
will fall into two main groups consisting of ‘switchers’ within and across subtask. 
On the contrary, four patterns emerge from the results that portray participants' 
behaviour under risk and uncertainty suggesting heterogeneous attitudes toward 
risk as well as uncertainty. First those that switched their choice of prospect at some 
point within a subtask; for instance switched (i.e. from prospect A to B or vice versa) 
in a specific subtask (e.g. within Type 1). Second, participants that switched (i.e. from 
prospect A to B or vice versa) across subtask (e.g. choose prospect A throughout in 
Type 1 and switched to prospect B at some point in Type 2 or vice versa). Third, 
participants that consistently chose prospect B in each particular domain. Fourth, 
participants that always chose prospect A in each specific domain. 
                                                          
46 Following the discussions in section 5.2 in Chapter 5, Figure 2 shows the 7 prospect pairs referred 
to as subtasks. Types 1 and 2 are jointly pooled to make a gain domain task. Types 3 and 4 pooled to 





Note: M = Monetary prospect, T= Time Prospect, P=Proxy monetary prospect 
 
 
Figure 10. Participants’ patterns of behaviour under different conditions, context 
and content domains  
 
 
6.2.1.1 Gain Domain 
As presented in Figure 10, in gains domain tasks (referring to Types 1 & 2) 
participants' choices under risk and uncertainty fall into four patterns.  This consist 
of individuals’ that: (a) switched their choice of prospect at some point within a 
subtask, (b) participants that switched across subtask, (c) participants that 
consistently chose prospect B (inner prospect) in each particular domain and (d) 






















Risk versus Uncertainty 
Participants that switched within subtask for risk were approximately 6%. Out of 
the 94% that did not switch within subtask, over 51% of these did not switch from 
the ‘safer’ prospect B. This statistics suggests risk avoidance among majority of 
participants. The proportion is similar for participants’ choices across subtask as 
about 18% only switched (e.g. in the first instance choose prospect A for Type 1 tasks 
then switched to prospect B in Type 2 or vice versa). As for the participants’ choices 
under uncertainty as presented in Figure 10, those who switched within subtask 
were approximately 11%. Also, 19% switched across subtasks. Notably, 51% under 
uncertainty did not switch at all i.e. consistently choosing the inner prospect 
(prospect B) for all gain domain tasks. Thus, whether it is for risk or uncertainty; 
participants at the aggregate level find the inner prospect more attractive for gains. 
Since the inner prospect is by nature less “risky”, this finding is an indication of 
participants’ dislike for risk and uncertainty in the gain domain.  
Hypothesis 4.1: Attitudes to risk differ from uncertainty (for gains) 
McNemar’s (1947) test that permits for evaluation of occurrence of statistically 
significant changes in proportions on a dichotomous variable between two groups 
of the same population was used to determine whether the proportion of the outer 
prospect as opposed to the inner prospect chosen by participants under conditions 
of risk is similar to conditions of uncertainty. The result presented in Table 12B 
show no statistical significant difference in the choices made in the gain domain 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty at the 1% level, (χ2 = 1.74, p > 0.187). 
Therefore, we fail to reject the hypothesis that participants’ choices under risk do 
not differ from uncertainty in the gain domains. 
Do attitudes to risk differ when making decision on behalf of others (Proxy-gain vs. 
Self-gains)? 
Comparing the choices made across the context domains of proxy-gain47 versus self-
gains only tasks; a smaller number of participants i.e. 37% (compared to 51% for 
                                                          
47 For clarification wherein self-gain and proxy-gain are mentioned in the same sentence, ‘self-gain’ 
refers to risk for oneself in the monetary domain framed as pure gain only while proxy implies taking 
risk on behalf of ‘other’ person in the monetary domain also framed as pure gain only. In this thesis, 
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self-gain) continually picked the inner prospect suggesting significantly lower 
proportion48 preferring the less ‘risky’ prospect when the decision was taken ‘on 
behalf of another’ compared to self.  
Hypothesis 5: There is significant difference in a DM’s risk attitude when making 
personal vs. proxy decision. 
McNemar’s test was used to determine if there are differences in the overall choices 
farmers made in the proxy-gain and self-gains context domains. The result show 
statistical significant difference in the choices at the 1% level (χ2 = 23.2, p < 0.001). 
This statistical difference suggest context-specific risk attitudes i.e. risk attitude 
differ when faced with risk for oneself or risk on behalf of others. Hence, we reject 
the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in a DM’s risk attitude under 
personal and proxy context. While further econometric tests are used to confirm the 
reason behind the significant difference in the choices farmers made in the proxy-
gain and self-gains domain, however it may be as a result of responsibility effect and 
possibly the scales of the payoffs.  
6.2.1.2 Loss Domain 
The results presented here was obtained from participants’ choices in subtasks 
framed as losses across both monetary and time contexts. Similar to the gain 
domain, participants are also categorised into four groups. This consist of 
individuals’ that: (a) switched their choice of prospect at some point within a 
subtask, (b) participants that switched across subtask, (c) participants that 
consistently chose prospect B (inner prospect) in each particular domain and (d) 
participants that consistently chose prospect A (outer prospect) in the gain domain 
task. 
Risk versus Uncertainty 
In the loss domain task (Types 3 & 4), there was switching within subtask under risk 
by 15% of the farmers while 18% switched across subtasks. However, for 
uncertainty 12% switched within subtasks while 20% switched across tasks as 
                                                          
proxy is only tested in the gain domain. This study tested proxy only in the gain domain under 
conditions of risk. 
48 Chi-square test of the proportion confirms this ( χ2 = 6.26, p = 0.01) 
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shown in Figure 10. The choice participants made in the loss-only domain is 
reversed compared to the preference in the gain domain tasks. Unlike the gain 
domain where the inner prospect was largely preferred, the predominant prospect 
choice in the loss domain was the outer prospect as observed by the majority (56% 
and 59% under risk and uncertainty respectively) picking the outer prospect 
overall. Notably, 38% in the case of risk and 42% under uncertainty did not switch 
at all (i.e. these group consistently chose only the outer prospect along all loss 
domain tasks) thereby portraying consistent risk/uncertainty seeking behaviour. 
This finding suggest that for both risk and uncertainty, participants at aggregate 
level behaves as though the outer prospect is more attractive for losses. Since the 
outer prospect is by design more “risky”, these choice patterns are possible 
indicators of participants’ risk and uncertainty seeking attitude in the loss domain. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Attitudes to risk differ from attitudes to uncertainty (for losses) 
To determine whether there was any significant difference in overall choices under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty in the loss domain, McNemar’s paired test was 
performed. The result shows statistical significant difference in the choices made in 
the loss domain for risk compared to uncertainty as obtained from the test at the 
5% level, (χ2 = 6.11, p = 0.013). The mean values49 indicate that under uncertainty 
(compared to risk), participants on average preferred the outer prospect (having 
larger variance) to the inner prospect. Thus, the hypothesis that attitudes to risk 
differ from uncertainty for losses cannot be rejected.  
Do attitudes to risk differ with context domains (Time-loss vs Monetary-loss)? 
A comparison of the choices made in the time-loss50 context with the money-loss 
context domain task show some variation51 in the number of participants that 
continually picked the outer prospect without switching (42% in the time context 
vs. 38% in the monetary context for losses). Similarly, there was difference in the 
proportion of participants that switched within subtask (15% in the monetary 
                                                          
49  The proportion that chose the outer prospect for risk is 56% while for uncertainty 59%. 
50 Money-loss refers to risk for oneself in the monetary domain framed as pure loss only while time-
loss implies risk framed as a loss to otherwise productive farm hours. In this thesis, time is only 
tested in the loss domain under risk. 
51 Albeit not statistically significant 
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context vs. 22% in the time context for loss) and across subtask (18% in the 
monetary context vs. 22% in the time context). 
Hypothesis 3: There is difference in DM’s risk attitude under time and monetary context 
Non-parametric test was used to test for significance difference in the choices 
farmers made in the time-loss and money-loss context domains. The result show 
statistical significant difference in the choices as obtained from the McNemar’s test 
at the 1% level (χ2 = 16.9, p < 0.001). This significant statistical difference indicates 
that risk attitude differ across context. Thus, the hypothesis that attitudes to risk do 
not depend on context is rejected.   
Do attitudes to risk and uncertainty differ with content domains? 
Having examined and cross-compared attitudes to risk to that of uncertainty in the 
gain domain on one hand and in the loss domain on the other hand in the preceding 
subsection; here the comparison is a condition specific test of choices within content 
domains. That is comparing gain vs. loss under risk as presented in Hypothesis 1 and 
gain vs. loss under uncertainty as proposed under Hypothesis 2.     
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes to risk depends on content domains 
Non-parametric test was used to test for significance difference in the choices 
farmers made in gain and loss content domains under risk. The result show 
statistical significant difference in the choices as obtained from the McNemar’s test 
at the 1% level (χ2 = 113.3, p < 0.001). This significant statistical difference indicates 
that risk attitude differ across content domains. Thus, the hypothesis that attitudes 
to risk does not depend on content domains is rejected.   
Hypothesis 2: Attitudes to uncertainty depends on content domains 
Similarly, under uncertainty the result show statistical significant difference in the 
choices farmers made in gain and loss content domains under uncertainty as 
obtained from the McNemar’s test at the 1% level (χ2 = 198.9 p < 0.001). This 
significant statistical difference suggest that risk attitude differ across content 
domains. Therefore, the hypothesis that attitudes to uncertainty does not depend 
on content is rejected.   
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6.2.1.3 Mixed Domain 
The results presented here was obtained from participants’ choices in subtasks 
framed as mixed i.e. having both gains and losses as possible outcomes. The 
proportion of choices in the mixed domain task (Types 5, 6 & 7) is presented in 
Figure 10.   
Risk versus Uncertainty 
The pattern indicates greater switching within and across subtasks in the mixed 
domain compared to either the gain and loss domains. 36% under risk (resp. 31% 
for uncertainty) switched within subtask while 19% and 28% under risk and 
uncertainty respectively across subtasks. The most preferred choice in the mixed 
domain tasks was the inner prospect as over 63% and 62% under risk and 
uncertainty respectively picked the inner prospect overall. This predominant 
preference for the inner prospect in the mixed domain tasks is similar to the choice 
pattern reported for gains only tasks, which suggest participants’ dislikes risk and 
uncertainty in the mixed domain. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Attitudes to risk differ from uncertainty (for mixed) 
McNemar’s test was used to test for significance in the choices made in the mixed 
domains under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The result show no statistical 
significant difference in the overall choices of participants in the mixed domain for 
risk and uncertainty at the 10% level (χ2 = 2.06, p = 0.151) in which case we fail to 
reject the hypothesis that in the mixed domain, attitudes to risk differ from 
uncertainty. 
6.2.2 Statistics of choice under risk and uncertainty (separate subtasks) 
Figures 11 and 12 show the choice pattern further examined by sub-tasks under 
risk and uncertainty respectively but in the monetary context only52. The choices 
made under both conditions of risk and uncertainty have similarities as well as 
differences across the various content and context domains. The findings and 
discussion are presented. Recall that section 5.2 in Chapter 5 explains the 7 Types 
of prospect pairs; Type 1 and Type 2 being subtasks in gain domain task. Type 3 and 
                                                          
52 Comparison between subtasks in the time and proxy cases are presented in Appendix 6 
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Type 4 are subtasks in the loss domain task; while Type 5, Type 6 and Type 7 are 
subtasks which consist of a mixture of both gains and losses and jointly referred to 
as mixed domain tasks.  
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6.2.2.1 Gain Domain 
As shown in Figure 11, a significant proportion consisting of 52% and 72% in the 
subtasks (Type1 and Type2 respectively) never switched within a subtask as they 
always preferred the inner prospect under conditions of risk. Overall a larger 
proportion picked the inner prospect for Type2 (74%) compared to Type1 (56%).   
 
 
Note. Gain1 = Type 1 - unconstrained in the gain domain, Gain2 = Type 2 - lower bound of the 
outer prospect at zero in gain domain, Loss1 = Type 3 - unconstrained in the loss domain, Loss2 
= Type 4 upper bound of the outer prospect at zero in the loss domain, Mixed1 = Type 5 - 
unconstrained in the mixed domain, Mixed2 = Type 6 - inner prospect of the lower bound 
constrained to zero in the mixed domain, Mixed3 = Type 7 - inner prospect upper bound 
constrained to zero in the mixed domain. 
 
Figure 11. Patterns of behaviour by subtasks type under risk. 
 
Similarly, under conditions of uncertainty, majority of participants (consisting of 
56% and 70% for Type1 and Type2 respectively) chose the inner prospect 
consistently without switching under gains-only subtasks as presented in Figure 12. 
In aggregate, a larger proportion at some point in experiment picked the inner 






















Note. Gain1 = Type 1 - unconstrained in the gain domain, Gain2 = Type 2 - lower bound of the 
outer prospect at zero in gain domain, Loss1 = Type 3 - unconstrained in the loss domain, Loss2 
= Type 4 upper bound of the outer prospect at zero in the loss domain, Mixed1 = Type 5 - 
unconstrained in the mixed domain, Mixed2 = Type 6 - inner prospect of the lower bound 
constrained to zero in the mixed domain, Mixed3 = Type 7 - inner prospect upper bound 
constrained to zero in the mixed domain. 
 
Figure 12. Patterns of behaviour by subtasks type under uncertainty. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Attitudes to risk differ within gain content domains 
McNemar’s test for differences in the overall choices farmers made in the Type1 and 
Type2 subtasks under risk show statistical significant difference in the choices at the 
1% level, (χ2 = 123, p < 0.001). The hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
in the choices of farmers within the gain domain under risk is rejected.  
Hypothesis 1.2: Attitudes to uncertainty differ within gain content domains 
Similarly, the McNemar’s test result for differences in the aggregate choices farmers 
made in the Type1 and Type2 subtasks under uncertainty show statistical significant 
difference in the choices made at the 1% level  (χ2 =41.5 P < 0.001). Thus, the 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the choices of farmers in the gain 





















risk and uncertainty depends also on the size of the prospects. While further 
analysis is needed to explain this significant difference between Type1 and Type2 
(under both risk and uncertainty), this difference however could possibly be 
attributed to outer prospect of Type2 being bound between zero and a positive 
payoff as against Type1 in which both prospect payoffs are positive but non-zero 
bound. 
6.2.2.2 Loss domain 
As presented in Figures 11 and 12, the choices in the loss-only subtasks (Types 3 & 
4) are reverse of the gains domain case. The predominant preference of participants 
under risk for losses was the outer prospect. The proportion that picked the outer 
prospect overall for Type3 is 54% compared to 57% for Type4. Under uncertainty, a 
larger proportion (58%) picked the outer prospect for Type3 compared to Type4 
(60%).  
Hypothesis 1.3: Attitudes to risk differ within loss content domains  
Non-parametric McNemar’s test used to determine significance in the overall 
choices farmers made in the Type3 and Type4 subtasks under risk show statistical 
significant difference in the choices as obtained from the McNemar’s test at the 5% 
level (χ2 = 4.6, p = 0.032). Thus we reject the hypothesis that attitudes to risk do not 
differ within loss content domains. 
Hypothesis 1.4: Attitudes to uncertainty differ within loss content domains  
In the same vein, under uncertainty the result show significant difference in the 
choices as obtained from the McNemar’s test at the 10% level (χ2 = 3.53, p = 0.060). 
In which case, the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the choices of 
farmers the loss domain under uncertainty is rejected. 
Again the choice pattern across the different loss subtasks are subjected to further 
statistical estimations due to significant difference in the proportion of participants’ 
choice in Type3 and Type4. In line with the previous postulation, the difference 
observed could be attributed to outer prospect of Type4 being bound between zero 
and a negative payoff as against Type3 in which both prospect payoffs are negative 
non-zero bound. However, it goes to suggest that the attitudes to risk and 
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uncertainty depends also on the size of the prospects even in the same content 
domain. 
6.2.2.3 Mixed domain 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that in the mixed subtasks (Type5, Type6 and Type7) 
that the inner prospect was consistently chosen under risk and uncertainty 
respectively. Contrasting the choices in the subtask Type5 (which is unconstrained 
in the mixed domain) against Type6 (which had its inner prospect of the lower 
bound constrained to zero) yielded some interesting results.  
Hypothesis 1.5: Attitudes to risk differ within mixed content domains  
McNemar’s test for significance in the overall choices farmers made in the Type5 
and Type6 subtasks under risk show statistical significant difference in the choices 
at the 10% level (χ2 = 3.5, p = 0.061). In addition, a comparison of the choices in the 
subtask Type5 (which is unconstrained in the mixed domain) versus Type7 (which 
had its inner prospect upper bound constrained to zero) show statistical significant 
difference in the choices at the 1% level (χ2 = 46.2, p < 0.001). Thus, the hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference in the choices of farmers within the mixed 
domain under risk is rejected.  
Hypothesis 1.5: Attitudes to uncertainty differ within mixed content domains  
For uncertainty the results are different from risk as there is no significant 
difference in the choices at the 10% level, (χ2 = 1.37, p=0.241). On the other hand, a 
comparison of the choices in the subtask Type5 versus Type7 show statistical 
significant difference in the choices at the 1% level (uncertainty: χ2 = 81.2, p < 
0.001). Therefore, hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the choices of 
farmers within the mixed domain under uncertainty cannot be rejected. 
This significant difference in the population choice between Type5 and Type6 on one 
hand and Type5 and Type7 on the other hand may be connected with their design 
characteristics. For the Type6 case, there is no chance of a getting a negative payoff 
compared to Type5 while for the Type7 case there is no chance of a getting a positive 
payoff compared to Type5. This may well result in farmers showing greater 
preference for the prospect that presents the possibility of attaining some ‘desired 
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levels’; in this case a possibility of making a gain. In addition, there may be the 
possibility that participants treat zero payoffs as either positive or negative relative 
to the value of other payoff in the same prospect. These possibilities are investigated 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Table 12B 
Summary of the Test of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses χ2 p-value Significance 
Attitudes to risk differ from 
uncertainty (for gains) 
1.74 p > 0.187 Not significant 
Attitudes to risk differ from 
uncertainty (for losses) 
6.11 p= 0.013 Significance at 5% level 
Attitudes to risk differ from 
uncertainty (for mixed) 
2.06,  p= 0.151 Not significant 
There is difference in DM’s risk 
attitude under personal and proxy 
context 
23.2  P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
Attitudes to risk depends on context 
domains 
16.9  P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
Attitudes to risk depends on content 
domains 
198.9  P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
Attitudes to risk differ within gain 
content domains 
123 P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
Attitudes to risk differ within loss 
content domains 
4.6 p= 0.032 Significance at 5% level 
Attitudes to risk differ within mixed 
content domains 
3.50 P= 0.061 Significance at 10% level 
Attitudes to uncertainty differ within 
gain content domains 
41.5 P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
Attitudes to uncertainty differ within 
loss content domains 
3.53 p= 0.060 Significance at 10% level 
Attitudes to uncertainty differ within 
mixed content domains 
81.2 P< 0.001 Significance at 1% level 
 
In summary, the results presented in section 6.2 suggest that participants’ choices 
in the experiment are heterogeneous given the four patterns that portray 
participants' behaviour under risk and uncertainty. Also, whether faced with 
conditions of risk or uncertainty, participants find the inner prospect more 
attractive for gains (and mixed task) and the outer more attractive for losses. Since 
the inner prospect is by nature less ‘risky’, this finding is an indication of 
participants’ dislike for risk and uncertainty in the gain (and mixed) domain; and 
liking for risk and uncertainty in the loss domain. The results also suggest that 
participants’ choices differ across content (gain, loss, mixed) domains.   
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6.3 Results of Mean-Standard deviation Estimation  
GEE regression follows an estimation of the model in equation 4.4.1iv in Chapter 4 
and the results are presented in Table 13. In accordance with the literature 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Mean-Standard deviation (MSD) measures risk by its 
variance or standard deviation. In a scenario where a DM is faced with a risky and 
uncertain choice task; the ‘rational’ risk averse DM would a-priori prefer the option 
that has both the greater expected value and smaller SD. In the case where the 
expected values of the choice task are equal then the risk averse DM should prefer 
the alternative with the smallest SD. 
Recall from section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4 that for the variables in Table 13 ‘Mean’ and 
‘SD’ refers to the differences in mean and standard deviation respectively between 
the payoffs of prospects A and B. ‘Gain’, ‘loss’ and ‘mixed’ indicates that the payoffs 
are strictly positive, strictly negative or mixed domains. ‘ZB_outer_gain’ implies that 
the gain domain task has the lower limit of the outer prospect bound at zero. 
‘ZB_outer_loss’ means that the loss domain task has the upper limit of the outer 
prospect bound at zero. Similarly, ‘lower_ZB_inner_mix’ indicates a mixed domain 
tasks having the lower limit of inner prospect bound at zero while for 
‘upper_ZB_inner_mix’ the mixed domain task has the upper limit of inner prospect 
bound at zero. In line with the predictions of the M-SD theory, an increase in the 
difference between the means of the outer and inner prospects will result in the rise 
in the likelihood of choosing the outer option. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the model from which the result in Table 13 is obtained 
includes content domain specific variables (i.e. gain, loss and mixed) in addition to 
zero constrained prospects.  The dependent variable is binary which signifies the 
DM ‘prefers the prospect with greater variance (prospect A) = 1’; 0 otherwise53.  
  
                                                          




Table 13   
GEE and Probit results showing marginal effect for determinants of lottery choice 
 GEE (Probit) Probit 
 I II III IV V VI 
Variables Pooled Risk Uncertainty Pooled Risk Uncertainty 
Mean 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
SD -0.005 0.012** -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Gain x SD 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.010 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Loss x SD 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Gain -0.089*** -0.051 -0.114*** -0.089*** -0.052** -0.114*** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
Loss 0.058* 0.049 0.071* 0.057*** 0.048* 0.071*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.023) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) 
Mix -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.154*** -0.161*** -0.169*** -0.154*** 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) 
ZB&_Outer_Gain -0.157*** -0.189*** -0.127*** -0.157*** -0.189*** -0.127*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038) 
ZB_Outer_Loss 0.038 0.044 0.036 0.038** 0.044 0.036 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.036) (0.037) 
Lower_ZB_Inner_Mix -0.043 -0.044 -0.040 -0.043** -0.044* -0.040 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.038) 
Upper_ZB_Inner_Mix 0.183*** 0.217*** 0.150*** 0.183*** 0.217*** 0.150*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.039) (0.042) 
& ZB= zerobound             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1                
Standard errors are in parentheses 
No. of Observations = 11060 for pooled, 5530 for all others 
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Three variations of the GEE model are estimated; models I, II and III representing 
pooled (risk and uncertainty combined), risk only and uncertainty only respectively. 
In addition, three probit models (IV, V, VI) are estimated since its result is similar to 
the GEE under independence structure. Overall, the results indicate that the mean 
payoff of the prospect, the content domain (gain, loss or mixed) determine the 
likelihood of choosing the outer option i.e. prospect A. Note that a positive 
coefficient denotes the corresponding variable increases the likelihood of picking 
the outer prospect and vice versa.  
Mean – As shown in Table 13, the coefficient of the ‘mean’ effect is significant and 
positive for all estimated models. In line with the predictions of the MSD theory, the 
results show that for all six models, an increase in the difference between the means 
of the outer and inner prospects will result in the rise in the likelihood of choosing 
the outer option i.e. prospect A. However, this effect is relatively weak as evident 
from the small values of the estimated marginal effects.   
Standard deviation (SD) – There was no significant effect of SD on the choice of 
prospects in all estimated Models except for Model II where there is negative 
significant relationship (β =-0.05, z = -2.28, p<.05) between standard deviation and 
prospect choice. This significant relationship denotes that as the SD increases, it 
decreases the likelihood of picking the outer prospect under risk condition. Again, 
this effect is relatively weak as the values of the estimated marginal effects are small 
however; this findings conforms to a-priori expectations. 
Gain - The coefficient of  ‘gain’ is negative and significant in Models I (β = .038, z = -
2.67, p<.01), III (β = 0.49, z = -3.12, p<.01) and IV (β =-0.23, z = -5.50, p<.01) 
suggesting that when a gain domain task is presented to the participants, there was 
increased likelihood of avoiding the outer prospect.  
Loss – In contrast to the ‘gain’ effect, ‘loss’ has a significant but positive effect on 
prospect choice. This significant effect in Models I (β = .024, z = 1.91, p<.10), III (β = 
.30, z = 1.73, p<.10) and IV (β = .15, z = 3.52, p<.01) indicates that the likelihood of 
choosing the outer prospect increases when the task is in the loss domain. These 
findings are consistent with numerous findings in the literature predicting of risk 
avoidance for gains and risk seeking for losses. 
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Mixed - The mixed domain effect is negative and significant for models I, II, III and 
IV (β = -0.70, z = -4.74, p<.01), (β = -0.74, z = -4.55, p<.01), (β = -0.66, z = -3.85, p<.01), 
(β = -0.43, z = -8.05, p<.01) respectively; indicating greater likelihood of avoidance 
of the outer prospect in the mixed domain task. Notably, the increase in the 
probability of choosing the outer prospect is higher in the mixed domain than the 
gains only domain. Again, these results are in consonance with the findings in 
several risk/uncertainty decision-making literature.  
Zero bounds prospects- The effect of zero-bound-outer prospect in the gain domain 
are negative and significant for models I, II III and IV (β = -0.69, z = -5.52, p<.01), (β 
= -0.83, z = -5.57, p<.01), (β = -0.56, z = -3.32, p<.01), (β = -0.42, z = -8.93, p<.01)54 
respectively. The relatively large estimated marginal effect in all four models 
supports previous findings in Section 6.2 that not only are participants more likely 
to avoid the outer prospect in the gains domain; but there is higher likelihood to 
specifically avoid the outer prospect when its lower bound is at zero. This result 
highlights the preference for substantive deterministic gains. In contrast, the 
coefficient of the zero-bound-outer in the loss domain (statistically significant in 
Model IV) highlights the findings in Section 6.2 that in the loss domain participants 
prefer the outer prospect i.e. prospect A; and are markedly more likely to choose the 
outer prospect when its upper bound is zero. Similarly, the effect of lower-zero-
bound-inner in the mixed domain are negative and significant for models IV and 
positively significant for upper-zero-bound-inner in all six models thus further 
indicating that participants are likely to prefer the more risky/uncertain prospect if 
the alternative prospect has likelihood of a strictly negative loss occurring. This 
study refers to these attitudes hereafter as ‘negligible gain avoidance’ (NGA) and 
‘negligible loss seeking’ (NLS). These unusual but insightful finding that it does 
matter to participants when one of the bound of the prospect was pegged at zero 
but the payoffs still remained strictly positive (or negative) was a-priori not 
expected.  
                                                          
54 In addition, the significant negative (resp. positive) coefficient of lower-zerobound-inner (resp. 
upper-zerobound-inner) in the mixed domain for model IV implies that when the payoffs of the inner 
lotteries are confined to a negative (resp. positive) domain compared to the alternative lottery that 




One possible argument could be that ‘NGA’ and ‘NLS’ are nothing more than artefact 
of the design. This assertion is investigated and the findings presented in section 8.1 
in Chapter 8. From a different perspective, it could be that participants adopted 
different decision rules that may well reflect those that are used in their day-to-day 
decision making even if it may not be “rational”. Thus, the rest of Chapter 8 
examined decision rules and alternative theories with the aim of providing further 
explanation on the phenomenon highlighted in this Chapter. The Chapter that 
follows is focused on further examining the risk and uncertainty attitudes of farmers 
using Bayesian procedure on CPT and the extent to which these aforementioned 





Recall that section 5.2 in Chapter 5 explains the 7 Types of prospect pairs; Type 1 
and Type 2 being subtasks in gain domain task. Type 3 and Type 4 are subtasks in 
the loss domain task; while Type 5, Type 6 and Type 7 are subtasks which consist of 
a mixture of both gains and losses and jointly referred to as mixed domain task. The 
results obtained from graphs, proportions and non-parametric tests suggest that 
participants’ fall into four choice patterns. First those that switched their choice of 
prospect at some point within a subtask; for instance switched (i.e. from prospect A 
to B or vice versa) in a specific subtask (e.g. within Type 1). Second, participants’ 
that switched (i.e. from prospect A to B or vice versa) across subtask (e.g. choose 
prospect A throughout in Type 1 but switched to prospect B at some point in Type 2 
or vice versa). Third, participants’ that consistently chose prospect B in each 
particular content domain. Fourth, participants’ that always chose prospect A or B 
in each specific content domain. Further, participants reacted differently to Types 2, 
6, 4 and 7 where the prospects’ upper or lower bound were constrained at zero. 
Also, the findings suggest that participants’ choices differ across context (personal, 
proxy & time) and content (gain, loss, mixed) domains. 
Further, the results of GEE and probit estimation showed that the mean value of the 
prospects had effect on the choices participants’ made and crucially, an increase in 
the difference between the means of the outer and inner prospects will result in the 
increase in the likelihood of choosing the outer prospects. The results also show that 
under risk and uncertainty; participants find the inner prospect more (less) 
attractive for gains (resp. losses). Since the inner prospect is by nature less “risky”, 
this finding is an indication of participants’ dislike (resp. love) for risk and 
uncertainty in the gain (loss) domain. Overall, there was higher likelihood of 
specifically avoiding the outer prospect when its lower bound is at zero – a 
phenomenon this thesis referred to as negligible gain avoidance. Similarly, in the 
loss domain participants’ were more likely to choose the outer lottery when its 
upper bound was zero in what is referred to in this thesis as negligible loss seeking. 
In Chapter 7, the result in Chapter 6 is subjected to Hierarchical Bayesian CPT 
estimation to broaden the findings on participants’ attitudes and further elucidate 




Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) Results and 
Discussion 
7.0 Introduction  
The chapter presents and discusses results obtained from estimating the 
Hierarchical Bayesian CPT model discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The results 
reported here will cover only (monetary) risk and uncertainty obtained from 
participants’ responses to task Types 1-7. The results have been limited to these two 
cases primarily due to time and resource constraints of the author as well as the fact 
presenting results for every case would require a number of very long sections. 
Thus, the CPT analysis has been constrained to what the author considers the two 
most important cases (monetary risk and uncertainty).  Therefore the analysis in 
this chapter is based on data obtained from 158 participants’ over monetary pure 
gains, losses and mixed tasks along 35 decision rows resulting in a total of 5530 risk 
choices and 5530 uncertainty choices.  
Although the estimates of the individual parameters were derived from a Bayesian 
procedure, inference about the parameters was via classical non-parametric test 
applied to the individual parameters extracted from the Bayesian mixed logit.  A 
proviso the analysis below is therefore that this is a two-stage procedure and as with 
all two stage procedures there will be an associated bias to these tests. Notably, the 
standard CPT function is likely to struggle to deal with the behaviour highlighted in 
the section 6.3 in Chapter 6 i.e. phenomenon of NGA and NLS and significantly large 
number of non-switching at different points in risk preference ladder. This 
possibility leads to the bunching of individuals at the end of the parameter space 
implying appropriateness of using non-parametric tests. 
Chapter 7 comprises of three main sections. Section 7.1 describes participants’ risk 
attitudes over gains, losses and mixed prospects, section 7.2 describes participants’ 




7.1 Attitudes to Monetary Risk  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the utility and weighting functions fitted in this 
study are power utility (see equation 3.4.3) and Prelec II weighting function (see 
equation 3.4.9) functions respectively. The CPT estimation permitted different 
subjective value function for gains (α), losses (β) in addition to accommodating 
separate weighting function for gains (𝛾+ and 𝛿+) and losses (𝛾−and 𝛿−). This thesis 
impose restriction on the CPT parameters. The restriction are α ∈ [0.05, 2], β ∈ [0.05, 
2], λ ∈ (0.05, 3), γ+ ∈ [0.25, 2], γ- ∈ [0.25, 2], δ+ ∈ [0.25, 2], δ- ∈ [0.25, 2],  φ ∈ [0, ∞] 
to enable the possibility of capturing different shapes of the value and probability 
weighting function.  
The joint posterior parameter distributions which was estimated in python 
software55 was obtained from Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm for 
12,000,000 iterations out of which 2,000,000 iterations were discarded as burn-ins 
thus was not used to represent the posterior.  In order to reduce correlation across 
retained posterior draws, 1 in every 1000 draws was extracted resulting in a total 
of 10,000 iterations. Visual observation of the trace plots confirms convergence of 
the MCMC draws. 
To prevent misleading and unrepresentative values that might arise from reporting 
only the median as in Resende & Tecles, (2011), Abdellaoui et al. (2008) this study 
reports both the mean and median values. A description of the estimated 
parameters under risk is presented in Table 14. These results confirm the presence 
of heterogeneity among respondents (for instance 25%, 50% and 75% of the sample 
have β value of at most 0.12, 0.57 and 1.42 respectively). This corroborates the 
findings of Abdellaoui et al. (2008) and Resende & Tecles, (2011), that parameter 
estimates at individual level provides evidence of heterogeneity among 
participants. 
The results in Table 14 further underline the non-normality of the distributions of 
individual preference parameters, also highlighting that using the underlying mean 
and variance parameters from the mixed logit as being indicative of the population 
                                                          




would be misleading. Therefore, for testing hypotheses, the individual preference 
parameters are used, in conjunction with non-parametric tests. 
Table 14  
Descriptive Statistic for CPT Risk Parameter under risk 
Variables Mean Median SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
α 0.53 0.06 0.73 0.05 0.05 0.06 1.30 1.99 
β 0.76 0.57 0.68 0.05 0.12 0.57 1.42 1.93 
𝛾+ 0.73 0.34 0.59 0.26 0.27 0.35 1.33 1.96 
𝛾− 0.80 0.65 0.52 0.25 0.31 0.65 1.16 1.90 
𝛿+ 0.71 0.45 0.52 0.25 0.29 0.45 1.27 1.92 
𝛿− 0.86 0.42 0.66 0.25 0.26 0.42 1.58 1.99 
λ 1.90 1.90 0.97 0.50 0.84 1.90 2.95 3.00 
φ 20.87 20.56 16.51 0.19 5.52 20.56 34.97 55.87 
 
7.1.1 Utility Parameters under Risk 
Recall from Chapter 3 that for the CPT model estimated in this thesis, the curvature 
of the value function is determined by α and β. Also in line with the definition of risk 
aversion/seeking in Chapter 2 in respect of the curvature of the value function; 
values of 0 < α, β < 1 implies risk aversion and risk seeking in the domains of gains 
and losses respectively. The parameter λ on the other hand symbolizes differences 
in the weight attached to loss compared to gain. 
Figures 13 and 14 are plots showing the distribution of α and β parameters of the 
value function at individual level.  Figure 13 shows that of the 158 participants, 
majority (over 72%) have α < 1 parameter value. This indicates that the curvature 
of majority of the value function for gains was concave. Thus, in line with the 
definition adopted in section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2 describing risk aversion in respect 
of the curvature of the value function; farmers were prevalently risk averse in the 
gain domain (although to varying degrees as shown across the different percentiles 
in Table 14).  The distribution of the value function for losses as presented in Figure 
14  confirms that for about 54% of participants β < 1 implying a majority had convex 
value function in the loss domain and indicating predominantly risk seeking attitude 
towards losses.  
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Notably, the results in Table 14 and distributions in Figures 13 & 14 show that 
preferences of many respondents could only be modelled using “extreme curvature” 
of the value function. The masses clustered at the lower limit of the restriction for 
both α and β indicates extreme behaviour i.e. excessive risk aversion (as presented 
in the 50th percentile) and risk seeking in the gains and loss domains respectively, 
which is line with the findings reported in Chapter 6.  
A one sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test show that the parameters α and β are 
significantly less than 1 at the 1% level (Z = -7.50, p < 0.001 and Z = -5.08, p < 0.001 
respectively) thereby we reject the hypothesis of domain specific risk neutrality.  
Hypothesis 1: Attitudes to risk depends on content domains 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test to compare sample distribution of α and β parameters 
shows statistically significant difference between α and β at the 1% level (Z = -3.16, 
p < 0.001) in which case the hypothesis that the sample distributions are equal i.e. 
α = β is rejected in favour of α < β. This significant difference denotes that the 
curvature of the value function is content domain specific. That is risk attitude is 
distinctive across gains and losses. This finding corroborates the results in Chapter 
6. Past studies using CPT (including the pioneers Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) have 





Figure 13-18: Histogram of the CPT parameter for the beta distribution under risk 
 
 
Figure 13. α parameter 
 
 
Figure 14. β parameter 
 
Figure 15. γ+ parameter 
 
Figure 16. γ− parameter 
 
Figure 17. δ+ parameter  




The coefficient of the DM’s relative sensitivity to gain and loss (λ) show that 
participants with λ >1 made up over 64%. In aggregate, an estimated mean value 
for λ is 1.90 is obtained as shown in Table 14. This mean value reflects a kink that is 
not too sharp at the reference point. The mean coefficient (λ = 1.90) in this study is 
close to the value (λ = 1.87) reported in Booij and van de Kuilen (2007).  However, 
as discussed in Balcombe et al. (2018), when a symmetry restriction is not imposed 
on the power parameters, the interpretation of this coefficient is complex. 
 
 
Figure 19. Average value function for α and β under risk. 
Figure 19 is a plot of the results reported for the value function computed from the 
means of α, β and λ parameter estimates. As shown in the plot, the concavity for 
gains and convexity for losses is a pointer to risk aversion and risk seeking 
respectively and is in line with several previous findings of inverse S-shaped value 
function. Notably, the loss arm is steeper than the gains. This finding provides 
evidence in support of greater sensitivity to losses compared to gains; however not 
as intense as that reported in previous studies e.g.  Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and 




7.1.2 Probability Weighting Parameters under Risk 
The distribution of the gamma parameter in the domains of gain γ+ and loss  γ− 
presented above in Figures 15 and 16 respectively shows that about 65% and 69% 
respectively fell within the group with  0 < 𝛾+, 𝛾− < 1. This represents a 
predominant inverse S-shape for the parameters 𝛾+ and 𝛾− which determines the 
curvature of the weighting function. That is, overweighting low probability and 
underweighting high probability. Further, a one sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
of the hypothesis that  γ+ = 1 and γ− = 1 provides the basis for rejecting the null 
hypothesis given the parameters are significantly less than 1 at the 1% level (Z = -
5.24, p < 0.001 and Z = -4.87, p< 0.001). This finding is an indication of probability 
warping. This proof supports the hypothesis that that participants do warp 
probabilities and it corroborates Tversky & Kahneman, (1992); Mattos, Garcia & 
Pennings, (2007) that DM are sensitive to probability changes along the spectrum 
of unlikely to likely.  
Although the mean and median of 𝛾− is arithmetically larger than 𝛾+ as commonly 
reported in past studies56, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test show that there is no 
significant statistical difference between 𝛾+ and 𝛾− at the 5% level (Z = -1.29, p = 
0.19). Thus the hypothesis that the sample distributions are equal i.e. 𝛾+ = 𝛾− cannot 
be rejected. This finding indicates that under risk, domain specificity have no 
significant effect on weights attached to events.  
The weighting function parameters δ+ and δ− which measures the level of optimism 
is presented in Figure 17 and 18. A significant proportion (consisting of about 70% 
and 63% respectively) of participants fell within the 0 < δ < 1 bracket. A one sample 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test show that the parameters δ+ and δ− are significantly less 
than 1 at the 1% (Z = -6.19, p<0.001) and 5% (Z = -2.71, p=0.028) level respectively. 
This finding corresponds to the behaviour commonly reported in the literature as 
pessimism for gains and optimism for losses. On this basis, the hypothesis of a single 
but dominant risk attitude for gains and losses is rejected. This finding corroborates 
the hypothesis tested in Chapter 6. 
                                                          
56 Glöckner & Pachur, (2012), Fox & Poldrack, (2008)  are typical cases 
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A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test used to compare sample distribution of the weighting 
parameter δ+ and δ− show no significant statistical difference between δ+ and  δ− 
at the 5% level (Z = -1.29, p = 0.19). Thus, the hypothesis of similar elevation across 




Figure 20. Prelec II probability weighting 




Figure 21. Prelec II probability 
weighting function for values 𝛄−𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝛅− 
under risk. 
 
Note: The yellow lines in each plot represents the functions for individual DMs, the blue line shows 
the group-level mean, and the red line symbolizes the identity line 
 
Figure 20 and 21 are plots of the probability weighting function for the parameters  
𝛾+, δ+ and 𝛾−, δ− respectively. The shape of the plots for the group-level mean 
confirms that on average the DMs overweighting of large probabilities in the gains 
domain is greater compared to loss. While both plots have an inverse S-shape 
however, there exists some difference in the weighting functions that arises from 
the inflection points and elevation in the gain domain relative to the loss domain.  
Overall the attitudes to risk of farmers does not coincide with risk neutral EUT as 
the test of the various hypothesis (α = 𝛽 = 1;  λ = 1;  γ+ = γ− = 1) earlier reported 
provide sufficient evidence to reject the EU maximizer hypothesis given the 
prevalence of outcome and probability sensitivity. However, the findings that 
farmers’ did not regard equally likely outcomes as ‘equally likely’ contradicts the 
assertion of Levy & Levy (2002) that subjective probability warping does not 
feature in the case of equally likely outcomes.   
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7.1.3 Choice sensitivity 
Recall that the estimated value of the choice sensitivity parameter φ determines 
whether the choice made by a DM is random or driven by subjective values. 
Typically, the smaller the value of the estimates of 𝜑, the more random the decision 
and vice versa. An estimated mean (median) value for 20.87 (resp. 20.56) shown in 
Table 14 suggest that on average, participants choice pattern was influenced by the 






7.2 Attitudes to Monetary Uncertainty  
Similar to the model for risk, the uncertainty model was estimated with provision 
for different subjective value function for gains (α), losses (β), weighting function 
for gains (𝛾+and 𝛿+) and losses (𝛾−and 𝛿−). A description of the estimated 
parameters under risk is presented in Table 15. An observation of the results 
confirms heterogeneity among the respondents for all the parameters - a finding 
similar to the CPT estimation for risk. 
Table 15  
Descriptive Statistic for CPT Uncertainty Parameter under uncertainty 
Variables Mean Median SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
α 0.57 0.09 0.72 0.05 0.05 0.09 1.20 1.97 
β 0.93 0.86 0.82 0.05 0.06 0.86 1.83 1.99 
𝛾+ 0.81 0.37 0.66 0.25 0.30 0.37 1.54 1.99 
𝛾− 1.15 1.10 0.75 0.25 0.28 1.10 1.97 2.00 
𝛿+ 0.79 0.68 0.31 0.33 0.56 0.69 1.12 1.57 
𝛿− 0.94 0.68 0.68 0.25 0.26 0.68 1.65 1.97 
λ 1.87 2.03 0.87 0.52 1.06 2.04 2.68 2.97 
𝜑 13.78 6.18 13.69 0.17 1.31 6.18 30.87 41.89 
7.2.1 Utility Parameters under Uncertainty 
An examination of the distribution of the α and β parameter values predicted at 
individual level by the CPT model is presented in Figure 22 and 23. The majority of 
the participants accounting for over 75% had α < 1 parameter values implying 
concave curvature of the value function for gains. However, for the β parameter this 
was much less, as about 53% of the estimated value parameter for losses conformed 
to β < 1. This pattern is similar to the findings in the monetary risk domain where 
participants were predominantly risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. 
Similar to the results reported in Chapter 6, the preferences of many respondents 
could only be modelled using extreme curvature of the value function. There are 
masses clustered at the lower limit of the restriction for both α and β. A large 
proportion of participants were excessively risk averse in the gain domains and risk 
seeking in the loss domain evident from the 50th percentile in Table 15 and 
distribution in Figures 22 & 23.   
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Figure 22. α parameter  
Figure 23. β parameter 
 
Figure 24. γ+ parameter 
 
Figure 25. 𝛾− parameter 
 
Figure 26. δ+ parameter  
Figure 27. δ− parameter 
 
In aggregate, the results presented in Table 15 show the median (mean) value for α 
is 0.09 (0.57) and β is 0.86 (0.93). A one sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test show 
172 
 
that the parameters α is significantly less than 1 at the 1% level (Z = -7.20, p < 0.001) 
thus the hypothesis α = 1 implying risk neutrality or linear sensitivity to outcomes 
in the gain domain is rejected. Similarly, the hypothesis that β = 1 is rejected at the 
1% level (Z = -3.13, p < 0.001).  
Hypothesis 2: Attitudes to uncertainty depends on content domains 
In other to test the hypothesis that α = β, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was used to 
compare sample distribution of α and β parameters. The result shows statistically 
significant mean difference between α and β at the 1% level (Z = 3.23, p < 0.001). 
This implies that under uncertainty the curvature of the value function is domain 
specific and is asymmetric across gains and losses thus rejecting the hypothesis that 
attitudes to uncertainty does not depends on content domains (α = β) and conclude 
that the alternative hypothesis is true at 95% confidence level.  
The distribution of the coefficient of the DM’s relative sensitivity to gain and loss (λ) 
show that participants with λ >1 made up over 72%. This proportion suggest that 
majority of farmers were more sensitive to losses than they are to gains of equal 
proportion. On average, the value for the estimated λ is 1.89 (with a median value 
of 2.03) as shown in Table 15. The above interpretation of λ are purely descriptive 
as in line with Balcombe et al. (2018), when a symmetry restriction is not imposed 





Figure 28. Average value function for α and β under Uncertainty. 
Figure 28 shows the value function computed from the average parameter values of 
α, β and λ parameter estimates. As shown in the plot, the concavity for gains and 
convexity for losses is an indication of risk aversion and risk seeking respectively. 
Notably, the loss region is steeper than the gains region with a kink that is not too 
sharp at the reference point. Again, this finding provides evidence in line with 




7.2.2 Probability Weighting Parameters under Uncertainty 
Figures 24 and 25 are plots of the distribution of γ+ and γ− parameters under 
uncertainty. Inverse S-shape (0 < 𝛾+< 1) was predominantly observed across DMs 
for the gain parameters 𝛾+ while S-shape (𝛾− > 1) was most prevalent for losses 
given the proportion of 63% and 51% having the aforementioned shapes for gain 
and loss respectively. This result differs from the inverse S-shape for both 𝛾+ and 
 𝛾− shown by participants under risk. This inverse S-shape (S-shape) implies 
overestimation (underestimation) of low probabilities and underestimation 
(overestimation) of high probabilities for gain (loss).  
Using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank  test, the hypothesis that  γ+ = 1 and γ− = 1 is rejected 
given the 𝛾+ parameter is significantly less than 1 and the 𝛾− is significantly greater 
than 1 at the 1% a (Z = -3.11, p < 0.001; Z = -3.94, p < 0.001 respectively). This pattern 
is an evidence of probability warping.  
Aggregate level predictions of the estimation of the gamma parameter for the beta 
distribution that characterise gain γ+ and loss  γ− are presented in Table 12. The 
statistics show a median value of 0.37 for 𝛾+and 1.10 for 𝛾−. A Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test used to compare sample distribution of the weighting parameter γ+  and 
γ− suggest significant statistical difference between γ+  and γ−  at the 1% level (Z = 
-3.54, p < 0.001). Therefore, the hypothesis that 𝛾+= 𝛾− is rejected. This finding is 
different from what was obtained under risk and favours the suggestion that under 
uncertainty, the weights attached to probabilities depend on content domain.  
Figure 26 and 27 are plots of the distribution of the weighting function parameters 
δ+ and δ−which defines the degree of elevation of the PWF and the attractiveness of 
the prospects. The plots confirm that a large proportion (consisting of about 70% 
and 63% respectively) of participants fell within the 0 < δ < 1 bracket. A one sample 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank  test show that the parameters δ+ is significantly less than 1 
at the 1% level (Z = -7.06, p < 0.001). However for δ−, the hypothesis that and δ−=1 
cannot be rejected (Z = -0.63, p = 0.26). This finding corresponds to pessimism for 
gains and (near) neutrality for losses. As such, the hypothesis of a single but 
dominant attitude for both gains and losses is rejected. 
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The elevation parameters  δ+ had a median (mean) of 0.68 (0.79) while the 
elevation parameters δ− had a median (mean) of 0.68 (0.94). A Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test used to compare sample distribution of the weighting parameter γ+  and 
γ− suggest significant statistical difference between γ+  and γ−  at the 5% level (Z = 
-2.12, p = 0.03). Thus, the hypothesis of identical elevation across domains is 
rejected and conclude that the hypothesis of difference in elevation of the weighting 
function for losses than for gains is true at 95% confidence level.  
 
 
Figure 29. Probability weighting function 
for values  𝜸+𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝛅+ under Uncertainty 
 
 
Figure 30. Probability weighting 
function for values  𝜸−𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝛅− under 
Uncertainty 
 
Recall: The yellow lines in each plot represents the functions for individual DMs, the blue line shows 
the group-level mean, and the red line symbolizes the identity line 
 
The probability weighting function for values 𝛾+, δ+ and 𝛾−, δ− are presented in 
Figure 29 and 30. The shape of the group-level mean plots confirms an inverse S-
shape for gains and S-shape for losses suggesting that the DMs underweights large 
probabilities for gain but overweights large probabilities of loss. Other difference in 
the weighting functions is notable in the inflection points and elevation for in the 
gain domain relative to the loss domain.  
Overall, the behaviour of farmers does not coincide with EUT as the test of the 
various hypothesis (α = 𝛽 = 1;  λ = 1;  γ+ = γ− = 1) earlier reported provide 
reason to reject the EU maximizer hypothesis at 95% confidence level given that 




7.2.3 Choice sensitivity 
As discussed in the previous section that the estimated value of the choice 
sensitivity parameter φ determines if the choice made by a DM is random or driven 
by subjective values. Smaller values of the estimates of φ imply randomness in the 
decision and vice versa. An estimated mean (median) value for 13.7 (6.18) shown 
in Table 15 suggest that participant choices where not utterly random but 
determined by the subjective values. However, comparing the result to that of risk 
however, participants made less random choices on average under risk than 
uncertainty as expected a priori. 
Unlike the Mean-Standard deviation estimation in Chapter 6 where it is assumed 
participants exclusively evaluate specific properties of the distribution such as the 
mean and standard deviation; on the contrary the CPT parameter estimation 
indicated that participants possibly made decisions by means of putting into 
operation an intricate weighting of outcomes across the distribution. One 
postulation is that participants inferred correspondence between the two prospects 
and possibly mapped values across prospect which translates to some form of 
ranking.  
Also, despite using continuous prospects; respondents did not treat equally likely 
outcomes as ‘equally likely’ and appear to demonstrate cumulative probability 





7.3 Comparing Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes 
The different (combinations of) shapes of α and 𝛽 parameters demonstrate that risk 
and uncertainty attitude are not homogenous among farmers. By grouping 
participants according to the shape of their value function57 for both gains and 
losses under risk as shown in Figure 31, the largest proportion of participants 
(about 58%) had concave (convex) value function for gain (loss) followed by (about 
55%) concave value function in both gain and loss domains. This finding 










Figure 31. Shape of the value function for 










Figure 32. Shape of the value function 
for gains and losses under 
Uncertainty 
Concave (G) = Concave in gain domain, Concave (L) = Concave in loss domain, Convex (G) = Convex in 
gain domain & Convex (L) = Convex in loss domain 
                                                          
57 Participants are distributed according to the shape of the value function jointly considering the 
shape of α and corresponding β. 
58 Resende & Tecles, (2011) reports concavity in both gain and loss domains however they point out 




However, under uncertainty this pattern is different as presented in Figure 32. The 
predominant pattern was concave α and β followed by concave (convex) value 
function for gain (loss). Abdellaoui & Kemel, (2013) obtained similar pattern of 
predominant concavity for both gains and losses followed by concavity for gains and 
convexity for losses albeit under risk.  
Hypothesis 4: Attitudes to risk and uncertainty differ within context domain 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test to compare sample distribution of α’s for risk and 
uncertainty shows no statistically significant difference between α’s under risk and 
uncertainty at the 5% level (Z = -1.57, p = 0.11) in which case the hypothesis that 
the sample distributions are equal cannot be rejected. On the other hand, a Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test to compare sample distribution of β’s for risk and uncertainty 
shows statistically significant difference between β’s under risk and uncertainty at 
the 5% level (Z = -2.19, p = 0.02). This, significant difference denotes that the 
distribution of the curvature of the value function within a specific context (loss 
domain in this case) depends on conditions (risk vs uncertainty) and corroborates 
the results reported in Chapter 6. 
Taken together on average however, farmers are risk averse for gains and risk 
seeking for losses under both risk and uncertainty. Specifically, the study finds 
evidence of a gain-loss asymmetry in the utility function parameters. While the 
shape of the gain arm of the value function under risk and uncertainty appears 
similar at aggregate level, the loss arm under risk was more convex (indicating 
higher risk seeking for losses) compared to uncertainty.  
Overall, there is sufficient reason to dispute linear probability weighting both for 
risk as well as for uncertainty since the results provide evidence of probability 
weighting for gains and losses. However, the weighting pattern is different across 
risk and uncertainty. While participants overweight low probabilities for gains and 
losses on average under risk, for uncertainty overweighting of small probabilities 
did not apply to losses. As expected a-priori, a comparison of the structural “noise” 
parameter (μ) of risk and uncertainty shows that choices made under risk were less 




Although on average while the estimated parameters (α, β, 𝜆 ,  𝛾+, 𝛾−, 𝛿+, 𝛿−, μ) for 
risk and uncertainty appear similar, however overall there is weak (though 
significantly positive) correlation between these parameters across risk and 
uncertainty as shown in Figure 33(A-G).  
Figure 33(A-G). Scatterplots for the association between value and probability 
weighting parameters under conditions of risk vs. uncertainty.  
 
Figure 33A. Association between α value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33B. Association between β value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33C. Association between 𝛾+ value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33D. Association between 𝛾− value for 




Figure 33E. Association between 𝛿+ value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33F. Association between 𝛿+ value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33G. Association between 𝜆 value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
 
Figure 33H. Association between μ value for 
risk and uncertainty. 
Two arguments are put forward to explain the observed differences between the 
risk and uncertainty parameter estimates. First, there may well be genuine 
differences in individual behaviour under risk and uncertainty among the 
participants. Acknowledging the distinction between conditions of risk and 
uncertainty, a rational choice under risk may not necessarily be the same under 
uncertainty. This does not suggest that DMs are incoherent but given different 
conditions, DMs may act differently. Second, the different parameter values 
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obtained under risk and uncertainty for the same participant (for instance the 
characterisation of an individual whose choice follows a sequence of say inner-
outer-inner under risk versus inner-outer-inner under uncertainty results in 
different CPT parameter values), could possibly have arisen from estimating the 
CPT parameters under mis-specified model. By forcing the model unto the data that 
is inconsistent with the model create dependence on the parameter values which 
otherwise should not arise in a true model. 
Crucially, some of the findings in this study raises concerns about the CPT model as 
it may not have sufficient descriptive strength required to explain all participants’ 
attitudes. First, at the individual level, there is much heterogeneity in the behaviour 
and average behaviour is not supported by individual behaviour. Second, the 
standard CPT function struggled to deal with certain behaviour (including 
phenomenon of negligible gain avoidance and negligible loss seeking and significant 
number of non-switching at different points in risk preference ladder) highlighted 
in Chapters 5 and 6 evident from the significant bunching of individuals at the end 
of the parameter space. Thus, the preferences of many respondents could only be 
modelled using “extreme curvature” of the value function.  
Although the CPT provides a useful method to characterize heterogeneity however, 
relying on the CPT alone to draw conclusions especially for evidence-based 
recommendations in the face of the aforementioned concerns is limiting. This 
deduction is in line with the conclusion of previous studies including Harrison & 
Swarthout (2016) and Bruhin, Fehr‐Duda & Epper (2010). Therefore, the Chapter 8 





In summary, Chapter 7 covers results obtained from estimating parameters of the 
Hierarchical Bayesian CPT model. The CPT analysis in this chapter was constrained 
to the two most important cases (monetary risk and uncertainty).  Although the 
estimates of the individual parameters were derived from a Bayesian procedure, 
inference about the parameters was by classical tests applied to the parameters 
extracted from the Bayesian mixed logit.  
Key findings are that attitudes differ under the different conditions (risk and 
uncertainty) and content (gain, loss and mixed) domains. Using continuous 
prospects, respondents did not treat equally likely outcomes as ‘equally likely’ and 
appear to demonstrate cumulative probability distribution warping consistent with 
the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT).  In aggregate however, farmers are risk 
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses under both risk and uncertainty. 
However, there is reason to doubt the adequacy of the CPT model to handle the data 
in this case since the preferences of many respondents could only be modelled using 
“extreme curvature” of the value function. This was induced by “negligible gain 
avoidance’’ (i.e. avoiding prospects with zero lower bound in the gain domain) or 
“negligible loss seeking’’ (i.e. preferring prospects with zero upper bound in the loss 
domain) behaviours. The behaviours were bound to be reflected in this way under 
the CPT as the aforementioned phenomenon and the significantly large number of 
non-switching at different points in risk preference ladder resulted in bunching of 
individuals at the end of the parameter space. 
Arguably, the CPT model may not be the most appropriate to be applied in this 
context since the extreme parameter values are detrimental for model prediction 
accuracy and limits the capability of the CPT to effectively describe participants’ 
behaviour. However, it serves as a good basis for describing how DM’s decision 
makers act. Alternatives theories that may rationalize the NGA and NLS 








The results in Chapter 7 indicates that the attitude to risk and uncertainty cannot be 
entirely justified by the EUT, as there is empirical evidence of probability warping. 
Similarly, the CPT does not fit the data sufficiently from the perspectives of 
modelling participants’ attitudes; as many respondents could only be modelled 
using extreme curvature of the value function. The CPT also struggled to deal with 
the behaviour highlighted in the previous sections.  
Chapter 8 examined decision rules and alternative theories with the aim of 
providing further explanation to the findings in previous Chapters. It pivots on 
testing the proposition that ‘NGA’ and ‘NLS’ are nothing more than artefact of the 
design. In addition, it examines a different perspective that it could be that 
participants may have adopted different decision rules which may well reflect those 
used in participants’ day-to-day decision-making.  
The sequence of discourse in Chapter 8 is as follows. Section 8.1 examines 
participants’ level of comprehension 8.2 presents results of selected heuristics and 
decision rules, section 8.3 discusses findings from salience theory while sections 8.4 




8.1 Evaluating Participants’ Comprehension 
As pointed out in Chapter 6, this section investigates the possibility that the 
phenomenon of ‘negligible gain avoidance’ and ‘negligible loss seeking’ could be 
nothing more than artefact of the design. Participants understanding of the 
experiment was tested before and after the experiment. As discussed in section 5.2 
in Chapter 5, at the beginning of the experiments a detailed explanation of the 
necessary concepts relating to the choice task were explained using an unbiased 
spinner and demonstration continued until participants showed complete 
understanding of the concepts. Thereafter, four trial choice tasks preceded the 
actual experiment to test respondents’ understanding. With the onset of a new set 
of choice tasks such as - risk to uncertainty or from gains to losses, respondents 
attention were drawn by the researcher and necessary explanations made.  
Post-experiment, each farmer participated in a follow-up experiment. However, 
unlike the main experiment, the prospects pair presented to each participant 
consisted of ‘biased’ and ‘stochastically dominated’ prospects. The prospect pairs 
were designed such that Prospect A has a likelihood of the best outcome on the 
upside and was at least as good as prospect B on the downside, so that a rational DM 
is expected to pick Prospect A. The need for this section of experiment was to test 
whether level of understanding of the experiment affected participants’ risk seeking 
or risk avoidance attitude as well as influenced the phenomenon of ‘negligible gain 
avoidance’ and ‘negligible loss seeking’. An example of the experiment59 presented to 
participant is presented in Figure 34. 
  
                                                          





Figure 34a. Examples of ‘stochastically dominated’ prospects in gain domain 
Since Prospect A dominates B, a rational participant would avoid B. This a-priori 
expectation is met as the result show that no participant (0%) picked any 
stochastically dominated prospect. This finding suggests that is not simply a 
deficient level of understanding of the experiment that has led to what we have 
termed ‘negligible gain avoidance’ and ‘negligible loss seeking’. 
Further, participants were given experiments which were flipped version of the 
main experiment as shown in Figure 34b. In this case, Prospect B was more ‘risky’ 
in terms of wider variance. A-priori it was expected that participants choices would 
be consistent such that those participants that chose Prospect A in the main 
experiment should choose prospect B in the follow-up.  
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The results presented in Figure 35 indicates that all participants’ (100%) in the 




 Figure 35. Histogram showing participants’ switching across domains 
 
Across other domains however, about than 5% made inconsistent choices in the 
gain domain under uncertainty while about 2% of participants were inconsistent in 
their choices in the gain domain under risk. This result subjected to a paired sample 
t-test show no statistical significant difference in the choices made during the 
experiment and post-experiment under conditions of risk (t = -0.81, p > 0.41) and 
uncertainty (t = 0.70, p > 0.47) at the 10% level. This finding again suggest that 
participants’ understood the experiment and their decisions where not merely 








8.2 Selected Heuristics and Decision Rules 
In Figures 36 and 37, the proportion of choices under risk and uncertainty that 
conforms with the prediction of maximin and maximax is presented. As discussed 
in section 3.6 in Chapter 3, using the maximax criterion; the DM assesses prospects 
based on the highest payoff possible. The DM’s aim is to maximize the maximum 
payoff. The sequence of decision-making involves isolating the maximum payoff of 
all available options then choosing the option with the highest maximum payoff. On 
the other hand, in the case of maximin; the DM is most concerned with avoiding the 
worst possible outcome of the worst-case scenario with the belief that the chance 
that the worst case in any event will happen is high. Thus, the DM identifies the 
worst possible outcomes then choose the option that is best among the worst. 
Under risk (uncertainty respectively) in the gain domain, the choices made by about 
65% (67%) conforms with the expectations of minimax heuristic. Similarly, in the 
mixed domain under risk and uncertainty about 56% and 59.1% of choices 
respectively coincides with the predictions of the minimax heuristic. For the loss 
domain however, the predominant heuristic was the maximax heuristic as 56% and 
59% of the choices made under risk and uncertainty respectively was in line with 
maximax heuristic prediction. 
  
Figure 36. Proportion of choices under 
risk similar to the prediction of 
maximin and maximax 
Figure 37. Proportion of choices under 
uncertainty similar to the prediction of 





An asymptotic McNemar's test confirmed that in the gain domain there is statistically 
significant differences between the proportion of choices made by participants’ and 
the prediction of the maximin χ= 534, p < .001 (resp. maximax χ =1033, p < .001). 
Similarly in the loss domain there is statistically significant differences between the 
proportion of choices taken by participants’ and the predictions of the maximin 
χ=693, p < .001 (resp. maximin χ= 883, p < .001). Finally in the mixed domain, the 
test for statistically significant differences between the proportion of choices made 
by participants and the prediction of the maximin also suggest that there is 
statistically significant χ= 856, p < .001 (resp. maximax χ =1501, p < .001). The 
implication for this finding is that although certain proportion of the sample choices 
conforms to maximin and minimax predictions, this is not statistically sufficient to 




8.3 Salience Theory 
This section briefly examines the possibilities of participants allotting weight to 
judgments for salient payoffs. As discussed in section 3.8 of Chapter 3 salience is 
determined through a function that examines the similarities and differences of the 
characteristic of prospects in respect of a reference level with the aim of 
ascertaining the extent to which that characteristic is distinctive and attracts the 
DM’s attention. Specifically, this section sought to provide answers to the questions; 
are zero payoffs salient? If yes, was it overweighted?  
Recall from the discussion in Chapter 3 that the CPT overweight tail events i.e. 
attaching more weights to outcomes that are unlikely or events that are rare. 
However, Salience theory suggest that the differences in payoffs is key to weighting 
payoffs. Thus only when the greatest difference is salient are tail events then 
overweighted. 
There are two main assumptions regarding the densities that could be made herein. 
First, complete independence between prospects. Second, participants’ may have 
inferred correspondence between the two prospects and possibly mapped values 
across prospect such that for every value in Prospect A, there is an equivalent value 
in B which translates to some form of ranking and correspondence between both 
prospect. The certainty equivalent under salience with power utility for these two 
assumptions was estimated. 
By treating the lotteries as discrete uniform lotteries with 1000 increments between 
the upper and lower limits’ approximating the continuous case was possible. For the 
assumptions of complete independence and correlation, the baseline parameter 
values from Bordalo et al., (2012) was adopted where θ = 0.1, δ = 0.7 and a power 
utility coefficient α = 0.25. Recall that θ > 0, permits for the possibility of prospects 
with zero payoffs to be less salient than non-zero payoffs provided there is sufficient 
distance between payoffs of one prospect and its alternative. It was expected a-
priori for instance in the gain domain where the lower bound of the ‘risky’ prospect 
is more salient, the DM would avoid taking risk i.e. the salience of the worst payoff 
will result in the risky prospect appearing less attractive.  
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The results however provides evidence to conclude that salience does not explain 
participants’ zero averse/liking. Notably, for those prospects with zero bounds, 
salience theory suggest that it may not have been the zero payoff that resulted in  
‘negligible gain avoidance’ or ‘negligible loss seeking’  but some of the other payoff 
values may have been extremely salient. Changing the values of θ and δ parameters 
did not change the results much; thereby suggesting minimal sensitivity to the θ and 
δ values. Although participants may have put some additional weights to salient 
payoffs, however the extent to which it is overweighted is not determined and it 
may well differ across participants.  Crucially, it gives an indication that salience 
however can result in participants, making ‘unusual’ choices. 
While Salience theory provide some insight into participants’ attitude, other areas 
require investigating perhaps using a combination of theories; for instance salience 
with regret or disappointment. Since additional data is required to permit 




8.4 Avoidance/Seeking of payoffs in the Neighbourhood of Zero 
The discussion here builds on the principles driving zero avoidance (seeking) in the 
case of discrete prospect that when a DM is ‘guaranteed’ a non-zero strictly positive 
(negative) payoff compared to an alternative prospect with a downside (upside) 
having the possibility of zero payoff; a zero averse DM will avoid (choose) the 
alternative prospect. This suggest that in the gain domain for instance, the reason 
that drives the decision of a zero-averse (seeking) DM is the dislike for zero payoff 
rather than the attraction of the non-zero outcomes. However, in the case of 
continuous prospects employed in this study, this dislike or attraction is not zero 
avoidance/liking but avoidance/seeking of the area in the neighbourhood of zero. 
To investigate possible existence of avoidance of the area in the neighbourhood of 
zero, first a piecewise power utility function was set up with a kink in the middle 
obtained from inserting a steep linear component around some narrow region 
around zero as shown in blue line representing the piecewise power in Figure 38.  
 
 




The effect of avoidance of the area in the neighbourhood of zero on certainty 
equivalents for the discrete case estimation relied on payoffs of 50/50 prospects 
with two payoffs wherein the upper bound is 50 and the lower bound decreasing 
progressively towards zero. A plot of the data is presented in Figure 39. The CE plot 
of this hypothetical data does not show ‘abnormal’ behaviour in regions close to 
zero.  
 
Figure 39. EV and CE of 50-50 lottery 
 
Further, presented in Figure 40 is the continuous equivalent of Figure 39 showing a 
combination of extreme probability weightings (the beta weighting scheme is 
employed in this case) that permits quite ‘extreme’ zero avoidance whereby DMs 
are not actually avoiding zero but regions in the neighbourhood of zero. However, 
plotting the CE of uniform prospect and beta weightings show that; where the 
regions do have neighbourhoods close to zero (suggested by the green line in Figure 
40) the attitude of the DM does not suggest extreme risk aversion that was reported 




Figure 40. EV and CE of uniform prospect and beta weighting 
 
In line with arguments of the few studies that have reported zero avoidance (e.g. 
Payne (2005), Ert & Erev (2010), Cettolin & Tausch (2015)); one possible 
explanation for the difference in risk and uncertainty attitude between strict gains 
for instance and zero-bound gains could be dependent on participants’ 
unwillingness to take chances which may result in not getting a strict positive 
payoff. In the real world, the economic situation of the participants’ may have 
skewed their preferences by influencing their perception of zero payoffs 
notwithstanding its possibility of occurring is zero. Thus, zero may have been 
treated as a ‘loss’ in the gain domain and vice-versa suggesting that a guarantee of 
winning something or not losing anything at the very least may be the main 
aspiration for DMs. The implication of this behaviour is participants’ may choose 
prospects that increases (reduces) the likelihood of a strict gain (loss) even at the 
expense of lower expected value.  
It is not within the scope of this thesis to attempt a full implementation of this model 
as an extension of the mixed logit model earlier presented. However, future work 





This chapter focuses on exploring decision rules and alternative theories with the 
aim of shedding light on the finding in Chapters 6 and 7 relating to significantly large 
number of non-switching at different points in risk preference ladder, bunching of 
individuals at the end of the parameter space and ‘negligible gain avoidance’ 
(‘negligible loss seeking’) in the gain (loss) domain.   
In summary, although we find that zero outcomes may have generated certain 
‘biases’, the decision taken by participants in accordance with their choices was not 
muddled by misunderstanding as participants’ showed they understood the 
experiment. Also, certain proportion of the sample choices conforms to maximin 
and minimax predictions. However, it was not statistically sufficient to conclude 
that the maximin and minimax heuristic predicts the predominant choices overall. 
As for salience theory, it failed to justify the findings of ‘negligible gain avoidance’ 
and ‘negligible loss seeking’. This limitation could stem from the fact that it is 
primarily designed for discrete lotteries that are state contingent. However, the 
prospect used in this study are continuous and do not fit states settings. Although 
this does not rule out the possibility that DMs implicitly imputed or assumed state 
dependence before making comparison. Also, DMs may have inferred covariance 
between outcomes implying a joint distribution rather than marginal distribution. 
These presumptions need detailed investigation in future studies. 
The avoidance of the area in the neighbourhood of zero is used to explain the 
‘negligible gain avoidance’ and ‘negligible loss seeking’ by employing a combination 
of extreme probability weightings that allows the presence of quite “extreme” 
avoidance in the neighbourhood of zero. The results show that when the regions do 
have neighbourhoods close to zero the behaviour of the DM becomes “normal”. 
Crucially, this Chapter finds that no single heuristics or theories single-handedly 
justifies all the observed behaviours of participants. However, each theory 
contributed to explaining certain behaviour of participants thus indicating that 
typologies of individuals may have adopted different decision rules that may well 





Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes - Implications for 
Farm Decision Making 
 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter utilizes the estimated parameter values under risk and uncertainty 
attitudes obtained in Chapter 7 to ascertain the relationship between  farmers’ risk 
and uncertainty attitudes and bipolar disorder tendencies and; risk/uncertainty 
attitudes and decision to participate in off-farm income earning activities.  
As detailed in Chapter 4, the probit equation presented in equation 4.5.9 is estimated 
in other to determine the relationship between risk attitude and decision to engage 
in off-farm income generating activities. To determine factors that influences 
preference for the type of off-farm income generating activities (OFIGA), the 
multinomial probit presented in equation 4.6.13  is estimated while the effect of 
bipolar tendencies on risk attitude is determined from estimating a multivariate 
multiple regression. 
This chapter consist of three sections as follows. In section 9.1 the relationship 
between risk/uncertainty attitudes and bipolar propensities is reported. In section 
9.2 the results of empirical test of relationship between risk/uncertainty attitudes 
and off-farm participation decisions are presented; followed by determinants of the 




9.1 Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes and Bipolar Disorder 
Tendencies    
This section reports the results of the effect of bipolar disorder tendencies on 
risk/uncertainty attitudes. In order to test the hypothesis that BD affects 
risk/uncertainty attitude, this study draws from the psychological concept of 
outcome sensitivity suggesting that a priori, farmers with BD tendencies are more 
sensitive to changes in outcome as they move further from the reference point. In 
addition, it is expected a priori that that BD tendencies also affect the elevation and 
slope of the probability weighting function such that farmers with BD tendencies60 
will be more optimistic (pessimistic) for gains (losses). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, bipolar disorder tendencies and farmers’ mood during 
the duration of the experiment are the key variables in the regression model. Recall 
in Chapter 7 the interpretation accorded the CPT parameters that the curvature of 
the value function that describes the risk/uncertainty attitude is determined by α 
and β for the domains of gains and losses respectively. The parameter λ on the other 
hand symbolizes differences in the weight attached to loss compared to gain. As for 
the elevation captured by δ, higher values represent more optimism in the gain 
domain. While for the curvature of the probability weighting function determined 
by γ captures the strength of the deviation of the probability weighting function 
from linear. 
Two models were estimated with the key dependent variables being bipolar 
tendencies and mood. Bipolar tendencies (Bipolar) describes the effect of 
borderline to severe bipolar tendencies on risk and uncertainty. Mood captured the 
state of mind/feeling prior to the risk and uncertainty experiment. In addition to the 
main variables of interest, other control variables included in the estimated models 
are age and gender. Model I estimated the effect of Bipolar, mood and Bipolar*Mood 
on all the 8 CPT parameters (α, β, 𝜆 , 𝛾+, 𝛾,− 𝛿+, 𝛿−, 𝜑) under risk while model II 
estimated the same parameters but under uncertainty. 
                                                          
60 Bipolar disorder as discussed in Chapter 2 is characterised by episodes of both elevated and 




The results discussed hereafter are from the regression examining the effect of 
bipolar disorder tendencies on risk attitude only (since bipolar disorder tendencies 
has no significant effect on most uncertainty attitude parameters. The estimated 
model has a Roy's largest root of 4.30 (for model II 2.04) with a p-value below 
0.01(resp. 0.05), suggesting therefore that there are significant differences in the 
group means for the combination of regressors. 
As presented in Table 16, the variable ‘bipolar tendencies’ is significant and has a 
positive effect on the shape of the subjective value function for losses (β). This result 
implies that farmers’ with bipolar disorder tendencies show greater risk aversion 
for losses. The implication of this finding is that characterizing DMs having bipolar 
tendency by a generalized propensity to take risk without reference to domains and 
mood/state of mind when the decision is taken may be misleading. This finding 
corroborates Chandler et al., (2009) findings that compared to healthy controls; the 
choices of participants BD were less risk seeking when presented with loss framed 
gambles.  
Bipolar tendencies is significant and has a positive relationship with the elevation 
of the probability weighting function in both the gain and loss domains (i.e. 𝛿+ and 
𝛿−) which translates to farmers with bipolar disorder tendencies are more likely to 
be more optimistic for gains and pessimistic for losses. This behaviour differ from 
the results in Chapter 7 that show the average farmer is pessimistic for gains and 
optimistic for losses. This behaviour could be justified from the point that in certain 
states of BD, there is very low threshold of describing gains  which resulting in 
excessively optimistic attitudes. 
In addition, bipolar tendencies is significant and has a positive relationship with the 
curvature of the PWF for gains 𝛾+; suggesting that the probability weighting 
function of farmers’ having bipolar propensities is closer to being linear compared 
to farmers’ that do not show bipolar propensities. Bipolar tendencies also has a 
significant and negative relationship with choice sensitivity 𝜑 suggesting that 
farmers that have bipolar propensities are more likely to make random choices 
compared to those without. This finding suggest that BD affect attitudes and may 
impede optimal decision which can have negative consequences. 
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Table 16  
Multivariate Regression Examining the effect of Bipolar Disorder Tendencies on Risk Attitude 




Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
α Bipolar 0.787 0.527 0.299 0.527 
 Mood 0.211 0.327 0.197 0.327 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.539 0.571 -0.016 0.571 
  Age 0.172*** 0.058 0.071 0.058 
 Gender 0.008 0.126 0.233** 0.126 
β Bipolar 1.380*** 0.490 0.441 0.599 
 Mood 0.442 0.303 0.500 0.371 
 Bipolar*Mood -1.192*** 0.531 -0.359 0.649 
  Age 0.061 0.054 -0.087 0.066 
 Gender 0.042 0.117 0.175 0.143 
λ Bipolar 0.816 0.713 0.185 0.485 
 Mood 0.223 0.442 0.104*** 0.300 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.854 0.773 -0.020 0.525 
  Age -0.084 0.078 0.110 0.053 
 Gender 0.144 0.171 0.127 0.116 
𝛾+ Bipolar 0.743* 0.423 0.189 0.546 
 Mood 0.255 0.262 0.439 0.339 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.479 0.458 -0.256 0.592 
  Age 0.140*** 0.046 -0.125 0.060 
 Gender 0.007 0.101 0.083 0.131 
𝛾− Bipolar 0.562 0.387 0.009 0.231 
 Mood 0.243 0.240 0.152 0.143 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.481 0.419 0.044 0.250 
  Age -0.023 0.042 0.010** 0.025 
 Gender -0.008 0.093 0.045 0.055 
𝛿+ Bipolar 0.792** 0.376 0.703 0.500 
 Mood 0.307 0.233 -0.003 0.310 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.590 0.408 -0.723 0.542 
  Age 0.076* 0.041 0.035** 0.055 
 Gender 0.060 0.090 -0.014 0.120 
𝛿− Bipolar 0.863* 0.481 -0.769 0.644 
 Mood 0.496* 0.298 0.063 0.399 
 Bipolar*Mood -0.762 0.521 0.786 0.697 
  Age 0.102* 0.053 -0.050 0.071 
 Gender -0.065 0.115 0.040 0.154 
𝜑 Bipolar -21.288** 12.178 0.372 10.149 
 Mood -8.093 7.545 -1.445 6.287 
 Bipolar*Mood 16.790 13.195 -1.928 10.996 
  Age -1.169 1.336 -1.034 1.113 
 Gender 0.586 2.914 -3.074 2.429 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.          
199 
 
Hypothesis 6: DMs having bipolar disorder tendencies have significantly 
different risk and uncertainty attitude from DMs with no bipolar disorder. 
In other to test the above hypothesis, a Welch’s t-test 61 was used to compare the 
average risk and uncertainty attitude of both groups. The result show statistically 
significant mean difference between the risk attitude of farmers having bipolar 
disorder tendencies and those without at the 10% level (t = -1.79, p < 0.092) in the 
gains domains only. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclude that 
the hypothesis that farmers having bipolar disorder tendencies have significantly 
different risk attitude from farmers with no bipolar disorder is true at 95% 
confidence level. 
Mood is positive and significant for the elevation parameter 𝛿− suggesting that 
farmers in good mood attach substantially higher weights to probabilities 
associated with losses. Thus, they show more pessimism for losses compared to 
farmers in bad mood. This finding conforms with that of Kliger & Kudryavtsev, 
(2014), Arkes, Herren & Isen, (1988) and Isen, & Geva, (1987) and possibly supports 
the position of the mood-maintenance hypothesis that suggest DMs tend to be risk 
averse when in a positive mood so as not to interfere with their current state. In 
other words, DMs become reluctant to take risks particularly if the possible 
outcomes bring about losses that consequently switch the state of good to bad 
mood. 
Since bipolar disorder is characterised by episodes of depression and mania, the 
interaction between bipolar tendencies and mood test the hypothesis that there is 
difference in the effect between bipolar disorder and risk parameters in good mood 
compared to the bad mood. The negatively significant mood x bipolar coefficient 
suggests that bipolar tendencies and mood interact in influencing risk attitude. This 
means that the effect of bipolar disorder is smaller among farmers that are in good 
mood compared to those in bad mood. 
Age has a significant and positive relationship with curvature of the value function 
in the gains domain α, indicating that additional years to the age of the farmers result 
                                                          
61 The Welch (1947) t-test is chosen based on its reliability in cases where unequal sample sizes 
and variances occur. 
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in increased risk seeking for gains. In addition, the coefficient of δ+ and δ− further 
suggest that age increases optimism for gains and decreases pessimism for losses.  
The key findings of the above results is that risk and uncertainty attitudes are 
temporally variable and influenced by the mental health of the DM, which in turn 
influences decision-making behaviour. Specifically, DMs’ mood determines the 
weights attached to probabilities and bipolar disorder tendencies influences the 
formation (curvature and elevation) of the probability weighting function. Crucially, 
individuals with BD tendencies are more likely to make random choices. The 
implication of this is that a DMs’ reasoning and behaviour may be distorted which 




9.2 Risk/Uncertainty Attitudes and Decision to Participate in 
Off-farm Income Earning Activities  
Recall that the Probit model presented in Chapter 4 estimates the effect of risk and 
uncertainty attitudes on off-farm income earning activities (OFIGA) participation. 
The results obtained from the Probit regression are presented in Table 16. Five (5) 
models were estimated to determine the effect of ‘selected variables’ on OFIGA 
participation. This selection was guided by the relationships identified from 
previous studies in the literature and discussed in section 2.5 in Chapter 2.  
Model I estimated the effect of bipolar tendencies alone on OFIGA participation, 
Model II estimated the effect of risk attitudes (using parameters obtained from the 
CPT in Chapter 7) on OFIGA participation while Model III incorporates bipolar 
tendencies, risk attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics in the estimation. 
Models IV and V are similar to Model III and IV respectively but for uncertainty. 
Wald test confirm that the variables included in all five models are not 
simultaneously equal to zero at the 5% level (Model I: χ2 (1) =3.85, p = 0.04, Model 
II: χ2 (6) =29.94, p < 0.001, Model III: χ2 (21) =78.51, p < 0.001, Model IV: χ2 (6) 
=15.03, p = 0.02, Model V: χ2 (21) =66.71, p < .0001). Models III and V had the highest 
chi square values. These significant chi square values suggest that the inclusion of 
these variables enhances the model and results in a better fit. Models III and IV is 
chosen for discussion hereafter based on goodness of fit criteria including the AIC, 
pseudo R2, likelihood ratio (lr) test and Wald test. 
The results for the models incorporating risk and uncertainty parameters are 
similar. Therefore, the discussion in this section will be concurrent with any major 
differences highlighted. Whether or not farmers engaged in OFIGA was a-priori 
expected to be explained by risk and uncertainty parameters and bipolar tendencies 
while controlling for age, gender, marital status, education, farm size, farm 
ownership, geographic location and time spent on the farm.   
As presented in Table 17, bipolar disorder has a significant negative relationship 
with OFIGA participation. This implies that a change from no-bipolar to bipolar 
tendencies decreases the probability of participating in OFIGA by about 28% 
suggesting that farmers’ having bipolar disorder tendencies are less likely to 
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participate in OFIGA. One explanation for this could be adduced from the discussion 
Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 regarding the challenge mental health related factors has 
on job performance and the resultant difficulty people with BD have at their place 
of work thereby they may be less inclined to participate in OFIGA.  
β is positive and significant suggesting that farmers that are more risk averse in the 
loss domain are more likely to participate in OFIGA. In other words, a one-unit 
increase in the β increases the probability of participating in OFIGA by 17%. This is 
rational, as farmers who engage in OFIGA may have done so to complement farm 
income with OFIGA that may have much lower income ‘uncertainties’ and possibly 
lower chances of monetary losses. Hence, this findings can possibly explain the view 
point of Canning (1992) and Bardhan et al., (2006) that OFIGA participation is 
mostly a risk management tool that ‘pulls’ risk averse farmers (particularly for 
monetary gains) to participate in; with the objective of  “cushioning” uncertainties 
associated with farm income.  
𝛿− is negative and significantly affects OFIGA suggesting that a unit increase in 𝛿− 
(that being less pessimistic) will decreases the probability of participating in OFIGA 
by about 15% holding other independent variables constant. In contrast with the 
findings regarding β, this result show that the manner in which farmers use 
probabilities may not reflect their risk preferences in its entirety since a risk averse 
farmer may be optimistic in terms of probability weightings. 
As for the control variables, age has a significant negative relationship with OFIGA 
participation indicating that older farmers are less likely to partake in OFIGA 
compared to younger farmers. A year increase in age decreases the probability of 
participating in OFIGA by 1%. This is justifiable as it is common in the study area for 
younger farmers to have the physical capabilities to work off-farm. Bhatta & 
Arethun, (2013) and Agwu, Nwankwo & Anyanwu (2014) in different context have 
reported similar results. 
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Table 17  
Marginal Effect after Probit Regression Estimating the Effect of Risk/Uncertainty Attitudes on Off-farm Participation Decision 
 No Risk or Uncertainty With Risk Parameters With Uncertainty Parameters 
 Model I Model II                              Model III  Model IV                               Model V 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Bipolar -0.223** 0.109   -0.285*** 0.078   -0.279*** 0.079 
α   -0.191** 0.094 0.075 0.080 -0.030 0.082 0.115 0.076 
β   -0.021 0.077 0.117** 0.067 -0.353** 0.139 -0.150 0.124 
𝛾+.    -0.009 0.112 -0.118 0.080 0.100 0.093 -0.079 0.092 
𝛾−.    0.195** 0.089 -0.072 0.072 0.470** 0.165 0.146 0.144 
𝛿+.    0.169 0.131 -0.066 0.103 -0.044 0.148 -0.126 0.156 
𝛿−.    0.014 0.071 -0.156** 0.064 -0.035 0.051 -0.142** 0.072 
Age     -0.010*** 0.003   -0.009*** 0.003 
Gender     -0.076 0.061   -0.053 0.061 
MStatus     -0.120 0.124   -0.251* 0.129 
PriEdu     -0.072 0.073   -0.066 0.073 
SecEdu     0.129 0.089   0.111 0.091 
HigherEdu     -0.100 0.103   -0.127 0.124 
HHsize     0.001 0.013   0.001 0.014 
Farm Type     -0.448*** 0.161   -0.507*** 0.169 
Farm Tenure     0.267** 0.117   0.217* 0.125 
Farmhours     -0.030 0.019   -0.033 0.023 
Farmsize     -0.204*** 0.052   -0.206*** 0.051 
Location     0.113** 0.054   0.177*** 0.060 
Cooperative     -0.147** 0.073   -0.122 0.077 
Rural     -0.340*** 0.092   -0.120* 0.065 
Note. Dependent variable = Participation in off-farm income generating activities (OFIGA) where OFIGA= 1 if Farmer engages in off-farm income 
generating activities, 0 otherwise             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.        
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Against a-prior expectation, education had no significant effect on the probability of 
being involved in OFIGA. This finding may be attributed to the significantly large 
proportion of the sample (65%) having either no formal or completing primary 
education at the most. Typically, in Nigeria smallholder farming is considered a 
‘residual’ occupation that accommodates mostly those with little or no capacity to 
seek other non-farm alternatives.  This result is in consonance with Beyene (2008) 
who reports that household participation in off-farm activities is not influenced by 
level of education. However, it contradicts Babatunde, (2013) and McCarthy & Sun, 
(2009) findings that individuals with higher level of education tend to allocate more 
time to off-farm income generating activities. 
Marital status has a significant negative effect on OFIGA participation though for 
uncertainty only. A change from single to married decreases the probability of 
participating in OFIGA by 25%. This indicates that married farmers are less likely to 
engage in OFIGA that their single counterparts. This finding is similar to De Brauw 
& Rozelle, (2008). 
Farm type is negative and significant for OFIGA participation indicating that farmers 
operating monoculture62 have a lower likelihood of engaging in OFIGA. This suggest 
that a change in farm type decreases the probability of participating in OFIGA by 
44%. This inverse relationship could be attributed to risk/uncertainty attitude as 
farmers who practice monoculture may be more risk seeking (for gains) hence 
invest all their resourses in one crop or animal despite the risk of losing everything. 
Farm size is negative and significant for OFIGA participation indicating that farmers 
cultivating larger farm have a lower likelihood of engaging in OFIGA. A one-unit 
increase in farm size decreases the probability of participating in OFIGA by 20%. 
This inverse relationship may be related to wealth levels associated with farm size 
and a reflection that land constraints possibly encourages off-farm participation. 
This result supports Alasia et al., (2009) and Fernandez-Cornejo et al., (2007) 
separate findings of inverse relationship between income from off-farm and farm 
size. 
                                                          
62 Monoculture is an agricultural practice whereby a farmer grows only one crop type or raises a 
single species of animal. The alternative to monoculture is polyculture. 
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In addition, there is significant positive relationship between farm tenure and 
OFIGA participation indicating that farmers who own their land are more likely to 
participate in OFIGA than those who rented land. While this is Contrary to VanWey 
& Vithayathil (2013) and may appear counter intuitive at first instance, however 
farmers that operate on rented or leased land have additional burden of paying rent 
out of their farm returns compared to their counterpart that own land. This may 
induce renters to work the land more compared to landowners so that they can get 
maximum benefit from their investment. Finally, farmers in rural areas are less 
likely to participate in OFIGA. A change from urban to rural decreases the 
probability of participating in OFIGA by 34%. This could be justified from the 
perspective that compared to urban dwellers there may be less off-farm income 




9.3 Determinants of Preference for the Types of Off-farm Income 
Generating Activities  
In line with the discussion in Chapter 4, for the multinomial probit regression (MPR 
hereafter) the comparison is between the baseline "No OFIGA" and the three OFIGA 
categories i.e. employee, worker and self-employed. The results of the marginal 
effect after multinomial probit regression examining the determinants of the choice 
of OFIGA are presented in Table 18.  
Similar to section 9.2, five (5) models estimated the effect of selected variables on 
the types of OFIGA engaged in by farmers. Model I estimated the effect of bipolar 
tendencies alone on types of OFIGA, Model II estimated the effect of risk attitudes 
on types of OFIGA engaged in while Model III incorporates bipolar tendencies, risk 
attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics in the estimation. Models IV and V are 
similar to Model III and IV respectively but for uncertainty. A confirmation that the 
models are not simultaneously equal to zero was obtained from the Wald test at the 
5% level (Model I: χ2 (3) =5.64, p = 0.14 NS, Model II: χ2 (18) =30.19, p =0.03, Model 
III: χ2 (63) =169.30, p < 0.001, Model IV: χ2 (18) =39.54, p = 0.002, Model V: χ2 (63) 
=177.03, p < .0001). Thus, the inclusion of these variables enhances the model and 
results in a better fit. Given the results for the risk and uncertainty models are 
similar, subsequent discussion in this section will refer to both models concurrently. 
Models III and IV are the most preferred models based on the criteria of the AIC, 





Table 18  Marginal Effect after Multinomial Probit Examining the Determinants of the Type of OFIGA 
  No Risk or Uncertainty With Risk Parameters With Uncertainty Parameters 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
1 = Employee                 
Bipolar -0.212 0.153   -0.262 0.166     -0.282* 0.148 
α    -0.005 0.102 -0.038** 0.134 0.085 0.105 0.231* 0.140 
β    0.172* 0.073 0.189 0.092 0.085 0.112 0.244* 0.134 
 
   0.088 0.114 0.095 0.134 -0.008 0.117 -0.171 0.145 
 
   -0.051 0.090 -0.037 0.108 0.032 0.135 -0.169 0.158 
 
   -0.192 0.126 -0.163 0.175 -0.612*** 0.206 -0.766*** 0.267 
    -0.079 0.080 -0.043 0.099 -0.248*** 0.089 -0.388*** 0.114 
Age      0.003 0.004     0.005 0.004 
Gender      -0.053 0.094     -0.052 0.094 
MStatus      0.357 0.226     0.349* 0.208 
PriEdu      0.173 0.107     0.156 0.103 
SecEdu      0.030 0.134     0.019 0.120 
HigherEdu     0.054 0.178     0.029 0.169 
HHsize      -0.024 0.019     -0.027 0.019 
Farm Type     -0.427** 0.171     -0.363** 0.179 
Farm Tenure     0.068 0.127     0.003 0.138 
Farmhours     -0.057** 0.029     -0.066** 0.031 
Farmsize     -0.111 0.071     -0.101 0.081 
Location     0.135 0.083     0.177** 0.087 
Cooperative     -0.044 0.127     -0.105 0.117 
Rural         -0.090 0.123     -0.124 0.093 
N = 158, Reference = Farmer not participating in any off-farm job.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.         
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  No Risk or Uncertainty With Risk Parameters With Uncertainty Parameters 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
2 = Worker                 
Bipolar -0.132 0.109   -0.118 0.184     -0.103*** 0.175 
α    -0.166 0.114 -0.189 0.139 -0.330*** 0.108 -0.442 0.130 
β    -0.122 0.086 -0.111 0.105 -0.114 0.126 -0.123*** 0.150 
 
   -0.102 0.127 -0.105 0.152 0.346*** 0.122 0.420 0.135 
 
   0.102 0.099 0.063 0.13 0.255* 0.149 0.263 0.179 
 
   0.236* 0.139 0.227 0.174 -0.034 0.208 0.104 0.242 
 
   0.070 0.079 0.040 0.104 0.114 0.099 0.215* 0.120 
Age      -0.002 0.005     -0.005 0.004 
Gender      -0.011 0.094     0.024 0.102 
MStatus      -0.310* 0.168     -0.381** 0.164 
PriEdu      0.051 0.113     0.039 0.118 
SecEdu      0.283** 0.140     0.325** 0.134 
HigherEdu     -0.121 0.197     0.006 0.191 
HHsize      0.004 0.020     0.010 0.021 
Farm Type     0.026 0.216     -0.128 0.211 
Farm Tenure     -0.126 0.173     0.055 0.183 
Farmhours     -0.033 0.034     -0.020 0.035 
Farmsize     -0.147* 0.088     -0.174* 0.090 
Location     0.042 0.087     0.028 0.094 
Cooperative     0.202 0.148     0.211 0.139 
Rural         -0.075 0.166     -0.059 0.109 
N = 158, Reference = Farmer not participating in any off-farm job.     




  No Risk or Uncertainty With Risk Parameters With Uncertainty Parameters 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
3 = Self-employed                
Bipolar 0.094 0.121   0.000 0.128     0.011 0.134 
α     0.117 0.100 0.305*** 0.117 0.317** 0.124 0.388*** 0.122 
β    -0.053 0.083 0.056 0.095 -0.158 0.110 -0.234* 0.131 
 
   -0.034 0.102 -0.135 0.117 -0.377*** 0.139 -0.419*** 0.137 
 
   0.057 0.094 -0.108 0.116 -0.024 0.131 0.004 0.158 
 
   -0.125 0.116 -0.138 0.143 0.426** 0.208 0.524* 0.225 
 
       -0.127* 0.071 -0.196** 0.087 -0.022 0.099 -0.009 0.119 
Age      -0.015*** 0.004     -0.013*** 0.004 
Gender      -0.023 0.096     -0.015 0.099 
MStatus      -0.223 0.156     -0.299* 0.160 
PriEdu      -0.314*** 0.105     -0.273*** 0.103 
SecEdu      -0.154 0.116     -0.191* 0.109 
HigherEdu     -0.039 0.156     -0.159 0.172 
HHsize      0.023 0.020     0.022 0.019 
Farm Type     -0.221 0.158     -0.175 0.183 
Farm Tenure     0.463*** 0.160     0.278 0.171 
Farmhours     0.055** 0.030     0.045 0.030 
Farmsize     -0.005 0.078     0.018 0.082 
Location     -0.019 0.078     0.030 0.077 
Cooperative     -0.367*** 0.132     -0.276* 0.143 
Rural         -0.285** 0.120     0.005 0.094 
N = 158, Reference = Farmer not participating in any off-farm job.     




9.3.1 Employee relative to No-OFIGA  
As presented in Table 18, bipolar disorder has a significant negative relationship 
with the type of OFIGA participation. This implies that a change from no-bipolar to 
bipolar tendencies decreases the probability of taking up fixed regular paid 
employment by about 28% suggesting that farmers’ having bipolar disorder 
tendencies are less likely to engage in regular paid employment compared to relying 
on income derived solely from farming. In line with the reasons adduced earlier in 
Section 9.2, the challenge mental health related factors has on job performance and 
the resultant difficulty people with BD have at their place of work could be 
responsible for this effect. 
The significant negative value of α indicates that the relative probability of taking 
up fixed regular paid employment63 compared to engaging solely in farming reduces 
by 3% as farmers becomes less risk averse by one unit. That is, the chances of 
choosing to take up a regular paid employment are lower amongst farmers that are 
more risk seeking for gains. This is rational as it is expected to find more risk averse 
farmers participating in this category of OFIGA since risk averse farmers will prefer 
the ‘assured’ but possibly lower earnings from paid employment than to ‘gamble’ at 
earning more (albeit with possibility of earning less or nothing) by relying solely on 
farming. Thus, farmers taking up fixed regular paid employment as an off-farm 
activity may do so for the reason of providing a buffer against anticipated farm risk 
and as a “necessity” rather than taking advantage of an “opportunity” to make 
additional income as characterised by their risk seeking counterpart.  
The result is however different for attitudes to uncertainty given that the probability 
of taking up fixed regular paid employment compared to engaging solely in farming 
increases by 23% with a unit increase in α. This suggest that the likelihood of 
choosing to take up a regular paid job is higher amongst farmers that are more 
uncertainty seeking for gains. This finding does not conform to a-priori expectation 
as the greater tendency would have been to observe farmers that are uncertainty 
                                                          
63 Jobs captured in the employee category were mainly off-farm fixed regular (weekly or monthly) 
wage employment including teaching, shop keeping, security guards etc.  
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averse for gains having greater tendency to participating in all categories of OFIGA. 
A possible explanation could be that DMs become uncertainty seeking (possibly due 
to ‘overconfidence’). Such overconfidence may arise from the propensity to set 
excessively optimistic prediction of uncertain events in the case where the 
probability density of outcomes are not clearly defined. 
The significant positive value of β suggest that a unit increase in β will increase the 
chances of engaging in fixed regular paid employment by 24%. In other words, 
farmers that are less risk seeking for losses under uncertainty are more likely to 
engage in fixed regular paid employment. This could be justified from the 
perspective that since the farm prospect has likelihood of loss in farm income, thus 
farmers that are averse to uncertainty will prefer the ‘assured’ earnings from OFIGA 
to complement farm income rather than rely solely on the farm earnings.  
As for the socioeconomic variables; marital status and location have positive effect 
on the type of OFIGA while farm tenure and time spent farming have negative effects 
on the type of OFIGA. 
9.2.2 Worker relative to No-OFIGA  
Bipolar disorder has a significant negative relationship with the type of OFIGA 
participation. This implies that a change from no-bipolar to bipolar tendencies 
decreases the probability of taking up causal wage employment by about 10% 
suggesting that farmers’ having bipolar disorder tendencies are less likely to engage 
in causal wage employment compared to relying on income derived solely from 
farming. Again, the reasons adduced earlier regarding mental health related factors, 
employment difficulty and job performance could be responsible for this effect.  
As presented in Table 18, the variable β is negative and significant for worker64 
indicating that relative probability of taking up causal work compared to not 
participating in any OFIGA decreases by 12%, as uncertainty aversion in the case of 
losses increases by one unit. In other words, being uncertainty averse for losses 
decreases the probability of choosing to work off-farm in the worker category. 
                                                          




Similar to the case of employee, this finding could be justified from the perspective 
that when the farm prospect has possibility of loss in farm income, farmers that are 
averse to uncertainty may prefer the ‘assured’ earnings from OFIGA.  
Regarding the controls, married farmers are less likely fall in the worker category; 
secondary education is significant and positive suggesting that the relative 
probability of working off-farm in the worker category against having no OFIGA is 
higher for farmers that have secondary education compared to those without any 
formal education. The size of the farm is significant and negatively related to 
farmers in the worker category indicating that probability of taking up paid 
employment reduces as farm size increases. 
9.2.3 Self-employed relative to No-OFIGA  
As presented in Table 18, the risk attitude variables α is significant with a positive 
value indicating that the relative probability of being self-employed65 compared to 
engaging solely in farming increases for farmers that are risk and uncertainty 
seeking for gains. That is, the relative probability of starting one’s own business 
alongside farming compared to not participating in any OFIGA increases by 30% 
(38%) when risk (uncertainty) aversion for monetary gains decreases by one unit. 
One explanation for this could be that not all farmers necessarily engage in OFIGA 
as a cushion for risk as often reported in the literature but rather may be driven by 
“opportunities” to make supplementary income not withstanding having to face 
additional uncertainties and risks. 
In addition, β and 𝛿− are significant negative determinants of the type of OFIGA 
under uncertainty as presented in Table 18. This suggest that the relative 
probability of becoming self-employed alongside farming compared to engaging 
solely in farming decreases as uncertainty aversion and pessimism for losses 
increases. In other words, a unit increase in uncertainty aversion and pessimism for 
losses will decrease the chances of becoming self-employed by 23%  and 19% 
respectively. This could be justified from the perspective that when off-farm 
prospects have possibilities of resulting in income losses, farmers that are averse to 
                                                          
65 OFIGA classified as self-employed includes jobs such as food processors, hairdressing, 
transporting, tailoring, cobbling etc. 
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uncertainty will be less willing to exploit off-farm “opportunities” to make 
supplementary income from self-employment specifically as the success of starting 
and sustaining a business involves a lot of decision making under uncertainties. 
Finally, considering the control variables; age, primary education and membership 





In summary, this Chapter presents results and discusses the empirical findings of 
three issues. First, the relationship between risk and uncertainty attitudes and 
decisions to be involved in off-farm income earning activities was examined. 
Second, the link between risk and uncertainty attitudes and the nature or type of 
off-farm activity engaged in was explored. Third, the effect of mental health related 
factors on attitudes to risk and uncertainty of farmers in the study area is 
investigated. The probit equation was estimated to determine the relationship 
between risk attitude and decision to engage in off-farm income generating 
activities. To determine factors that influences preference for the type of off-farm 
income generating activities (OFIGA), the multinomial probit presented was 
estimated while the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk attitude was determined 
from estimating a multivariate multiple regression. 
The main findings in Chapter 9 are; risk and uncertainty attitudes are influenced by 
mental health of the DM, which in turn influences decision-making behaviour. 
Specifically, a DMs’ mental health determines the weights attached to probability 
and bipolar disorder tendencies influences the formation (curvature and elevation) 
of the probability weighting function. Precisely, farmers’ with bipolar disorder 
tendencies show greater risk aversion for losses. In addition, farmers with bipolar 
disorder are more likely to show higher optimism for gains and pessimism for 
losses. This behaviour differs from the results in Chapter 7 that show the average 
farmer is pessimistic for gains and optimistic for losses. Crucially, farmers that have 
bipolar disorder propensities are more likely to make random choices compared to 
those without bipolar. Other findings are that the effect of bipolar disorder is 
smaller among farmers who are in good mood compared to those in bad mood. 
Further, the results suggest risk aversion (for losses) increases participation in off-
farm income generating activities (OFIGA). Similarly, farmers’ likelihood of 
engaging in specific types of OFIGA (self-employed, worker and employee) is 






Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 
10.1 Summary 
Attitudes to risk have generated a lot of attention over the years due to its vital 
importance in decision-making processes that are necessary for life and livelihoods. 
Attitudes towards uncertainty have received less attention even though arguably 
most important decisions are under uncertainty rather than risk. In addition, many 
studies modelling attitudes to risk have adopted experiments that place significant 
cognitive burden on respondents. Crucially, they are also framed in a way that do 
not reflect everyday problems. Specifically, the most common way of eliciting 
attitudes is to ask people to choose between discrete monetary lotteries with known 
probabilities attached to the payoffs. Yet, the vast majority of choices that people 
make in their day-to-day lives are with respect to continuous non-monetary 
outcomes. As a result, several questions have so far arisen. For instance, are there 
any methods that best measure risk and uncertainty? Are these measures 
consistent?  Are DMs generally risk averse regardless of domain? Do DMs have the 
same attitudes e.g. to financial versus health uncertainties? This study was designed 
to examine the risk and uncertainty attitude of a farm-household decision maker. 
Specifically, the sub-objectives were to examine: (a) farmers’ attitude towards risk 
in different contexts and content domains; (b) farmers’ uncertainty attitude in 
different content domains; (c) compare risk and uncertainty attitudes (d) examine 
risk attitude of farmers when taking decision for others. (e) determine the 
relationship between bipolar tendencies and risk attitudes; (f) examine the 
relationship between risk attitude and decision to engage in off-farm income 
generating activities. 
This thesis reviewed literature on theories of decision-making, the approaches to 
eliciting attitudes to risk and uncertainty as well as the role of risk and uncertainty 
attitude on farmers’ decision making with the aim of providing direction to this 
study. The literature reviewed in this study suggested that theories (including the 
CPT and CEU) which relies on both the utility function and probability weightings 
216 
 
to explain risk attitude does a better job at explaining behaviour compared to those 
that implicitly assumes expected utility maximisation. Also, predominant elicitation 
methods in the literature relied mostly on binary lottery choices designs with very 
limited studies showing interest in extending popular theories to continuous 
prospects tasks. The review of literature also highlights the fact that risk attitudes 
in proxy decision in developing countries have not been widely researched. In 
addition, literature providing empirical evidence on risk and uncertainty attitudes 
and the relationship between the decision to engage in off-farm income earning 
activities, the link between risk attitude and type of off-farm activity and the effect 
of bipolar disorder on farmers’ risk attitude was limited.  
To achieve the objective of estimating farmers’ attitudes to risk and uncertainty in 
different context and content domains, Bayesian hierarchical CPT model was 
estimated. The GEE and probit model was used to estimate the determinants of 
prospect choice. The objectives of examining the relationship between risk and 
uncertainty attitudes and decision to engage in (as well as the type of) off-farm 
income generating activities on one hand; and effect of bipolar tendencies on risk 
attitudes on the other hand were determined from estimating the probit regression 
and multivariate multiple regression models respectively. 
The data used in this study was obtained using two data gathering tools. First, 
choices under conditions of risks and uncertainties were obtained using an interval 
‘lottery-style’ experiment that is least as realistic as discrete prospects but more 
indicative of the kind of choices made by farmers on a day-to-day level. Attitudes 
towards risk as opposed to uncertainty were elicited by specifying that all outcomes 
over the specified interval were ‘equally likely’ (thus specifying a uniform 
probability density).  Uncertainty was communicated by indicating that one 
outcome within the specified interval would be realised but without the 
specification of an associated probability density. Second, a two-part questionnaire 
with the first section capturing socioeconomic characteristics and the second 
section modified Bipolar Spectrum Diagnostic Scale (originally designed by Ghaemi 
et al., 2005) was issued to participants. Multistage sampling technique was used to 
obtain the respondents of the study. The number of participants that took part in 
the experiment and completed the questionnaire was 158. 
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By relying on graphs, proportions and non-parametric tests to describe and explain 
the choices made by participants during the experiment, the results presented 
suggests that participants’ choices in the experiment are heterogeneous. In addition, 
under conditions of risk or uncertainty; participants find the inner prospect more 
attractive for gains (and mixed task) and the outer more attractive for losses. Since 
the inner prospect is by nature less ‘risky’, this finding indicated participants’ dislike 
for risk and uncertainty in the gain (and mixed) domain; and love for risk and 
uncertainty in the loss domain. Further hypotheses testing suggest that 
participants’ choices differ across content (gain, loss, mixed) domains. In addition, 
the results suggest that participants’ choices differ with context (i.e monetary vs. 
time). Participants prefer the ‘risky’ prospect more when making choices on money 
compared to time i.e. participants took more ‘risk’ when making choices on money 
compared to time. Regarding whether attitudes to risk differ when making decision 
on behalf of others; the results show that participants prefer less ‘risky’ prospect 
more when making choices for themselves compared to the choice on behalf of 
others i.e. participants disliked ‘risk’ more when making choices for themselves 
compared to the choice on behalf of others. 
The results obtained from Hierarchical Bayesian CPT model estimation suggest that 
at individual level, risk and uncertainty attitudes are not homogenous across 
content (gain, loss and mixed) domains. In aggregate, farmers are risk averse for 
gains and risk seeking for losses under both risk and uncertainty. However, the test 
of hypothesis suggest significant difference in the distribution of the curvature of 
the value function under risk compared to uncertainty implying that attitudes differ 
under both conditions. In addition, there is evidence of probability weighting for 
gains and losses. This finding of subjective probability warping in the case of equally 
likely outcomes imply that farmers’ did not always regard equally likely outcomes 
as ‘equally likely’. However, there were behaviours that were difficult to reconcile 
with CPT, as the preferences of many respondents could only be modelled using 
“extreme curvature” of the value function. This was induced by what is termed 
negligible gain avoidance (i.e. avoiding prospects with zero lower bound in the gain 
domain) or negligible loss seeking (i.e. preferring prospects with zero upper bound 
in the loss domain) behaviours. 
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By exploring decision rules and alternative theories with the aim of shedding light 
on the phenomenon of negligible gain avoidance and negligible loss seeking in the 
gain and loss domains respectively, the findings suggests that is not simply a 
deficient level of understanding of the experiment that has led the aforementioned 
behaviour. Typologies of individuals may have adopted different decision rules that 
may well reflect those used in their day-to-day decision making even if it may not 
be “rational”.  
Finally, the estimation of the effect of bipolar tendencies on risk attitude farmers 
suggest that risk and uncertainty attitudes are influenced by the mental health of 
the DM, which in turn influences decision-making behaviour. Specifically, a DMs’ 
mood determines the weights attached to probabilities and bipolar disorder 
tendencies influences the formation (curvature and elevation) of the probability 
weighting function. Specifically, farmers’ with bipolar disorder tendencies show 
greater risk aversion for losses. In addition, farmers with bipolar disorder are more 
likely to show higher optimism for gains and pessimism for losses. This behaviour 
differs from the results in Chapter 7 that show the average farmer is pessimistic for 
gains and optimistic for losses. Crucially, farmers that have bipolar disorder 
propensities are more likely to make random choices compared to those without 
bipolar. Other findings are that the effect of bipolar disorder is smaller among 
farmers who are in good mood compared to those in bad mood. 
Finally, the results from the estimation of the relationship between risk attitude and 
decision to engage in off-farm income generating activities show that risk aversion 
for losses increases OFIGA participation. As for the factors that determines 
preference for the type of off-farm income generating activities (OFIGA), the results 
indicates that farmers’ likelihood to engage in specific types of OFIGA is determined 
by their risk and uncertainty attitudes and bipolar tendencies decreases the 




10.2 Concluding Statement 
Measuring farmers’ risk and uncertainty attitudes using interval prospect-choice 
experiment has highlighted the potential to investigate the vast majority of choices 
people make in their day-to-day lives with respect to both continuous monetary and 
non-monetary outcomes without placing significant cognitive burden on 
respondents. Notably, this unique experiment enables this thesis contribute to the 
literature examining risk and uncertainty attitudes separately; and underscores the 
nomenclature where risk and uncertainty is being used in a non-standardised way 
as the results show attitudes differ under different conditions (risk and 
uncertainty). Despite facing decisions with continuous prospects, DM do not treat 
equally likely outcomes as ‘equally likely’ but demonstrate cumulative probability 
distribution warping consistent with the Cumulative Prospect Theory. However, not 
all behaviours can be reconciled with CPT, Salience theory, Heuristics and other 
theories as reported in this thesis thus accentuating earlier speculations regarding 
the extent to which these theories reflect actual behaviour under risk and 
uncertainty. Crucially, in evaluating the determinants of risk/uncertainty attitudes 
it is important not to overlook biological/physiological traits. Integrating aspects of 
mental health related issues into the broad decision making literature is justified 
from several perspectives including the implications of making random choices 




10.3 Risk and Uncertainty Attitudes and Implications for Policy 
Design 
From the view-point of policy design implications, the assumed stereotypic 
homogenous ‘risk averse’ attitudes attributed to farmers’ and the assumption that 
there is no difference between attitudes under risk and uncertainty by the 
government could be one of the reasons why in many cases the objectives of policies 
and projects from successive Nigerian governments are not met. In Nigeria where 
farmers rely on the government for all kinds of support, this speculative stance may 
result in inappropriate policies and ill-judged farm support. Since the strength of 
any policy depends on the quality of empirical findings which drives it, studies of 
this nature which provide valid empirical based information regarding the risk and 
uncertainty attitudes of farmers in specific contexts is relevant to assist policy 
makers take informed decisions.  
The findings from this thesis that only the mean (average) rather that both mean 
and variance had significant effect on the prospect chosen by farmers has 
implications for policy. Broadly, an intervention or policy that may appear as an 
advancement or development when viewed from the perspective of smaller 
variance of expected effect (compared to what already exist) may not necessarily be 
preferred by farmers especially in the case where farmers focus are on the average 
benefit they expect to derive. Findings of this nature can help policy makers to 
thoroughly understand and synchronise farmers’ expectations with intervention 
goals.  
Crucially, in designing and executing policies; attention should be paid to framing to 
avoid unconsciously swaying attitudes under conditions of risk or uncertainty. This 
is important as the manner in which policies and interventions are framed i.e. either 
as a ‘welfare gain’ or ‘hardship reduction’ has the possibility of affecting risk and 
uncertainty attitudes. In addition, any intervention in which the worst-case scenario 
has the possibility to leave farmers’ with zero benefit may not yield the desired goal 
as the possibility of ‘zero benefit’ may result in farmers rejecting such intervention.  
Regarding differences in farmers’ characteristics, the findings from this study brings 
to attention the need for tailored policy that accommodates socioeconomic and 
221 
 
biological/physiological diversity. With respect to the findings that mental health 
related factors plays a significant role in determining risk and uncertainty attitudes 
is a pointer that the farming population also includes vulnerable individuals which 
government in Nigeria should consider providing targeted support when 
introducing policies or intervention programmes.   
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10.4 Contribution to Knowledge and Literature 
The contributions of this thesis to knowledge and literature is both methodological 
and outcome related. These are summarised as follows: 
1. By expanding discrete to continuous prospects and testing in a different 
setting, this study shows the applicability of the interval prospect 
experiment to different contexts. The findings highlights the continuous 
prospect experiments are as realistic as discrete lotteries, less cognitively 
demanding than discrete lotteries and more indicative of the kind of choices 
made by farmers on a day-to-day level.  
2. This thesis subjects decision theories and phenomena including CPT, 
salience theory and heuristics to experiments involving continuous outcome 
thereby exposing their capabilities and extent to which their intuition 
corresponds to actual behaviour of DMs’ under risk and uncertainty. Eliciting 
attitudes with respect to continuous outcomes highlights certain behaviours 
that are difficult to reconcile with these theories. It further shows that DM’s 
in many cases adopt different rules and heuristics that may not be “rational” 
in certain context but are crucial in simplifying day-to-day decisions.  
3. The findings of probability warping by respondents in this study bring to the 
fore further evidence that DMs’ do not handle ‘equally likely’ outcomes as 
though all events of a sample space have the same likelihood of occurring. 
This finding draws attention to the function of subjective weighting in 
decision-making and challenges the conclusion of studies that assume that 
probability weighting can be overlooked for continuous prospects. Thus, it 
disputes any interpretation that arise from such assumption.  
4. Another key finding of this thesis is that attitudes differ under different 
conditions (risk vs. uncertainty), contexts (monetary & time) and domains 
(gain, loss & mixed). In addition, this thesis is one of few studies that 
examines risk attitude when a DM is faced with losses in the time context 
domain; and compares it with attitudes to losses in other contexts. 
5. As a contribution to the limited investigation on the possible temporal 
variability in risk/uncertainty attitudes and the effect physiological traits of 
a DM has on these attitudes; this thesis amalgamates otherwise independent 
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ideas of mental health related factors and risk/uncertainty attitudes with the 
wider implications of understanding how these factors interact and affect 
decision making. 
6. This thesis employs a combination of parameters that measures subjective 
values of gains/losses and subjective probabilities as a determinant of 
farmers (off-farm participation) decision-making. From this perspective, it 
differs from previous studies on two grounds. First, rather than inputting 
risk and uncertainty attitudes in the estimation model as one single factor 
affecting decision making as done in previous studies; this study treats risk 
and uncertainty attitudes as separate variables.  Second, the attitudes to risk 
and uncertainty was obtained by parametric estimation prior to being used 
as a determinant in the econometric model.  
7. This thesis contributes to the broader literature examining risk attitudes in 
proxy decision in Agricultural Economics (that focuses on farmers in 
developing countries) which have not been widely researched.  
8. Lastly, this thesis contributes to the literature given the dearth of studies 
addressing the issues above in developing countries where famers risks their 
livelihoods by being exposed to arguably much larger risks/uncertainties 






10.5 Limitations and Suggestions for future Research 
The definition for risk aversion adopted in this thesis restricts the term to describe 
the value function albeit recognises that this does not necessarily correspond to a 
DM choosing a prospect on the basis of mean preserving spreads. Although this is 
rationalised from the perspective that the manner in which probabilities are 
handled by DMs does not actually reflect their risk preferences as such, this 
definition however have its limitations. To extend the above definition will require 
that a probability-payoff domain is defined with clear sub-domains over which the 
DM is risk averse/seeking; however this will lead to further complications and 
muddling of the nomenclature. 
The number of respondents’ (N=158) although adequate for the objectives of this 
thesis considering practical limitations; however, findings that are more incisive 
could be obtained on a larger sample size and the findings generalized to the 
population. Crucially, increasing the sample size is required where the goal is to link 
attitudes to risk and uncertainty with farm decisions for the sake of providing 
empirical evidence to drive future policies.  
In designing the experiment, the aim of the thesis was to study several context 
(monetary and time) and domains (gain, loss and mixed) where participant were 
presented with 90 pairs of prospect choice task spread across the different context 
and content domains under risk and uncertainty respectively. This approach had its 
demerits as the quest to avoid fatigue and cognitive burden became a trade-off with 
the number of choice tasks presented to each respondents’ across each context and 
domain. Although this does not in any way disparage the outcome from the 
experiment, future research however could focus on less context and (or) content 
domains and increase the number of tasks presented to participants. 
The finding in this thesis that it matters to participants when the bound of the 
prospect was pegged at zero but the payoffs still remained strictly positive (or 
negative) brings to light the possibility of enhancing future visuals presentation the 
experiment. For instance, by adding cues such as the mid-point to each pair of 
prospect, excluding from the visual presentation to participants any real numbers 
that fall within the prospects intervals or adding alongside the continuous prospect 
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a discrete choice problem and possibly introducing more ‘zero-bound’ lottery pairs 
could provide further insight to DMs behaviour. However, these suggestions should 
be introduced with caution as there are associated shortcomings. 
This thesis did not compare different elicitation designs applicable to continuous 
prospect on participant so cannot conclude that individual heterogeneity is not 
partly influenced by elicitation method. In future studies, it may be necessary to 
investigate if individual heterogeneity found among participants is a result of 
experiment design by comparing different designs on participants in the same 
study.  
Decision-making models including those not identified in this thesis need to be 
subjected to further rigorous test specifically one that involves continuous 
prospects to further assess and possibly compare their performances. Although, it 
has been contended that a CPT model with an extremely steep section provides a 
framework for the phenomena of NGA and NLS, however the problem remains that 
this phenomena has not been widely reported in the context of discrete prospect 
experiments. 
Also, it is not within the scope of this thesis to attempt a full implementation of the 
model that combine extreme probability weightings to investigate zero 
avoidance/seeking of payoffs in the neighbourhood of zero as an extension of the 
mixed logit model used in this study. However, future work may investigate this as 
a possible extension. 
Finally, with respect to developing countries specifically there is prospect for future 
research to be extended to investigate other types of decision-making such as 
linking risk and uncertainty attitudes with farmers’ adoption, migration, investment 
or savings decisions. Such finding will have enormous impact on farmers who risks 
their entire livelihoods by being exposed to arguably much larger 
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
Variable Description 
AGE Age in Years 
GENDER 1 = Male, 0 = otherwise 
M.STATUS Married = 1, 0 = otherwise 
L.EDU No formal Education = Reference 
Primary School = 1, 0 = otherwise 
Secondary School  = 1, 0 = otherwise 
Higher Education = 1, 0 = otherwise 
H.H SIZE Number of Persons 
P.OCC.TYPE Farmer  = 1, 0 = otherwise 
OWNER.P Own business = 1, 0 = otherwise 
N.YEARS.P Number of years in primary occupation 
TIME.SPENT Hours spent  per day in primary occupation 
SEC.OCCU Yes = 1, 0 = otherwise 
SEC.OCCU.TYPE Crop Farmer  = 1, 0 = otherwise 
OWNER.S Own business = 1, 0 = otherwise 
N.YEARS.S Number of years in secondary occupation 
TIME.SP.SEC Hours spent  per day in secondary occupation 
FARM.SIZE Farm size in hectare(s) 
OFIGA 1 = participate in off-farm income gen. 
activities, 0 = otherwise 





Appendix 2: Participant level curvature of the subjective value 
and probability weighting functions 
 Risk   Uncertainty 
ID α β 𝜸+ 𝜸− α β 𝜸+ 𝜸− 
1 X X S IS X X S IS 
2 C C IS S C C IS S 
3 X X S IS X X S IS 
4 X X S IS X X S IS 
5 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
6 C C S IS C C S IS 
7 X X S IS X X S IS 
8 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
9 C X IS S C C IS S 
10 C X IS S C X IS S 
11 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
12 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
13 X X S IS C X S IS 
14 X C S S X X S S 
15 C X IS S C X IS S 
16 X C S S C X S S 
17 X C S S X C S S 
18 X X S IS C C S IS 
19 X X IS S C X IS S 
20 X C S S X C S S 
21 X X S IS X C S IS 
22 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
23 C C IS S C C IS S 
24 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
25 C C IS S C C IS S 
26 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
27 C X S IS X C S IS 
28 X C S S X C S S 
29 C X IS IS X X IS IS 
30 C C IS S C C IS S 
31 X C S IS C X S IS 
32 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
33 C C S IS C X S IS 
34 C C S IS X X S IS 
35 C X IS S C C IS S 
36 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
37 C X S IS C X S IS 
38 C C IS IS X C IS IS 
39 X C S S X X S S 
40 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
41 C C S S C X S S 
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42 X X S IS X X S IS 
43 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
44 X X S IS C X S IS 
45 C C IS IS C X IS IS 
46 X X S S X X S S 
47 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
48 X X S IS X X S IS 
49 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
50 C X IS IS X X IS IS 
51 C X IS IS X C IS IS 
52 X X S IS C X S IS 
53 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
54 X X S IS X X S IS 
55 C X IS IS X C IS IS 
56 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
57 X C S S C C S S 
58 X X IS IS C X IS IS 
59 C X IS IS X X IS IS 
60 C C IS S X X IS S 
61 X X IS IS C X IS IS 
62 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
63 C C IS IS C X IS IS 
64 C C IS IS C X IS IS 
65 C X IS S X C IS S 
66 C X IS S X C IS S 
67 X X S IS C X S IS 
68 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
69 C C IS S C C IS S 
70 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
71 C C S IS X X S IS 
72 X X IS IS X X IS IS 
73 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
74 C X S IS C X S IS 
75 C X IS S C C IS S 
76 X C S S X C S S 
77 C X S IS C X S IS 
78 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
79 X C S S X C S S 
80 C X S IS C X S IS 
81 C C IS S C C IS S 
82 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
83 X X S IS X X S IS 
84 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
85 X X S IS X X S IS 
86 X X S IS X X S IS 
87 C C IS S C C IS S 
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88 X C S S X C S S 
89 C C IS S C C IS S 
90 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
91 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
92 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
93 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
94 C C IS S C C IS S 
95 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
96 C C IS IS X C IS IS 
97 C C IS S C C IS S 
98 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
99 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
100 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
101 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
102 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
103 C X S IS C X S IS 
104 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
105 C C IS S C X IS S 
106 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
107 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
108 C C S S X X S S 
109 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
110 X X S S X X S S 
111 X X IS S C X IS S 
112 X X S IS X X S IS 
113 C X IS S C C IS S 
114 C C IS IS C X IS IS 
115 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
116 C C S S X C S S 
117 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
118 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
119 X X S IS X X S IS 
120 C C S S C X S S 
121 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
122 X X S S C X S S 
123 C X IS IS X C IS IS 
124 C C IS S C C IS S 
125 C X S IS C X S IS 
126 X C S S X X S S 
127 C C S IS C X S IS 
128 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
129 X X IS IS C C IS IS 
130 C C IS IS X C IS IS 
131 X X IS IS C X IS IS 
132 C C IS S C C IS S 
133 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
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134 C C IS S C C IS S 
135 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
136 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
137 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
138 X X S IS X X S IS 
139 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
140 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
141 C C IS IS C X IS IS 
142 C C IS S C C IS S 
143 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
144 C C S IS X C S IS 
145 C C IS S C C IS S 
146 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
147 C X IS S C X IS S 
148 C X IS IS C X IS IS 
149 X X IS IS C X IS IS 
150 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
151 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
152 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
153 C C IS IS C C IS IS 
154 C X IS IS C C IS IS 
155 X X S IS C C S IS 
156 C X IS S X X IS S 
157 X C S IS C C S IS 
158 C C IS IS C C IS IS 




Appendix 3: Questionnaire 
HOUSEHOLD ID: ……………………………………….    DATE:………………… 
STATE………………………………          
COMMUNITY/VILLAGE……………………………………… 
Interview is administered to the household head ( ) 1  
Interview is administered to a close family member ( ) 2 * 






Example: Section A 
Here is an example of a farmer who was faced with two choice situations regarding 
time taken to get vaccinated. 
 
The farmer was informed that two NGO’s were running new health centres in his 
Local Government Area with facilities on opposite wings in the same building 
however with same level of service provision. Generally, there was a processing 
(registration) time between arrival and when the vaccine was administered. The 
malaria vaccine was available for free for a limited number of days and he was 
expected to arrive at 9am if he decides to attend one of the clinic sessions. 
The processing time for the first NGO presented as prospect A will take 30 minutes 
(i.e. it will take 30 minutes to complete his registration) after which he will be 
equally likely to be called in for the vaccine at any time between 30 minutes and 6 
hours. While for the second NGO presented as prospect B, the registration time will 
take 2 hours after which he will be equally likely to be called in for the vaccine at any 
time between 2 hours and 3 hours 30 minutes. Given that he had to make a choice 
between prospects A or B, 
The farmer chose Prospect A. 
That means he choose the prospect where it was equally likely to take him any-time 
54 minutes and 8 hours 36 minutes to get to vaccinated. 
In the section that follows, you will be asked similar questions and will be expected 













Two NGO’s are running new health centres in the Local Government Area with 
facilities on opposite wings in the same building however with same level of service. 
Generally, there is a processing (registration) time between arrival and when the 
vaccine will be administered. At the moment, this malaria vaccine will be available 
for free for a limited number of days and you are expected to arrive at 9am if you 
decide to attend one of the clinic sessions. 
 
In Question 1 (presented below) the processing time for the first NGO with prospect 
A will take 54 minutes (i.e. it will take 54 minutes to complete your registration) 
after which you are equally likely to be called in for the vaccine at any time between 
54 minutes and 8 hours 36 minutes.  
While for the second NGO with prospect B the registration time will take 4 hours 36 
minutes after which you are equally likely to be called in for the vaccine at any time 
between 4 hours 36 minutes and 5 hours 24 minutes. Given that you have to make 
a choice between prospects A or B which one of the two will you choose?  
 
Note  






























































































Example: Section B 
Here is an example of a farmer who was presented with a set of monetary prospects 
as shown below. 
 
 
For Prospect A, he was equally likely to earn any amount between ₦2000 and ₦6000. 
For Prospect B he was equally likely to earn any amount between ₦3500 and ₦4500.  
The farmers chose Prospect B. 
Thus, the farmer was equally likely to earn any amount between ₦3500 and ₦4500. 
In the section that follows, you will be asked similar questions and will be expected 










Imagine you are faced with a similar set of monetary prospects as presented below.  
In question 1, you are equally likely to earn any amount between ₦4280 and ₦7358 
if you choose Prospect A. While you are equally likely to earn any amount between 
₦5361 and ₦6315 if you choose Prospect B.  
Given that you have to make a choice between prospects A or B which one of the 
two will you choose? 
Note 













































































































































































































































































































Example: Section C 
Here is an example of a farmer who is employed by an agricultural firm as a farm 
manager with the responsibility of taking decision on this large farm. He reached an 
agreement with his employer over returns from his decisions - that for any decision 
taken he will get 5% of the total payoff.  
 
In this case for Prospect A, the firm was equally likely to earn any amount between 
₦428000 and ₦7358000. This implies that the farmer’s 5% was equally likely to be 
any amount between ₦21400 and ₦36970 if he chooses Prospect A. While for 
Prospect B the firm was equally likely to earn any amount between ₦536100 and 
₦631500. This implies that the farmer’s 5% was equally likely to be any amount 
between ₦26805 and ₦31575 if he chooses Prospect B.  
The farmers chose Prospect A. 
Thus the firm was equally likely to earn any amount between ₦428000 and 
₦7358000 while the farmer was equally likely get any amount between ₦21400 and 
₦36970. 
In the section that follows, you will be asked similar questions and will be expected 











Overall to firm 





Amount to Firm 




Suppose that you are employed by an agricultural firm as a farm manager and you 
have the responsibility of taking decision on this large farm. Currently you are faced 
with the following situations.  
In prospect A, overall the firm is equally likely to earn any amount between 
₦636146 and ₦858691; and the 5% that accrue to you if you choose prospect A is 
equally likely to be any amount between ₦31807.3 and ₦42934.55. 
While for prospect B overall the firm is equally likely to earn any amount between 
₦694532 and ₦804389; and the 5% that accrue to you if you choose prospect  
B is equally likely to be any amount between ₦34726.6 and ₦40219.45 
Given that you have to make a choice between either prospects, which of the 
prospects will you choose? 
Note: The pair of prospect from which you are to make the decision on behalf of the 
firm is the top graph named “Amount to firm”. The bottom graph directly below 
named “Amount to you” is a representation of the 5% you are equally likely to earn 
from the decision you make as a manager in the firm.  
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Example: Section D 
A farmer was presented with a set of monetary prospects as shown below. 
 
In the case of Prospect A, he was informed he will earn any amount between ₦2000 
and ₦6000 which may or may not be equally likely.  
While for Prospect B he will earn any amount between ₦3500 and ₦4500 which may 
or may not be equally likely.  
The farmers choose Prospect B. 
This implies that the farmer will earn any amount between ₦3500 and ₦4500 which 
may or may not be equally likely. 
In the section that follows, you will be asked similar questions and will be expected 











Imagine you are faced with a set of monetary prospects as presented below. In 
question 1, you may be or may not be equally likely to earn any amount between ₦0 
and ₦2800) if you choose Prospect A, while for Prospect B you may be or may not be 
equally likely to earn amount between ₦800 and ₦1200. Given that you have to make 
a choice between prospects A or B which one of the two will you choose?  
Note 









































































































































































































































































































































E. Mood Evaluation Scale 
Please fill in the blank space by choosing the any option from 1-5 as it describes how you 
feel. 
(1) Not at all   (2) Just a little (3) Somewhat (4) Moderately (5) Quite a lot (6) Very 
much 
 
I notice that my mood and/or energy levels shift drastically from time to time___.  
I notice that, at times, my mood and/or energy level is very low, and at other times, very 
high___.  
During this ‘‘low’’ phase I often feel a lack of energy; a need to stay in bed or get extra 
sleep; and little or no motivation to do things I need to do___.  
I often put on weight during these periods___.  
During my low phases, I often feel sad all the time or depressed___.  
Sometimes, during these low phases, I have a feeling of low self-confidence___.  
My ability to function at work or socially is impaired___.  
Typically, these low phases last for a few weeks, but sometimes they last only a few 
days___.  
With this type of pattern I may experience a period of ‘‘normal’’ mood in between mood 
swings, during which my mood and energy level feels ‘‘right’’ and my ability to function is 
not disturbed___.  
I may then notice a marked shift or ‘‘switch’’ in the way I feel___.  
My energy increases above what is normal for me, and I often get many things done they 
would not ordinarily be able to do___. 
Sometimes, during these ‘‘high’’ periods, I feel as if they have too much energy or feel 
‘‘hyper’’___.  
During these high periods, I may feel irritable, ‘‘on edge’’, or aggressive___.  
During these high periods, I take on too many activities at once___.  
During these high periods, I become totally confident that everything I do will succeed___. 
During these high periods, I may spend money unusually___.  
I may be more talkative, outgoing during these periods___.  
Sometimes, my behaviour during these high periods seems strange or annoying to 
others___.  
Sometimes, I get into difficulty with others during these high periods___. 




F. Mood Evaluation Scale Scoring 
 
The scoring66 for the test questions as presented in Mood Evaluation Scale is: 
0 points - Not at all 
1 point - Just a little 
2 points - Somewhat 
3 points - Moderately 
4 points - Quite a lot 
5 points - Very much 
 
The likelihood of having BD increases with a higher score. Scores for each respondent 
were cumulated and matched with the screening test scoring ranges: 
0-10 No BD Likely  
11-18 Possible Mild BD   
19-22 Borderline BD  
23-37 Mild-Moderate BD  
38-56 Moderate - Severe BD  
≥ 57  Severe BD  
  
                                                          
66 Respondents were not shown this section 
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G. Socioeconomic Characteristics 
1 Age of Respondent: ............  
2.  Gender............  
3. Marital Status............  
4. Highest Level of Education Completed............  
5. Household Size............  
6. Primary occupation? ............  
7. Who do you work for in Primary Occupation? ............  
8. How long have you been in Primary Occupation? ............  
9. How much time do you spend per day in Primary Occupation?  
10. Do you have any Secondary Occupation? ............ 
If yes proceed to A11  
if no skip questions A11- A17  
 
11. Secondary occupation? ............  
12. Who do you work for in Secondary Occupation? ............  
13. How long have you been in Secondary Occupation?...........  
14. How much time do you spend per day in Secondary Occupation? 
............ 
 
15. *What is the total size of farm?............  
16. Who own the land on which you farm? ............  
17. Are you a member of farmers’ cooperative? ............  





H. Pre-Test Questionnaire Evaluation Sheet 
1. Did you understand the questions presented in the questionnaire? 
_____________ 
(1) Not at all   (2) Just a little (3) Somewhat (4) Moderately (5) Quite a lot (6) 
Very well 
If you choose 1-5 above please proceed to the next question. Otherwise 
proceed to question 4. 
 
2. What question(s)/section(s) did you not understand?___________ 
3. What did you not find clear in these question(s)/section(s)______________ 
4. Did you find the any question in the Modified Bipolar Spectrum Diagnostic 
Scale too personal? 










Appendix 4: Follow up Experiment 
Dear Respondent, 
Thank you for participating in this research earlier in the year. I am currently collating 
results and have summarized your response from the experiments. 
As agreed in our previous meeting, I am contacting you regarding the choices you 
made during the experiment. According to the choices you made earlier, you will 
Choose Prospect 1 over 2 in the following: 
Please confirm if Prospect 1 reflects your personal choice or otherwise. 
 
Please confirm if Prospect 1 reflects your personal choice or otherwise. 
 
In total participants were presented with 5 variants of ‘stochastically dominated’ 
prospects as above. In addition, participants repeated experiments which were 
flipped version of the main experiment reported in Appendix 4 i.e. Prospect B was 
more ‘risky’ in terms of wider variance. 
Finally, can you provide any reason(s) why you have made this choice?  
Thank you for accepting to be contacted once again. 
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Appendix 6: Descriptive Statistics  
For the proxy-gain subtasks, participants’ made decision on behalf of others on 
tasks in the gain only domain to permit comparison between the monetary decision 
for oneself versus others; thus the design followed the monetary decision for self in 
the gain domain (i.e. Types 1 & 2) presented in Figure 2 in Chapter 5. The result 
presented in Figure 13 show that 54% (resp., 71%) for Type1 (resp., Type2) subtask 
picked the outer (resp., inner) prospect overall. An examination of the proxy 
subtasks show that of this overall proportion, 48% constantly chose the outer 
prospect for Proxy1 while 67% consistently picked the inner prospect for Type2.  
 
Note. Proxy1 = Type 1 - unconstrained in the gain domain, Proxy2 = Type 2 - upper bound of the 
outer prospect at zero in the gain domain 
 
Figure 41. Choice by subtask type for proxy-gain under risk. 
 
 
McNemar’s test to determine the significance in the overall choices farmers made in 
the Type1 and Type2 subtasks under risk however show statistical significant 
difference in both choices at the 1% level (χ2 = 149, p < 0.001) thus the hypothesis 
that there is marginal homogeneity in the aggregate choices of farmers within a 
















Finally, paired t-test to determine whether choices farmers made in the self and 
Proxy tasks under risk show statistical significant difference between both choices 
at the 1% level (t(1579)=-4.89, p<0.001) thus the hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in a DM’s choice pattern under personal and proxy context is 
rejected. However under uncertainty, the hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in a DM’s choice pattern under personal and proxy context cannot be 
rejected at 1%  level (t(1579)=1.03, p=0.301). 
As for switching behaviour by subtask type for time under risk, a histogram of the 
time subtasks is presented in Figure 14. Recall in Chapter 5 for time context, 
participants’ made decision on time tasks in the loss only domain to permit 
comparison between the monetary decisions versus time; thus the design followed 
the monetary decision in the loss domain (i.e. Types 3 & 4) presented. The results 
presented in Figure 14 indicate that the choice made under time context has some 
similarities to monetary context in the loss domain.  
 
Note. Time1 = Type1 - unconstrained in the loss domain, Time2 = Type 2 - lower bound of the 
outer prospect at zero in loss domain 
 
















There was a strong preference for the outer prospect among participants in the time 
context. This is evident from 50% and 58% of participants’ for Type3 and Type4 
respectively that never switched choice in the loss domain along the entire 
experiment. McNemar’s test to determine significance in the overall choices farmers 
made in the Type3 and Type4 subtasks under risk however show no statistical 
significant difference in both choices at the 10% level, (χ2 = 0.70, p = 0.402). Thus, 
the hypothesis that there is marginal homogeneity in the aggregate choices of 
farmers within a specific content domain cannot be rejected.  
Finally, paired t-test to determine whether choices farmers made in the monetary 
and time framed tasks under risk show no statistical significant difference between 
both choices at the 10% level, t(1579)=-0.99, p=0.321 thus the hypothesis that there 
is no significant difference in a DM’s choice pattern under personal and proxy 
context cannot be rejected. However under uncertainty, the hypothesis that there is 
no significant difference in a DM’s choice pattern under personal and proxy context 








Appendix 7: Stochastic dominance  
In the decision theory literature, stochastic dominance is a type of ordering (albeit 
partial) by which prospects with different probabilistic outcomes are ranked.  
First order stochastic dominance (FODs) 
Given two prospects A and B having CDFs FA and FB. Suppose prospects A and B 
have a bounded support [0,∞] such that 𝐴(0) = 𝐵(0) = 0 then prospect A first-
order stochastically dominates B when a DM that maximizes expected utility prefer 
A to B iff 
            𝐴(𝑥) ≤ 𝐵(𝑥)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑥 
Provided the DM’s utility function (𝑢) is non-decreasing 𝑢:ℝ → ℝ, 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐴 first-order 
stochastically dominates B 
𝑈(𝐴) = ∫𝑢(𝑥) 𝑑𝐴(𝑥) ≥ ∫𝑢(𝑥) 𝑑𝐵(𝑥) = 𝑈(𝐵) 
Second order stochastic dominance (SODs) 
While FOSD implies SOSD, the reverse does not necessarily apply. As for second 




(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 ≥ ∫ 𝐴
𝑥
0
(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 for all values of 𝑥  ∈ [0,∞] 




≥ ∫ 𝑢(𝑥) 𝐹𝐴(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
∞
0
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑥 
and 𝐹𝐵(𝑥
∗) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑥
∗) for some 𝑥∗ then prospect A dominates B from the position of 






Appendix 8: Obtaining CEU under probability warping  
The link between non-linear mathematical expectation and probability measure 
referred to the Choquet expectation is denoted by 
∫𝑓𝑑𝑣 = ∫ [𝑣({𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 |𝑈(𝑓(𝑠)) ≥ 𝑧}) − 1]𝑑𝑧
0
−∞




Representing outcome in 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3.4.21) under state 𝑠 by 𝑓(𝑠) = 𝑠  gives 
  ∫ 𝑓𝑑𝑣 = ∫ [𝑣({𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 |𝑈(𝑠) ≥ 𝑧}) − 1]𝑑𝑧
0
−∞




In the case where it is established 𝑣 is a true probability distribution then 
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3.4.21) reduces to 
     𝑣({𝑠 ∈ 𝑆}:𝑈(𝑠) > 𝑧) = 1 − 𝐹𝑠(𝑈
−1(𝑧))                (3.4.23) 
where 𝐹𝑠 is the cumulative distribution function of s.  
The expected utility is given as 




Suppose the distribution of the prospect outcomes follow a generalised beta67 
𝑠 ~ 𝑓𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑠|𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑙, 𝑞) 
Then 
                 𝑈(𝑠) > 𝑧 ⇒ 𝑠 > 𝑈−1(𝑧)                                  (3.4.25) 
Thus 
𝑣({𝑠}: 𝑈(𝑠) > 𝑧) = 1 − 𝐹𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑈
−1(𝑧)|𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑙, 𝑞)         (3.4.26) 
                                                          
67 Given P which represents an absolutely continuous random variable on the interval [0,1], P is 
characterised by  a Beta distribution with shape parameters  𝛼 and 𝛽 in the case where its PDF 𝑓(𝑝) is 




}      
Where a generalised Beta distributed random variable is  𝑠 = 𝑙 + 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑙) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥~𝑓𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑝|𝛼, 𝛽) 









Rearranging the above equation, 
𝑣({𝑠}: 𝑈(𝑠) > 𝑧) = 1 − 𝐹𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 (
𝑈−1(𝑧) − 𝑞
𝑞 − 𝑙
|𝛼, 𝛽)        (3.4.27) 
Obtaining the EU therefore, is possible from estimating the equation 
𝑉 =  ∫ 𝑈(𝑠)𝑑𝐹𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑠|𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑙, 𝑞) 
𝑞
𝑙
       (3.4.28) 










Appendix 9: Statistics on Bipolar Disorder in Nigeria 
 
Figure 43. The ranking of bipolar disorder with other disorders in Nigeria  
 




Figure 45. The proportion of the population with bipolar disorder in Nigeria 
 




Appendix 10: Pilot survey results and discussion 
Recall that a pilot survey was conducted to determine how well the questions were 
understood, whether the content of each question was consistently given the same 
meaning by each respondent and most importantly if the main experiment was 
feasible. In order to achieve these objectives of conducting the pilot, 30 farmers 
randomly selected from two communities via a recruitment process facilitated 
through extension agents and community leaders participated in the experiment. 
The results presented here describes participants’ choices under risk and 
uncertainty when presented with the pilot experiment described in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 47. Participants’ patterns of behaviour under different conditions and 
content domains 
 
In the gain domain, participants that switched within subtask for risk were 
approximately 7%. This statistic suggests that extreme risk preference among 
majority of participants’ as over 57% did not switch from the ‘safer’ prospect B. As 
for participants’ choices across subtasks, only about 7% switched. The proportion 
of participants’ choices under uncertainty also presented in Figure 47 show that 
those who switched within subtask were approximately 3% while 10% switched 
across subtasks. Notably, a larger proportion under uncertainty (accounting for 
60%) compared to risk did not switch at all i.e. they consistently choose the inner 
prospect (prospect B) for all gain domain tasks. This behaviour suggest that both 
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for risk and uncertainty, participants at the aggregate level find the inner prospect 
more attractive for gains. Since the inner prospect is by nature less “risky”, this 
finding might be an indication of participants’ dislike for risk and (and even greater 
dislike for) uncertainty in the gain domain. These findings are in line with what was 
reported using data obtained from the main experiment. 
In the loss domain task (Types 3 & 4), there was switching within subtask under 
risk by 10% of the participants while 13% switched across subtasks. However, for 
uncertainty 7% switched within subtasks and across tasks as shown in Figure 47. 
Unlike the gain domain where the inner prospect was largely preferred, prospect 
choice in the loss domain was the outer prospect. Notably, 47% in the case of risk 
and 33% under uncertainty did not switch at all (i.e. these group consistently chose 
only the outer prospect along all loss domain tasks) thereby portraying extreme 
risk/uncertainty seeking behaviour. These findings are indications that both under 
risk and uncertainty, participants at aggregate level consider the outer prospect 
more attractive for losses. Again, since the outer prospect is by design more “risky”, 
these choice patterns are possible indicators of participants’ risk and uncertainty 
seeking in the loss domain. 
The main differences between the results of the pilot and the main study was that 
the proportion of participants that violated monotonic switching was higher in for 
the former compared to the latter. In addition, there was more switching within 
subtask in the main experiment. Although these identified differences were not 
subjected to further statistical tests, it is surmised that the incorporation of 
feedback discussed in 5.3.4 in Chapter 5 might have contributed to improving the 
quality of the data. 
Finally, we asked participants to provide reason the main reason that influenced 
their choice of prospects. As presented in Figure 48, about 80% percent mentioned 
the size of the prospects and 3% reporting the mood during the experiment as the 





Figure 48. Participant reasons for choosing (or avoiding) a prospect  
 
In addition, 10% said that they focused mainly on the portions that they desire in 
the gain domain (or dislike in the loss domain) suggesting that these group of 
participants inferred correspondence between the two prospects and possibly 
mapped values across prospect such that for every value in Prospect A there 
assumed an equivalent value in B. 
In summary, the pilot experiment made it possible to identify ambiguous areas in 
the experiment. In addition, the pilot survey enabled the researcher estimate the 
resources and time required for each respondent to complete the experiment. 
